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This thesis examines the policy and rhetoric directed toward immigrants from elite 
municipal actors in Maine’s two largest metropolitan areas: Lewiston and Portland. These cities, 
situated in one of the least diverse states in the nation, have recently seen large changes to their 
demographic makeups. While both share a similar history, in recent years they have diverged in 
terms of their politicians’ policy and rhetoric toward immigrants. The scholarship on immigration 
in the United States suggests that certain factors, such as the levels of economic anxiety present in 
an area, the existence of a so-called “creative class,” and an infrastructure of support services can 
influence how receptive a city’s existing residents may be to anti-immigrant rhetoric. This thesis 
employs a historical institutionalist framework emphasizing critical junctures, path dependency, 
and political entrepreneurship to account for the distinct economic development undertaken in 
Lewiston and Portland since the mid-twentieth century. By analyzing the histories of Maine’s two 
largest cities and the norm-breaking behavior of the former Governor of Maine, Paul LePage, this 
thesis offers an explanation as to why anti-immigrant rhetoric is more salient in certain locales. 
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Introduction 
In her book One Goal, Amy Bass beautifully and poignantly describes the story of the 
Lewiston High School soccer team and its “meteoric rise” to the pinnacle of the sport in Maine.1 
Bass follows this team beginning in 2015, and she highlights how many of the young men who 
made up this diverse squad fled with their families from war-torn countries in Africa to arrive in 
Lewiston. I read this book rapidly and was immediately taken in by the vibrant, ever-changing, 
and, at-times, contentious community of Lewiston that Bass describes.  She notes that Lewiston 
is not the “Maine of blueberry pie and lobster boils, sailboats and the Bush family,” but rather a 
city that had seen decades of economic downturn and, in 2000, had a population where “more 
than half of the city’s families with children under five lived at or below the poverty line.”2 Bass 
eloquently describes the immigration of Somalis beginning in 2001 and paints the picture of a 
small city struggling to adapt in a rapidly globalizing world.  
While the story of the Lewiston High School soccer team emphasizes success over 
adversity and that its triumphs are grounded in diversity, Bass is far from blind to the combative 
political climate present in Lewiston – a climate that is often openly hostile to immigrants. She 
notes such events as the throwing of a pig’s head into a Lewiston mosque, a particularly 
venomous act as pork is forbidden in Islam, and a letter penned by former-Mayor Larry 
Raymond urging the burgeoning Somali population to stop migrating to the city.3 After reading 
Raymond’s letter, I began to read about other Lewiston politicians, and I became suddenly 
caught up in a whirlwind of hostile comments about immigrants used by multiple elected 
officials in the city. The anti-immigrant stance taken by Raymond and others caught my attention 
                                               
1 Amy Bass, One Goal (New York: Hachette, 2018), xv. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid., 60. 
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and furthered my interest in the subject. While not all mayors of Lewiston have espoused 
distinctly anti-immigrant platforms since the arrival of the Somalis in 2001, since 2011, the city 
has repeatedly elected into office mayors who do employ anti-immigrant rhetoric. Why was this 
happening repeatedly? What was the political value of this rhetoric? And, why were voters in 
Lewiston – as evidenced by repeated re-election of mayors who gave voice to this anti-
immigrant sentiment – receptive to this rhetoric? 
In the first chapter of her book, Bass describes the early waves of immigration to 
Lewiston. From the first English settlers to the massive waves of French Canadians who came to 
work in the city’s prosperous mills, Lewiston has been a city defined by immigration.4 But this 
history presented a paradox to me. If Lewiston has been, as Bass describes so eloquently, a city 
built on the backs of immigrants, then how could it become a city in which anti-immigrant 
rhetoric was prevalent among elected officials? 
While certain factions of the community have welcomed the new arrivals from Somalia 
and other parts of the African continent with open arms, the electorate in Lewiston has, over the 
past decade, repeatedly elected into office mayors who spout distinctly anti-immigrant rhetoric. 
Instead of seeing consequences for their actions, politicians in Lewiston have been able to 
maintain their political vitality even after uttering racist, divisive comments. This rhetoric and 
the popular electoral response to it stand in stark contrast to recent history in the city of Portland, 
Maine, Lewiston’s more southern neighbor and Maine’s largest metropolitan area. The vast 
majority of elected politicians in Portland in the twenty-first century have been decidedly pro-
                                               
4 Ibid., 45-46. 
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immigrant and have repeatedly used welcoming language; many have even gone as far as to 
repeatedly bring forward a proposal to give non-citizens the right to vote in city elections.5  
As I began to research into the histories of immigration in both cities, I uncovered a range 
of historic similarities between Portland and Lewiston that only seemed to make their divergent 
recent politics all the more paradoxical. Both are built on the back of many waves of 
immigration; both are cities in which certain of these early immigrant populations experienced 
racism and prejudice; and, both are cities that lost their major, defining industries in the twentieth 
century. And, yet, even with these commonalities, Portland and Lewiston have developed into 
cities with different levels of receptivity to anti-immigrant rhetoric. 
By reading about the rise of anti-immigrant rhetoric in Lewiston I also discovered how 
these comments were mirrored in the election and re-election of Paul LePage to the Maine 
Governorship in 2010 and then in 2014. I argue that LePage’s bellicose, racialized, and ignorant 
rhetoric may explain how certain issues, such as perceived racial or economic threats, have 
become more salient in the cities in question. In short, the goal of this thesis is to examine how 
Portland and Lewiston have developed from cities with similar histories, regarding immigration 
and the loss of industry, into two metropolitan areas where elected politicians espouse very 
different rhetoric and policy with regard toward immigrants and immigration as a whole. 
Ultimately, I contend that the distinct economic pathways pursued by each city has created 
contexts receptive or hostile to anti-immigrant rhetoric, and, the norm-breaking behavior of 
Governor LePage gave cover to local politicians to give public voice to this rhetoric. 
                                               
5 Randy Billings, “Mayor and councilor pushing to give non-citizens the right to vote in Portland,” Portland 




This thesis relies on a theoretical framework derived from the scholarship on path 
dependency and critical junctures. Paul Pierson contends that “outcomes at a critical juncture 
induce path-dependent processes.”6 Path dependent theory highlights that “history matters” in the 
development of institutions, but also that crucial events can create pathways that politicians and 
other elite political actors may follow. These critical junctures are periods during which 
“significant change” may occur, change that has a “fundamental impact on subsequent historical 
dynamics.”7 I argue in this thesis that certain events in the histories of Portland and Lewiston can 
be considered as critical junctures inducing path dependent processes causing a divergence 
between the two cities. While linked, critical junctures and path dependency are importantly not 
one and the same.8 Path dependency is best described as the “reproduction of a critical juncture’s 
legacy rather than the production of the critical juncture itself.”9 I contend that events in the 
histories of Lewiston and Portland further reinforced their distinct paths forward. 
In particular, I argue that the distinct implementation of the Model Cities Program, a 
federal plan part of Lyndon B. Johnson’s Great Society initiative, represents the critical juncture 
that inspired path dependent processes affecting economic development. This critical juncture, 
and further events that reinforced this path, fostered different popular senses of economic well-
being; in Lewiston, where economic anxiety has persisted to far greater levels than in Portland, 
receptivity to anti-immigrant rhetoric has been more prominent. 
                                               
6 Paul Pierson, Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2004), 95. 
7 Jacob S. Hacker, “The Historical Logic of National Health Insurance: Structure and Sequence in the 
Development of British, Canadian, and U.S. Medical Policy,” Studies in American Political Development 12 
no. 1 (1998): 77. 
8 Hacker, “The Historical Logic of National Health,” 76-77. 
9 Ibid., 77. 
 5 
 Much has been written in the secondary scholarship on how economics motivates either 
pro or anti-immigrant viewpoints among a populace. Daniel Tichenor writes in Dividing Lines: 
The Politics of Immigration Control in America that economic booms or declines at the national 
level cannot perfectly explain the introduction of more exclusionary or more welcoming policies 
toward immigrants.10 However, in this thesis, I argue that within the smaller localized contexts of 
Lewiston and Portland the effects of perceived economic adversity can explain the rise of 
support for anti-immigrant platforms. And, other research suggests that these effects are also 
particularly potent if an economic downtown coincides with the arrival of a racially different 
other within a certain area.11 Thus, the fact that the recent waves of immigration into both cities 
are predominantly black African is of particular salience when evaluating why hostility toward 
immigration seems more politically rhetorically prominent in Lewiston than in Portland. To 
make sense of this contemporary situation, this thesis examines the economic histories with 
particular focus on the post-World War II economic downturns and attempts at revitalization 
undertaken in each city to highlight how their levels of economic development and anxiety 
differed. 
 Important as well to the explanation in how a city becomes welcoming to an immigrant 
population is its ability to attract, what scholar Richard Florida has dubbed, the creative class of 
individuals. Florida’s work posits that economic development in the United States is now driven 
by people who work as “scientists, architecture and design professionals, artists and 
                                               
10 Daniel J. Tichenor, Dividing Lines: The Politics of Immigration Control in the United States (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2002), 20.  
11 Jack Citrin, Donald P. Green, Christopher Muste, and Cara Wong, “Public Opinion Toward Immigration 
Reform: The Role of Economic Motivations,” The Journal of Politics 59, no. 3 (1997): 859. 
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entertainment industry professionals,” or in any profession where individuals “earn their money 
by means of creative thinking, designing, and producing.”12  
Florida’s thesis has been critiqued at length with regard to the creative class’ actual 
ability in engendering economic growth. Critiques suggest that “the existence of vibrant 
bohemian neighborhoods was most likely a consequence of economic growth, rather than a cause 
of it.”13 Other scholars have argued that Florida has ignored many “uncreative” cities, such as 
“Las Vegas, Memphis, and Oklahoma City,” who have seen explosive growth in recent years.14 
However, these critiques do not directly trench on the claim in the scholarship that cities with 
greater populations of creative class individuals are more hospitable to racially different 
populations.15 And, it is this claim that bears directly on the analysis undertaken in this thesis. 
Indeed, additional scholarship suggests that a higher population of creative class individuals and 
the institutions that attract them to such an area, such as museums, “cafes, sidewalk musicians, 
and small galleries and bistros,” so-called “third places,” may foster an environment wherein 
cultural capital is increased and racial threat is mitigated.16 Furthermore, the work of Elaine B. 
Sharp and Mark R. Joslyn contends that perceived racial threat is “clearly mitigated [in cities] 
where the new creative class…holds sway.”17 These factors are integral in the support of pro-
immigrant elected officials in contexts where racially different immigrants make up the bulk of 
new arrivals. In this thesis, I examine how Portland and Lewiston have attracted different levels 
                                               
12 Elaine B. Sharp and Mark R. Joslyn, “Culture, Segregation, and Tolerance in Urban America,” Social 
Science Quarterly 89, no. 3 (2008): 575. 
13 Jeffrey Zimmerman, “From brew town to cool town: Neoliberalism and the creative city development 
strategy in Milwaukee,” Cities 25 (2008): 233. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Sharp and Joslyn, “Culture, Segregation, and Tolerance in Urban America,” 575. 
16 Richard Florida, “The Rise of the Creative Class,” The Washington Monthly, May 2002, 21.  
17 Sharp and Joslyn, “Culture, Segregation, and Tolerance in Urban America,” 575. 
 7 
of creative individuals and have developed into cities with different numbers of institutions 
readily offering cultural capital to their populaces. 
 Finally, this thesis looks to the scholarship on the normalization of right-wing rhetoric. 
Matt Golder writes that politicians use “modernization grievances, economic grievances and 
cultural grievances” to garner support for their platforms. By focusing on creating divisions, 
capitalizing on people’s frustrations with their economic standing, and making populations 
harken back to when times were supposedly “better,” Golder argues that right-wing actors are 
able to drum up support for the campaigns.18 This thesis argues that these tactics, as employed by 
former-Governor Paul LePage in Maine, made the continued election of anti-immigrant 
politicians in areas already experiencing higher levels of perceived economic or cultural/racial 
threat more likely. 
 
The Plan of this Thesis 
 To restate, this thesis employs a historical institutionalist framework emphasizing critical 
junctures, path dependency, and political entrepreneurship to account for the distinct economic 
development undertaken in Lewiston and Portland since the mid-twentieth century. It contends 
that the divergent paths help to explain the occurrence of and receptivity toward different 
framing of immigrants by local politicians’ rhetoric and public policy advocacy 
Chapter One begins by surveying the racialization of the immigration debate in the 
United States. Immigration policy is deeply racialized, and consequently, discussion of 
immigration policy is often marked by ingroup versus outgroup dynamics and positions are oft 
influenced by triggers of anxiety. In particular, the chapter explores motivators of economic 
                                               
18 Matt Golder, “Far Right Parties in Europe,” Annual Review of Political Science 19 (2016): 482. 
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anxiety before summarizing two other areas of scholarship important to the broader arguments: 
Florida’s creative class argument, and the dynamics of normalization of right-wing political 
rhetoric. Through these sections, testable explanations are derived that are evaluated in later 
chapters. While many explanations are offered in Chapter One, this thesis does not make an 
effort to test each one; rather, they are included to show the immensity and multifaceted 
discipline that is the scholarship on immigration.  
Chapter Two offers a broad historical survey of Lewiston and Portland in order to 
underscore some similarities in the cities’ development. Specific attention is paid to the 
industrialization of both cities, their shared periods of anti-immigrant sentiment, and the distinct 
waves of immigration to both. In examining these two cities, Chapter Two seeks to situate the 
reader within the specific context and to begin to underline important junctures that may explain 
how and why the two cities have diverged in terms of their politicians’ rhetoric about 
immigrants. In particular, why has anti-immigrant rhetoric thrived, particularly among mayors in 
Lewiston, but been rarely seen in Portland? 
Chapter Three lays out an important critical juncture that may answer this question: the 
Model Cities Programs that were pursued in both Lewiston and Portland. This section employs 
the theoretical framework suggested by Pierson: that critical junctures can produce path 
dependent results, change institutions, and, in this case, influence politicians’ responses to 
immigrants. I argue that the Model Cities Programs in Lewiston and Portland represent the 
important critical juncture that created a divergence between the two cities. Chapter Three details 
funding discrepancies, organizational differences, and differing program development that 
established two distinct economic development pathways taken by each city. This chapter also 
utilizes data from the United States Census Bureau in order to suggest differing levels of 
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economic anxiety between the cities. It contends that the differences between Lewiston and 
Portland’s Model Cities Programs had important repercussions down-the-line for how both 
cities’ populations and politicians would view newcomers.   
Chapter Four delves into the story of economic investment into Lewiston and Portland 
during the 1990s. This chapter suggests that the large influx of capital into Portland, spearheaded 
by millionaire Elizabeth Noyce, aided the city in becoming a regional hub for the creative class 
of individuals with a diverse selection of institutions promoting cultural capital. Noyce is then 
positioned as a political entrepreneur, or a “strategic, self-activated [motivator] who [can] recast 
political institutions and governing relationships” through “singular acts of individual creativity” 
– her consequential vision and material investment reinforced the pathway of economic 
development initially begun by the Model Cities programs in the 1970s.19 It also looks at 
Lewiston and suggests that the lack of such outside funding or political entrepreneur, the city’s 
inability to attract large populations of creative class individuals, and its overall dearth of 
institutions offering increased cultural capital may suggest a greater receptivity to anti-immigrant 
rhetoric. While not a second critical juncture, I contend, in this chapter, that Noyce’s injections 
of capital into Portland and the lack of such development in Lewiston, further reinforced the 
economic development path that the two cities were set on in the wake of their Model Cities 
Programs.  
Chapter Four also applies Florida’s scholarship to the divergent contemporary histories of 
Lewiston and Portland. It seeks to understand the so-called creative class of individuals and 
elucidates links between further scholarship that suggests that a larger population of creative 
                                               
19 Adam Sheingate, “The Terrain of the Political Entrepreneur” in Formative Acts: American Politics in the 
Making, Stephen Skowronek and Matthew Glassman, eds. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
2007): 13. 
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class individuals in a certain locale may create an environment where racial threat is mitigated. 
Employing a path dependent approach, this chapter argues that this second injection of outside 
capital – now from a political entrepreneur – represents a moment that reinforced the pathways 
already initiated by the city’s distinct experiences with the Model Cities Program. The 
opportunity for divergent political rhetoric about immigrant “others” was thereby bolstered.  
Chapter Five is an examination of political rhetoric of municipal actors in Lewiston and 
Portland. I argue that the rise of Paul LePage as governor of Maine created a normalization of 
right-wing rhetoric in the state and heightened perceived economic and cultural threats posed by 
immigrants and racialized others. Building on a scholarship of the normalization of right-wing 
rhetoric from the secondary sources, this chapter examines speeches, campaign platforms, and 
interviews with mayors and city councilors from the two cities to describe how politicians, in 
Lewiston specifically, have exploited the city’s increased economic anxiety to inspire support by 
adopting anti-immigrant platforms. This chapter compares this rhetoric to that used by politicians 
in Portland who have generally not utilized a similar discourse.  
The conclusion of this thesis highlights the main findings from the research, identifies 
areas where further research may be needed, and offers policy suggestions.  
As suggested by the outpouring of support for the victims of the recent terrorist attack in 
New Zealand in Lewiston’s Kennedy Park, even as other political actors across the world 
erroneously link the attacks to increased immigration from predominantly Muslim countries, 
these actions suggest that pro-immigrant sentiment does remain strong in a state and a city 
founded by many waves of immigration.20 However, recent events also highlight deeply racist 
                                               
20 Jon Bolduc, “Janet Mills, state leaders lead vigil in Kennedy Park to condemn New Zealand Killings,” 
Lewiston Sun Journal, March 17, 2019, https://www.sunjournal.com/2019/03/17/governor-state-leaders-
condemn-recent-killings/; Ray Sanchez, “Far-right Australian lawmaker finds himself – literally – with egg on 
 11 
undertones still present across Maine, as evidenced by the anti-immigrant tweets of Waterville’s 
Mayor.21 These occurrences show the vitality and prevalence of this debate in Maine, and this 
thesis serves to disentangle and make sense of the issues at hand. By suggesting the important 
repercussions economic decision making at the local level has on support for immigrant-related 
rhetoric, this thesis contributes to the important topic in question and the ways forward in the 
context of the Pine Tree State. 
 
                                               
his face,” CNN, March 18, 2019, https://www.cnn.com/2019/03/16/asia/australian-senator-fraser-anning-egg-
incident/index.html.  
21 Scott Thistle, “Republican Party’s anti-immigrant tweets anger Portland mayor – and Republican Senators,” 
Portland Press Herald, March 16, 2018, https://www.pressherald.com/2019/03/15/tweets-from-maine-
republican-party-draw-criticism-from-portland-mayor-ethan-strimling/.  
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Chapter One - Literature Review 
Introduction 
The arousal of anti-immigrant policy action, and political rhetoric is complicated; there is 
no specific path in terms of how municipal politicians begin to exhibit a certain hostility to 
newcomers. Indeed, myriad explanations account for anti-immigrant political rhetoric, policy, 
and public opinion. While this thesis acknowledges the breadth of this discipline, the research 
question remains as follows: how have Lewiston and Portland’s differing histories of economic 
development and recent economic situations played a role in present-day municipal politicians’ 
views and professed policy and rhetoric toward immigrants. This chapter is divided into five 
sections that position the reader within the existing scholarship on immigration and ways in 
which politicians may adopt either anti or pro-immigrant policy and rhetoric.  
In Part One of this chapter, I examine the racialization of the immigration debate in the 
United States. In tracing the development of immigration within the country, this first section 
gives the reader a necessary background for the examined case studies where these issues of race 
and immigration exist. Part Two offers the reader an overview of the pertinent secondary 
scholarship on outgroup versus ingroup dynamics; giving a necessary background as to how and 
why different groups may perceive a threat from the “other.” In Part Three, I look at the 
literature on economic threat and how differing levels of economic anxiety in a community may 
have repercussions on how their respective politicians frame immigrants in either a positive or 
negative light. This section provides a pivotal testable explanation in this thesis: that an 
economic downturn in an area coupled with the arrival of a racially different other creates an 
environment in which people, and ergo politicians, are more likely to support anti-immigrant 
policy and rhetoric. Part Four of this chapter examines the work of Richard Florida and his 
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creative class thesis. In examining Florida’s scholarship on economic development and the 
potential of a city’s politicians to be more or less welcoming to immigrants, this section creates 
links to previous discussions of economic threat. In Part Five, I suggest how right-wing rhetoric 
has been normalized in the context of the state of Maine, has magnified threats at hand, and how 
such a normalization has created a space in which political actors adopting anti-immigrant 
viewpoints are able to be elected and remain in office.  
While a cultural narrative of inclusion often defines a national ethos in the United States, 
there is also a longstanding history of federal and state policy grounded in exclusion. Such 
practices have been motivated by a combination of factors over time and some have become 
more salient in recent years. Therefore, it is imperative to examine how anti-immigrant political 
standpoints develop in a country where political elites and ordinary citizens alike employ the 
cultural narrative of the welcoming immigrant while simultaneously endorsing covert and overt 
hostility to immigrants. By examining scholars’ work on how anti-immigrant hostility might take 
root, a framework to examine specific cities in Maine and to suggest which factors account for 
hostility toward immigrants can be developed. 
To that end, this chapter begins by offering a brief overview of the construction of race 
and the related “othering” of the immigrant in U.S. politics that can be dated at least to the mid to 
late-nineteenth century. Understanding the racialization of immigration remains integral to the 
full comprehension of the dynamics that exist in the U.S. today at both the local and federal 
level. It is also empirically relevant given that the vast majority of more recent immigrants to the 
state of Maine are racially different from much of the native population. By understanding the 
genesis of the racialization of immigration in the United States, this section serves to 
contextualize later discussion. 
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By exploring how perceived cultural or economic threats may be lowered in certain 
cases, this chapter engages the work of Richard Florida and examines the power of the creative 
class of individuals and their effect of changing the political leanings of a city. By discussing 
Florida’s and other scholars work, this section seeks to understand how certain industries, 
cultural institutions, or other opportunities may attract a certain type of individual to a city. 
While acknowledging critiques to the work of Florida, this section posits that the presence of 
such individuals positively influences the local economy and also create environments that are 
more welcoming for a racialized immigrant other.  Later chapters look to the different economic 
development histories of Lewiston and Portland and their ability to attract the creative class. This 
section posits that different levels of economic and cultural development may have an effect on 
how a city’s politicians and populace view an immigrant “other.” 
By grappling with the economic and cultural threats sometimes associated with the 
presence of immigrants, this chapter then seeks to connect these concerns with the scholarship on 
political rhetoric in the United States. By examining how and when more extreme political views 
are “allowed” in local contexts, this section seeks to understand when anti-immigrant platforms 
may resonate more fully with a community.  Using explanations derived from the literature on 
political rhetoric, this section proposes hypotheses that explain the election, continued success, 
and presence of municipal politicians with certain policies in the examined case studies. 
The purpose of this chapter is to situate the reader within the discussion of immigration in 
the United States and to examine scholarship linked to the specific cases studies in subsequent 
chapters. In focusing on issues that apply to the situations in Portland and Lewiston, this chapter 
offers testable explanations that can be used to examine policy and rhetoric in both cities. While 
wide-ranging in its breadth, this chapter shows the complexity and interconnected nature of 
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immigration issues in the United States. It is necessary to approach this discussion from a wide 
lens in order to comprehend the origins of the immigration debate within this country. However, 
this project’s specific focus is a qualitative approach to the professed policy and rhetoric 
developed by political elite in Lewiston and Portland. Chapter Two details the immigration 
histories of the two cities and highlighting certain and events and actions that begin to suggest a 
critical juncture between the two areas.  
Certain testable explanations that arise in the literature delve too far into questions of 
sentiment or individual feelings and are thus outside of the scope of the project and this thesis 
has no intention of testing each of the explanations derived from the literature. However, they 
remain in the broader literature review as they highlight important schools of thought within the 
wider discussion of immigration in the United States. This chapter will highlight certain testable 
explanations that will be applied to the case studies in further chapters to suggest how anti-
immigrant rhetoric and policy arises in Lewiston and Portland. 
 
1. The Construction of Race and the Immigrant Other 
In her book In the Shadow of Race, Victoria Hattam traces the discursive development of 
racial and ethnic divisions as well as how discourse surrounding immigration has changed since 
the mid-nineteenth century in the United States. She offers a framework and timeline that 
elucidates the development of race, the creation of the concept of ethnicity, and the associated 
exclusionary immigration tactics derived from both. The scholarship surrounding racial and 
ethnic divisions offers important insights into how race has been constructed and how 
immigrants have been defined as the “other” in political discourse in the United States. 
 Hattam begins by discussing race in terms of the work done by Jean-Baptiste Lamarck, 
whose work became the prevailing view in racial science in the nineteenth century. The 
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distinguishing feature of Lamarck’s work was the belief that there existed a “notion of 
heritability of acquired characteristics,” or the idea that “all human behavior could, over long 
periods of time, become habitual and ultimately heritable.” Lamarck’s idea of race suggested that 
“religion, language, nationality, and even institutions and social practices could become part of 
one’s genetic makeup.”1  
Lamarck’s hypothesis had an important effect of changing prevailing notions of race in 
the nineteenth century. While some debate existed, scholars agreed that there was a distinction 
between the “historic” and “natural” races. These natural races were believed to line up with 
specific areas of the globe and could match up with the widely-used nineteenth century color 
classifications of race: “Black, White, Red, and Yellow.” The definitions of historic races were 
more similar to what are now classified as nations. “Americans, French, and Germans were all 
considered historic races,” as scholars of the time argued that their once diverse populations had 
been slowly molded into “common bloodlines” over the passing of many years.2 Important to the 
definition of such historic races was the belief that such factors as environment and geography 
had a direct influence on their formation.  
The Lamarckian concept of race also laid the groundwork for the idea of “race 
superiority,” or the belief in an innate hierarchy among races from different regions.3 Building on 
Lamarck’s concepts, the sociologist E. A. Ross argued that there was a “race superiority” among 
different historic races, and that only races that had inhabited “great cities” for extended periods 
of time could possess the increased mental capacity and social functions derived from the 
                                               
1 Victoria Hattam, In the Shadow of Race, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 24. 
2 Ibid., 25. 
3 George W. Stocking, “Lamarckianism in American Social Science: 1890-1915,” Journal of the History of 
Ideas 23, no. 2 (1962): 249. 
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Lamarckian concept of inheriting acquired characteristics.4 Ross’ theory highly valued the 
Western European civilizations surrounding the Mediterranean and placed such races at the top 
of the proposed ranking.  
 Hattam highlights how these early discussions of race “did not refer to ethnicity or ethnic 
groups;” rather, scholarship in the mid to late nineteenth century was framed in terms of 
“scientific and historic races” instead of the more recent categories of “ethnicity and race.”5 
Consequently, she posits that “tracking the shift from the language of ‘historic races’ to that of 
ethnicity” can help us understand how the world has functioned over the course of history and, 
most importantly, how the U.S. has arrived at its present assumptions about immigrant and racial 
difference. The examination of the development of the definition of race and ethnicity can help 
make sense of how the U.S. has manufactured an infrastructure of identity difference and the 
construction of the immigrant “other.” 
The Lamarckian views of race and heredity began to break down with the rediscovery of 
Gregor Mendel’s work on genetics, and scholars began shifting away from the hypothesis that 
social and biological factors were closely linked. The writing of William Ripley exemplifies the 
shift toward accepting the disjunction of race and such cultural factors as language. He wrote that 
while “nationality may often follow linguistic boundaries...race bears no necessary relation 
whatever to them.”6 In his writing, Ripley moved away from the Lamarckian notion that race and 
environment were closely linked. The concept of race, which had once been an open border 
where “racial transformations [accompanied] geographic locations,” was now developing into 
defining stricter boundaries between nation and race.  
                                               
4 Edward A. Ross, “The Causes of Racial Superiority,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and 
Social Science 18, no. 1 (1901): 77-78. 
5 Ibid., 27; Hattam, In the Shadow of Race, 25. 
6 William Zebina Ripley, The Races of Europe: A Sociological Study, (New York: Appleton, 1899), 17. 
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Due to this shift, political elites began to worry over how to bind together the fabric of a 
nation if one’s race was not simply derived from a physical location.7 With the agreed upon loss 
of race as the binding glue of a nation, Mendelian concepts of heredity forced social scientists to 
redefine what it meant to be part of a nation. Nationality was no longer determined merely by 
“place, blood or allegiance,” rather it became a more complex notion, breaking away from the 
simplistic definitions of historic races.8 While scholars such as Richmond Mayo-Smith were 
optimistic about the assimilationist powers of the U.S. – noting the success such effects had on 
even the strongest “national peculiarities and habits” – the worry over preserving the Anglo-
Saxon stock of the nation became particularly salient with the mass migrations to the U.S. 
beginning in the late nineteenth century.9  
With the creation of a dividing line between race and nation, the question arose of how to 
bind together different races into a cohesive polity.10 During this time period, as immigration to 
the U.S. increased, scholars began to use the terms “foreigner” and “alien” to frame their 
examination of immigrants, altogether distancing themselves from previous notions of race. This 
created their own separate classification among scholars, apart from a race or a nation, in essence 
creating them as an “other” in U.S. society. 
Immigration thus became defined as a “question” or a “problem,” as this subset of aliens 
was deemed to pose a direct threat to the continuity of a nation. John Hawks Noble, another 
scholar of the time, defined the onslaught of immigrants as a “danger.” Noble regarded the 
newcomers as having “habits of thought and behavior [that were] radically different from those 
                                               
7 Hattam, In the Shadow of Race, 25. 
8 Richmond Mayo-Smith, “Assimilation of Nationalities in the United States,” Political Science Quarterly 9, 
no. 3, (1894): 426. 
9 Ibid., 431. 
10 Hattam, In the Shadow of Race, 40. 
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which the founders of the nation hoped to establish,” making them dangerous to the vitality of 
the country.11 Scholars began to propagate the idea that such immigrants were “unfit to be 
adopted by the community” already present in the U.S., and that they posed a threat that would 
only grow more potent as this “foreign” and “alien” class began to grow.12  
Immigration law and policy in the nineteenth century began to reflect these ideas of the 
immigrant as a racial “other” and thus a potential threat to national unity. This so-called 
immigration problem triggered laws and policies that created the idea that while immigrants 
were welcome under certain circumstances, they were considered as a distinct subsection of the 
U.S. population. Indeed, the country’s political tradition, while defined by an aspirational 
“allegiance to liberal democracy,” is often best understood as plagued by “exclusionary 
ascriptive beliefs” of which this late-nineteenth century emergent racialized “immigrant 
problem” is a clear manifestation. Rogers Smith argues that politics in the U.S. has been marked 
by “complex patterns of apparently inconsistent combinations of the traditions” of liberal 
democracy and white supremacy. His writing posits that policy and rhetoric in the U.S. is not a 
product of the high and mighty ideals articulated by the Framers; rather, it must be understood 
that U.S. political rhetoric and policy is the “product of often conflicting multiple traditions.” 13 
Consequently, exclusionary rhetoric is not antithetical to the U.S. cultural identity; rather, it is 
part of a longstanding tradition. 
The Chinese Exclusion Acts of the early late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries are 
excellent examples of such conflicting traditions. These laws banned the immigration of Chinese 
                                               
11 John Hawks Noble, “The Present State of the Immigration Question,” Political Science Quarterly 7, no. 2, 
(1892): 231. 
12  Ibid., 233. 
13 Rogers Smith, “Beyond Tocqueville, Myrdal, and Hartz: The Multiple Traditions in America,” American 
Political Science Review 87, no. 3 (1993): 562-564. 
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into the U.S., but never restricted birthright citizenship as it was “enshrined in common law” 
thanks to United States v. Wong Kim Ark (1898). Smith points out that the path of such acts 
speaks to the existence of the multiple tradition’s thesis in the U.S. The laws “maintained a 
valued inclusive feature of American law” in the form of birthright citizenship, and, at the same 
time, the reduction of the Chinese immigrant flow “fully satisfied the increasingly powerful 
champions of Anglo Saxon supremacy.”14 This again suggests that the political tradition in the 
U.S. has been marked by such a dichotomy; exclusionary policies and rhetoric are not 
antithetical to being American, rather they are a distinct part of the country’s identity. 
An examination of the history of immigration and citizenship law suggests that race and 
culture were the most important factors defining who was allowed to enter the U.S. and who was 
allowed to become a citizen.15 These laws and policies “sought to cultivate an Anglo-American 
identity within the United States through the law.” The passage of the national quotas system in 
1924 further entrenched the creation of racialized politics and the hierarchical nature of twentieth 
century conceptions of race and ethnicity.16 Consequently, immigrants from Northern European 
countries were offered the largest quota. This policy introduction showed that U.S. politicians 
were unafraid of showing their commitment to preserve the country’s “European stock.”17 
Hattam argues that scholars began to focus intensely on assimilation. Many began to 
argue that “immigrants were not dispersing throughout the nation,” rather they were forming 
“alien colonies” that would lead to “disorder and crime.”18 Such clusters of foreigners presented 
an intense threat in the eyes of political elites to the maintaining of the Anglo-Saxon institutions 
                                               
14 Ibid., 560. 
15 Anita Ortiz Maddali, “The Immigrant Other: Racialized Identity and the Devaluation of Immigrant Family 
Relations,” Indiana Law Journal 89, no. 2 (2014): 657. 
16 Ibid., 658. 
17 Ibid., 659. 
18 Hattam, In the Shadow of Race, 42. 
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that were supposedly integral to the nation’s unity. Early twentieth century scholarship was also 
marked by the view that the new immigrants of the late nineteenth century were different than 
those who had come before. They were perceived to be of lower classes and of different 
mentalities than the earlier Northern European immigrants who became the dominant force in the 
country. Scholars such as Madison Grant articulated the threat in warning of the dangers of lower 
classes of Europeans spoiling the country’s “Nordic blood.”19  
The belief arose that such newcomers posed a serious threat to “native Americans,” in 
that their increased infiltration and proliferation would lead to a devastating loss of the nation’s 
identity. Grant argued that the new bodies of immigrants from Italy, Slavic nations, and Ireland 
were “racially incompatible” with the existing racial identity of the U.S.20 Motivating the writing 
of Grant and other social scientists was the fear that intermarriage would have dire consequences 
for the nation’s racial purity.21  
Hattam describes how scholars of the age pointed to the need for assimilation policies. 
The perceived importance of such initiatives exemplifies both the racialization of immigration 
law and policy by the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as well as how policies began 
to take shape that positioned newcomers as not only different but threatening. Their racial 
differences and the fact that many of the new immigrants to the U.S. came from countries or 
cultures that had previously not contributed to the population of the pre-existing country, 
exacerbated the belief that the newcomers were different and incompatible with the system and 
culture in place. 
 
                                               
19 Madison Grant, “The Racial Transformation of America,” The North American Review 219, no. 820 (1924): 
348. 
20 Ibid., 349. 
21  Ibid., 352. 
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2. Outgroup versus. Ingroup Dynamics: The Immigrant as the “Other” 
The perceived threat of the “other” is a motivator for political rhetoric and public policy 
actions throughout history. The creation of inter-group anxiety is a particularly strong factor and 
it can increase the potential for virulent rhetoric, and, in extreme cases, violent actions. One 
needs to look no further than the late-twentieth century Rwandan Genocide to see the awful 
power of intergroup anxiety and how the threat of the “other” can be perceived in dangerously 
extreme ways. As immigration law and policy developed in the latter stages of the nineteenth 
century, this belief that immigrants constituted a “foreign,” “alien,” or “other” population 
became more entrenched.  
While immigration is woven into the “racial and cultural mosaic” of our society, the 
anxiety of change brought by newcomers is an occurrence that has played itself out again and 
again over the course of U.S. history.22 The “otherness” of such immigrants and the fact that 
many come from diverse cultural backgrounds, dissimilar to the supposed Anglo-Saxon/Nordic 
hegemony, poses a perceived threat in the eyes of some to the integrity of the nation. Citizens in 
a host country feel threatened as they are concerned about “negative outcomes for the self,” and 
potential intergroup anxiety may be particularly salient if one is ignorant of the immigrants’ 
different customs.  
The literature suggests that citizens will feel more threatened by immigrant populations 
who are racially different from themselves. A study conducted by Ted Brader, Nicholas A. 
Valentino, and Elizabeth Suhay highlights that citizens in examined U.S. states feel more 
                                               
22 Walter G. Stephan, Oscar Ybarra, and Guy Bachman, “Prejudice Toward Immigrants,” Journal of Applied 
Social Psychology 29, no. 11 (1999): 2223. 
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threatened by Latino immigration, not European immigration.23 This hypothesis is directly in line 
with the discussion of the development of racial overtones in U.S. immigration policy and law. 
As the overall immigration population became more heterogeneous, political elites reacted in 
ways that attempted to protect the nation from the threat of the “other:” in this case the racially 
distinct immigrant. 
Much of the research on people’s reactions toward immigration is rooted in Herbert 
Blumer’s theory of group position. Blumer, in looking at relationships between whites and 
blacks, made the important theoretical advancement that fear of the “other” would exacerbate 
when differences between groups became more salient through conflict.24 Blumer’s work also 
offers important insight into when the threat of the “other” may be less potent. He argues that 
when events of racial conflict or differences are not expanded upon by political elites into “big 
events,” potential adverse images or the perceived negative differences will be less salient.25 
When political leaders, or the leaders of a certain in-groups or out-groups, actively work toward 
crafting rhetoric with the goal of “racial harmony,” Blumer posits that intergroup anxiety will 
lessen.26 However, if politicians exacerbate a perceived racial threat from an “other,” continued 
support from the population may increase. 
The sense of threat of the “other” can be lowered in what scholars call the social contact 
hypothesis. While equal group status is difficult to define, animosity between groups can be 
decreased if “both groups expect and perceive” that they are on a level playing field. Common 
                                               
23 Ted Brader, Nicholas A. Valentino, Elizabeth Suhay, “What Triggers Public Opposition to Immigration? 
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25 Ibid., 7. 
26 Ibid. 
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goals offer ways for groups to come together around a “goal-oriented effort.” For example, 
Thomas Pettigrew argues that these may manifest themselves in the form of sports teams or other 
group activities. Intergroup cooperation must be “independent from intergroup competition,” and 
can be achieved through two differing groups of people coming together in the form of solving 
problems in a classroom setting or other public arena.27 Support of authorities, law, or custom is 
also integral, as with “explicit social sanction, intergroup contact is more readily accepted.”28 
This theory of structured contact offers important insight into when immigrants and native 
communities may avoid the negative effects caused by “othering”. If local politicians explicitly 
support and condone cultural differences, the work of Pettigrew and Blumer suggests that the 
fear of the “other” will subside. 
The literature on out-group anxiety offers several testable explanations for how and when 
political actors in certain cities may employ either exclusionary or inclusionary rhetoric and 
policy. Racial differences certainly play their role as an explanation for the existence of 
exclusionary rhetoric toward an out-group and the feeling of anxiety among in-group members. 
For example, Brader et al. supports the claim that racial differences between immigrants and 
citizens in a host city can explain certain anti-immigrant reactions. While these expectations are 
grounded in perceptions of racial difference or histories of conflict between groups, there are 
also other factors that may inspire or quell anti-immigrant reactions. For example, the contact 
hypothesis put forth by Pettigrew offers insight into situations where animosity may be lessened. 
If communities experience equal group status, work to common goals, have intergroup 
cooperation, and are given support by persons in authority, in-group anxiety may be lessened. A 
                                               
27 Thomas F. Pettigrew, “Intergroup Contact Theory,” Annual Review of Psychology 49, no. 1 (1998): 65. 
28 Ibid., 65. 
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combination or existence of several of these testable explanations can explain when and if anti-
immigrant stances may emerge.  
 
3. Economic Threat 
In his canonical text on immigration policy in the U.S., Dividing Lines: The Politics of 
Immigration Control in the United States, Daniel Tichenor argues that “economic forces are 
unquestionably significant for immigration policy making.”29 He contends that political elites in 
the U.S. have, for centuries, seen the economic potential of allowing in immigrants as a valuable 
source of labor in order to fuel the country’s economic development. Tichenor also posits that 
during period of economic downturn, “immigrants can become political scapegoats for a host of 
societal woes.”30  
While he does not deny their influence, Tichenor argues that economic booms or declines 
cannot always perfectly explain immigration policy and the introduction of exclusionary policies 
towards immigrants. He employs the example of the Immigration Act of 1917 as a restrictive 
policy toward immigrants that was enacted during a time in which the U.S. saw “sharp increases 
in GDP and low unemployment.”31 Similarly, he cites the legislation passed under President 
Jimmy Carter that increased the “total annual immigration roughly 10 percent;” a policy that was 
enacted during a period of economic stagnation in 1979-1980. Based on this and on other cases 
used by Tichenor in his writing, he suggests that the model of economic causation is far from 
perfect. 
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30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid., 21. 
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However, Tichenor’s assumptions have some limits. His focus is on a national scale, and 
while he does admit that economics play a large role in the shaping of immigration policy in the 
U.S., he does not attempt to tackle the issue at the state or local levels. As this thesis addresses 
policy and rhetoric at the more local scale, the question must be asked as to how, when, and why 
economic factors may influence policy on a smaller level. The literature suggests that while the 
economic model may be imperfect at a national level, the perceived economic threat posed by 
immigrants at a local level is a salient factor causing increased receptivity to anti-immigrant 
policy and rhetoric.  
The existing literature highlights the question of whether policy decisions and rhetoric are 
caused by factors such as job competition, large tax burdens, or “dimming financial prospects.”32 
The research does support the claim that some of these factors alter responses to newcomers. 
Most salient is the power of pessimism about the national economy as a motivator for anti-
immigrant responses; however, this claim is open to “ambiguous interpretations” of what 
constitutes an economy in distress.33 While the economic causation model is far from perfect, 
there are certain testable explanations that can be applied to cases. 
One such explanation is the theory of scapegoating which contends that perceived 
economic adversity “acts as a trigger for the displacement of anxiety and anger onto minority 
groups.” In simpler terms, it suggests that when times are bad or when “there is less to go 
around,” people are unlikely to share societal benefits with those who exist outside of the 
perceived ingroup as they will begin to blame outgroup members for their hard times.34  
                                               
32 Jack Citrin, Donald P. Green, Christopher Muste, and Cara Wong, “Public Opinion Toward Immigration 
Reform: The Role of Economic Motivations,” The Journal of Politics 59, no. 3 (1997): 859. 
33 Ibid., 876. 
34 Ibid. 
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The literature suggests that the most powerful motivator of a “rational fear of competition 
over scarce resources” is the belief that immigration will have “economic consequences,” 
independent of the current economic situation.35 If there is a period of economic downturn, the 
literature suggests that we should see a blaming of the “other” in a society, which in more cases 
than not will be the minority immigrant population. Additionally, the scholarship also suggests 
that while economic downturns do play a role in opposition to immigration, if increased levels of 
economic anxiety are coupled with the arrival of a racially different immigration population, the 
perceived threat and opposition may be even higher than simply in times of economic duress.36 
This explanation is integral to this thesis and is examined in more depth in coming chapters. 
The power of the perceived economic threat is also exacerbated when media use 
economic or cultural anxiety in any framing of policy concern. The use of the perceived 
economic or cultural threat can greatly increase people’s propensity to support anti-immigrant 
policy and rhetoric. As news media and politicians have begun to focus more on immigration 
related issues, the support of anti-immigrant populism has grown.37 However, the literature 
suggests that the use of an economic threat posed by immigrants was not as significant a 
motivator as when media used the wording of a perceived cultural threat.38 If media propagates 
information about immigrants in terms of economic threats or cultural differences or if they 
publish political rhetoric highlighting the same threats, we will expect to see a rise in support of 
anti-immigration policy and political rhetoric.  
                                               
35 Ibid., 876-877. 
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While the literature does not discount the motivating economic fears that immigrants will 
take jobs or create a drain on the economy, twenty-first century immigration policy and rhetoric 
has been intensely motivated by racial prejudices as well. This claim is supported in the literature 
by a study looking at the enactment of anti-immigrant legislation after the Great Recession as 
there is a “clear relationship” between the financial burdens felt by states and the increased 
“restrictive/punitive immigration policy enactment across the American states.”39 The authors of 
the aforementioned study make the important point that states experienced changing 
demographics during this same time frame. The data suggest that the growth of the Latino 
population has played a large role in the increased restrictive immigration policy across the U.S. 
This theory supports the power of the racialization of immigration policy and perception in the 
country. While economic pressures do play a role in the enacting of more anti-immigrant policy, 
their impact “must be considered alongside the growth and presence of 
racialized...populations.”40 
This research posits that if economic fear motivators are present – such as the fear that 
immigrants will create job competition or if the economy is on a serious downturn – and if the 
immigrant population is of a different race from the dominant white culture in the U.S.,  the 
arousal of anti-immigrant rhetoric will be present and potent.41 If an economic downturn occurs 
in conjunction with the arrival of a racialized “other” group of immigrants, we should expect to 
see an increased presence of anti-immigrant policy and rhetoric. 
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Even though scholars have continually downplayed certain roles of economic factors in 
the production of support for anti-immigrant policy and rhetoric, studies do support the claim 
that specific economic factors do play a role in the arousal of such hostility. On more local scale, 
less-skilled workers in a community “are significantly more likely to prefer limiting immigrant 
inflow into the United States.”42 This is a statistically “robust” result that has important 
implications, as the data suggest that areas with higher populations of low-skilled workers will 
be more in support of exclusive policy and rhetoric, while areas with higher levels of high-skilled 
workers will be more open to more liberal and inclusionary policy.43 
An important consideration highlighted by the literature is also whether or not 
immigrants and natives work in the same or different industries. While it has already been 
suggested that less-skilled workers will be more wary and more fearful of an increased flow of 
immigrants, further scholarship also contends that if “immigrants tend to work in the same 
industries as a particular subgroup of natives” the negative effects of newcomers’ arrivals will be 
exacerbated.44 High “immigrant share” industries are identified to be in “low-wage 
manufacturing jobs” such as in apparel, miscellaneous manufacturing, and textiles. Additionally, 
jobs in “private household services, hotels and motels…and transportation services” are also 
identified as being arenas in which the economic threat posed by natives and immigrants 
working in close quarters may be magnified.  
This explanation is also closely linked as to what kind of skill-level immigrants both high 
and low-skilled respondents in a host country are receptive to. The literature suggests that 
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respondents of both skill levels “strongly prefer high-skilled immigrants over low-skilled 
immigrants.”45 If a state or locale is taking in many high skilled immigrants, there will be a 
dearth of restrictive policies. While not examined in further chapters, this explanation suggests 
the power of perceived economic threat in causing increased receptivity to anti-immigrant 
rhetoric. 
The research also points to the power of public finances and their ability to influence 
support of anti-immigrant rhetoric and policy. In states and cities with “high fiscal exposure,” 
“poor natives” are much more likely to be opposed to immigration.46 When an “overcrowding” 
of public services is perceived to occur, anti-immigrant policy and rhetoric may flare up. Closely 
linked to the theory of scapegoating is the belief that immigrants pose a significant burden on the 
public services offered by either the municipal or federal government. Jeffrey Passel and Michael 
Fix contend that this issue has developed into “the most hotly contested question in U.S. 
immigration.”47 Jens Hainmueller and Michael J. Hiscox note that the belief that immigrant 
groups are posing a burden to the financial health of a locality or are simply freely benefiting 
from programs in place are serious motivators for the arousal of anti-immigrant policy and 
rhetoric.48 Based on this tax burden hypothesis, if there is a perceived “negative assessment” of 
the costs of immigration on publicly offered services, opposition to immigration will rise.49 This 
explanation is integral to this thesis and is examined in more depth in later chapters. 
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The economic threat here is thus not perceived on an “economic self-interest” level, as 
such concerns over more individual threats are largely discredited, rather the literature supports 
the explanation that the threats to services offered by a city or state may be more powerful. If 
immigrants are perceived to be taking advantage publicly offered services, there will be an 
increased opposition to their presence. However, if a city or state has fewer visibly offered public 
services, support of anti-immigrant rhetoric or policy may be lessened.  
Among these publicly offered services, the topic of welfare has emerged as the most 
powerful motivator of anti-immigrant sentiment among the populace and policy and rhetoric 
from elected leaders. In a study conducted in the United Kingdom by Christian Dustmann and 
Ian P. Preston, concerns over welfare were associated with negative changes in public opinion.50 
While it is not the goal nor within the bounds of this thesis to research public sentiment, the 
thoughts and feelings of a populace have effects on the adopted policy and rhetoric of municipal 
politicians. The findings of Dustmann and Preston suggest that concerns of welfare burdens are 
potent motivators of anti-immigrant sentiment among a populace. This finding is robust as it is 
in-line with multiple other studies that have identified welfare concerns as an integral motivator 
of anti-immigrant feelings, which leads to anti-immigrant policy and rhetoric.  
 
4. The Presence of a Creative Class 
This section examines the scholarship of Richard Florida and his explanation for differing 
paths of economic development in cities in the United States. Florida’s work contends that the 
major factors influencing economic success have recently changed. While cities with robust 
manufacturing options, massive corporations, or large firms were once seen as the gold standard 
                                               
50 Christine Dustmann and Ian P. Preston, “Racial and Economic Factors in Attitudes to Immigration,” The B.E. 
Journal of Economics Analysis and Policy 7, no. 1 (2007): 26. 
 32 
in fostering economic vitality, Florida posits that other sites, attractions, and institutions now 
create the driving force behind cities’ economic opportunities. He states that “museums, art 
galleries, and concert halls, as well as high-end shopping districts and bohemian artist enclaves,” 
and diverse recreation opportunities now represent attributes that attract a highly educated and 
desirable workforce known as the “creative class.”51 His central thesis suggests that the presence 
of persons of this creative class within an urban area can attribute to that locale’s economic 
growth.  
Building on Florida’s scholarship and other related pieces in the secondary literature, this 
section puts forth testable explanations as to why Lewiston and Portland have experienced 
different levels of economic development. By highlighting these explanations, this section 
contends that the presence of creative class individuals can lower economic anxiety indicators, 
create a more welcoming diverse environment, and, in turn, create a space in which anti-
immigrant is not tolerated – thereby incentivizing politicians to put forth pro-immigrant policy 
and rhetoric. 
This creative class is defined as persons who work as “scientists, architecture and design 
professionals, artists and entertainment industry professionals,” among other professions, and as 
a large presence of “gay, foreign born…[or] artistically creative bohemians” in a certain area.52 
While somewhat loosely defined, the creative class can be considered as individuals who “earn 
their money by means of creative thinking, designing, and producing,” rather than by more 
traditional business or manufacturing methods.53 Florida contends that urban regeneration and 
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economic development are now driven by the presence of such persons with higher levels of 
education and by cities that have the institutions necessary to attract such people to their 
locales.54  
 Florida writes that the conventional wisdom in economic theory held that urban 
development was driven by “companies, firms, and industries” located in specific cities. 
Previous scholarship focused solely on the location of large industries or companies as 
motivators for economic development; however, community partnerships, vibrancy of 
neighborhoods, and the presence of certain cultural institutions creating an attractive city culture 
were largely ignored. In redefining the scholarship on urban development in the United States, 
Florida contends that “human capital” has a large amount of influence on such processes and that 
“economic and lifestyle considerations both matter” in how a certain area experiences an 
economic upswing.55 This goes directly against the older concept that the presence of a large 
business alone would contribute to a city’s economic rise. The work of Florida and others 
suggests that the presence of other institutions that can attract the creative class of individuals is 
necessary.  
 While he does not fully rule out the presence of major industry or companies as a 
motivating factor, key to Florida’s thesis is the idea that this newly defined creative class does 
not merely choose their city of inhabitation solely by the industry or well-known multinational 
corporation, but rather they choose “cities that match their tastes and interests” outside of purely 
the professional atmosphere.56 In this way, Florida’s concept builds on the work of Richard 
Putnam and his social capital theory.  
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Putnam contends that “regional economic growth is associated with tight-knit 
communities where people and firms form and share strong ties,” Florida’s research suggests that 
these processes may actually inhibit growth.57 Through his interview process, Florida noted that 
his subjects were more in search of a “quasi-anonymity,” where they could exist with relatively 
weak ties to a greater community.58 This suggests that economic development potential may now 
be more potent in areas lacking outdated social structures that are more exclusive, “restricting, 
and invasive.” While once thought to be beneficial, Florida posits that these structures create 
larger barriers to entry and effectively “shut out newcomers.”59 
Florida contends that economic development is stronger in areas with “inclusive and 
socially diverse arrangements” that allow for inhabitants to feel a sense of community but not be 
burdened by the same past restrictions placed on people, especially those in minorities who could 
not easily gain access to the same communities. Places with weaker ties and fewer strict 
community structures are more “open to newcomers and thus promote novel combinations of 
resources and ideas.”60 This suggests that cities with fewer exclusive community structures and 
an acceptance of new forms of social interaction will more readily experience economic growth 
due to the presence of creative class individuals.  
Florida builds on the human capital theory that contends that people, not companies, are 
the driving force behind economic development. He adds to this principle by introducing his own 
creative capital theory. Florida posits that creative people, as a distinct class, are most 
responsible for the economic growth of a region and that they choose areas based on certain 
attributes and attractive qualities. In this way, he explains that cities are not arbitrarily chosen as 
                                               





creative class destinations; rather a series of attributes factor into becoming an attractive location 
for this class.  
 
4.A Attracting the Creative Class 
The genesis of Florida’s concept began during his time at Carnegie Mellon University in 
Pittsburgh, a city with historically strong ties to manufacturing and industry, but an area that had 
seen its fair share of young professionals leaving – preferring instead to relocate to cities such as 
Austin, Boston, San Francisco, or even smaller, lesser-known urban areas. Florida states that 
cities like Pittsburgh, who have spent in vain large quantities of money to create more attractive 
downtown options for large, creative-oriented business, have lost out to other cities away from 
traditional economic hubs.61 He notes that cities such as Pittsburgh, with rich histories of 
manufacturing and industry, tend to become “trapped by their past” and are “unwilling or unable 
to do what it takes to attract the creative class.”62 This suggests that if a city has a long, storied 
history with a defining industry, it may be less likely to quickly adapt and formulate a plan to 
attract creative class individuals. 
While some cities, such as Chicago, have been able to maintain both a traditional 
industrial economy and new creative class of individuals based solely on the city’s immense size, 
Florida’s scholarship examines why other, smaller, less well-known cities have recently become 
hubs to the new development. This work ties directly into the further examination of Portland, 
Maine, as to how and why a small city on the East Coast has seen economic development 
increase in recent years, even though it lacks and has even lost major industry and manufacturing 
jobs that once supported the city’s economy.  Florida’s work suggests that simply the building of 
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new office space, the renovation of older buildings, and the attraction of major companies cannot 
solely explain the rise of cities in the twenty-first century. While this has taken place in Portland 
and in Lewiston, this thesis seeks to elucidate differences in the two city’s development.  
Florida contends that places become centers for the creative class for many reasons. He 
posits that if cities have “low entry barriers for people” and are able to make newcomers feel 
quickly “accepted” by the city’s culture, they will more easily attract members of the creative 
class. This ties into the aforementioned discussion of whether or not a specific city has the strong 
and exclusive community structures that defined certain areas in the past. Exclusive structures 
such as an ethnic-group making up the majority in an area or a city focused on a certain industry 
may suggest higher barriers to entry for newcomers. Florida terms cities that are able to quickly 
adapt and welcome newcomers as “plug and play communities;” areas where “anyone can fit in 
quickly.”63  
Key to a city being seen as “accepting” is the presence of a diverse populace. Florida 
suggests a link between his scholarship and that of Gary Gates who focuses on the “location 
pattern of gay people.”64 Both the work of Gates and Florida suggested a large overlap on cities 
with high percentages of creative class members and areas with high numbers of gay individuals. 
Florida writes that “talented people seek [environments] that are open to differences.” In such 
communities, people are exposed to a variety of different family backgrounds, cultures, and other 
sources of inspiration needed to drive forth an economy. “Visible diversity” can aid an area in 
becoming a hotspot for creative class individuals.65  
                                               




Florida notes that diversity remains important to the creative class in terms of 
entertainment and recreational options and not solely racial or sexual diversity of an area. 
Important to the attraction of this class is the presence of a diverse selection of choices for 
nightlife, arts, and other various forms of entertainment and recreation. A creative class-
attracting city is not one with many chain restaurants and big-box stores near its downtown. 
Florida also contends that this new driving economic force of individuals prefer “participatory 
recreation over passive, institutionalized forms.”66 He notes that the creative class is particularly 
attracted to cities that can offer a “teeming blend of cafes, sidewalk musicians, and small 
galleries and bistros.”67 Through the presence of such institutions and activities, they are able to 
seek the “stimulation” they desire and continue to interact in more modern, less structured forms 
of interaction.  
The work of Florida suggests that for cities to attract creative class individuals, they must 
have a diverse set of cultural, recreational, and entertainment offerings outside of merely 
employment that can attract individuals. Based on this scholarship, if a city has “a solid mix of 
high-tech industry, plentiful outdoor amenities, and an older urban center” that retains some of 
its historical charm, the population of creative class individuals will increases thus injecting an 
economic lifeblood into the respective city.68  
 
4.B Creative Class Members and Immigration 
This thesis’ central focus remains to examine how and why politicians in Lewiston and 
Portland have developed remarkably different rhetorical platforms in terms of their stances 
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toward recent immigrants. It is important to discuss the links between the work of Florida on 
creative class individuals and the effects that the presence of such a population can have on the 
overall tolerance and political leanings of an area. This section examines the links between such 
scholarship and examines how the presence of a young, diverse, group of individuals 
participating in the creative economy may welcome newcomers and a racialized “other.” 
The work of Elaine Sharp and Mark Joslyn suggests a correlation between areas with 
more creative class individuals and higher levels of racial tolerance. As the immigrant 
communities most recently arrived in Maine are primarily areas in Africa and are of a different 
racial background than the majority of the native residents, the work of Sharp and Joslyn remains 
highly relevant in this context. The previous work of Sharp suggests that there exists a 
relationship between cities with large populations of creative class individuals and a different 
view on “urban politics and policy making,” than cities of the more traditional mindset, again 
underlining the claim that the presence of creative class individuals may drastically change the 
political atmosphere of a city.69 
Building on this previous scholarship, Sharp and Joslyn find “dramatic evidence” that 
cities with larger percentages of creative class individuals are likely to experience lower levels of 
perceived racial threat. White persons living in such contexts can “experience a higher level of 
minority-group presence without the racial threat dynamic taking hold than can whites living in 
cities with traditional subculture.”70 This ties into the work of Florida suggesting that cities with 
large populations of creative class individuals are markedly different in terms of economic 
development, culture, and, as suggested by the work of Sharp and Joslyn, how they perceive and 
react to a racialized “other.” 
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This scholarship contends that if a city has higher percentages of creative class 
individuals, the respective city’s electorate may support, and subsequently vote into office, 
elected officials who do not espouse anti-immigrant rhetoric and policy. As stated by the work of 
Florida, creative class individuals look to relocate to cities wherein diversity remains a core tenet 
of that city’s professed culture. Candidates who do not proclaim these values as core to their 
campaigns are unlikely to succeed in cities where this new political culture has taken hold. 
 
5. Normalization of Right-Wing Rhetoric 
As our current political climate has changed dramatically over the past decade, one of the 
most noticeable changes is how certain “formerly taboo subjects and expressions” are now 
entering mainstream discourse. Ruth Wodak defines this phenomenon as the rise of 
“normalization” of certain rhetoric in the political sphere. She posits that the limits of what is 
acceptable has shifted and that both our conventional rules and what we permit as acceptable 
political discourse has drastically changed.71 Rhetoric and or action that was once regarded as a 
politician’s downfall has now become permissible and even heralded by the voting public. 
Wodak grounds her claim in the rise of right-wing populism in Western politics, and her 
examination of the development and consequences of this trend brings to light certain more 
salient issues in the local context.  
This section highlights explanations for how such rhetoric has been normalized and it 
examine this type of discourse’s implications on a state-level. It also works to elucidate links 
between the origins of such normalization and the already mentioned sources of economic and 
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cultural threat as they both affect anti-immigrant rhetoric. This section seeks to tie these sources 
together in an effort to synthesize the extent of the testable explanations set forth in this chapter. 
Furthermore, it offers testable explanations for how the normalization of right-wing rhetoric can 
have repercussions at the city-level in the state of Maine.  
 
5.A Rise of Support for Right-Wing Actors 
 Populism is defined by a belief that there exists a corrupted, elite political class who are 
at direct odds with “the people.” Populist politicians attempt to situate and portray themselves as 
the only actors capable of truly representing “the people’s’” wishes in the political sphere.72 
Populists create an “us vs. them” dichotomy in their rhetoric and seek to exacerbate divisions to 
drum up support for their own viewpoints.73 This is evident in both left-wing and right-wing 
populist rhetoric, as both sides claim to represent the wishes of the people against the power of 
the all-powerful elite. However, right-wing populists add another nuance to this definition. Many 
politicians who consider themselves members of this school of thought choose to assume that the 
people they represent are “culturally homogenous” and that they are at risk of being overrun and 
sullied by the “others,” mainly immigrants and minorities, whom they paint to be supported by 
the corrupt, political elite.74 By infusing this vehemently xenophobic rhetoric into their speeches 
and campaign platforms, right-wing populists show their differences from left-wing political 
actors.   
 Right-wing actors define the population they represent in clear terms and make no 
mistake in creating stark divisions between native residents and the “other,” or the threat that 
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poses a large problem to the continued success of a country. In this way, the literature on the 
normalization of right-wing rhetoric ties into the aforementioned discussion of outgroup anxiety 
theory. As previously stated, if political actors employ a rhetoric of racial threat and exacerbate 
differences among communities, the research of Herbert Blumer suggests that support for anti-
immigrant policy will expand. Inversely, if politicians work toward creating “racial harmony,” 
Blumer posits that support for anti-immigrant rhetoric will decrease.75 The work of Blumer 
suggests that as right-wing populists gain more traction and explicitly state anti-immigrant 
positions, their words may drum up more continued support for their policies within a local 
context. 
Thomas Greven also notes that right-wing politicians also tactically use “negativity” in 
their discourse. Greven argues that they throw out “political correctness;” preferring instead to 
declare immigrants or other minorities as enemies of the people through the use of over-the-top, 
sometimes violent, rhetorical devices. This allows right-wing actors to “allow the staging of 
calculated provocations and scandals” and the exacerbation of minor issues into hot-button 
topics. Due to their brazen provocations, Greven also notes that their discourse is often picked up 
by media outlets and given greater prominence in the news cycle, furthering the reach of their 
previously hidden viewpoints. He posits that this is directly connected to the rising “market 
demands” for media, the seemingly never-ending news cycles, and the need for click-bait 
headlines.76 
The mainstreaming of anti-immigrant, racist rhetoric and professed policy of the right-
wing populists has occurred in large part due to the “politics of provocation.”77 This provocation 
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has led many newly powerful populists across the globe to demand a “witch-hunt” of the “liberal 
elite,” whom they blame for many of the woes of the populace. This tactic of blame has become 
an integral part of the mainstreaming of right-wing discourse. The central claim to this argument 
has been defined as the “pitting [of the] ‘the people’ against an out-of-touch elite.”78 This elite is 
portrayed as a “parasitical class” that seeks to only further enrich themselves at the expense of 
the downtrodden people.79 This is suggested by Trump’s repeated saying that he represents the 
“silent majority” within the United States. While not necessarily a radically new statement in the 
United States’ political discourse, Trump has brought this phrase back into the limelight. 
 It is important again to stress that this tactic has not been used solely by the right-wing 
populists across the globe; rather, liberal politicians have used similar methods. Bart Cammaerts 
argues that the rhetoric of “99% vs 1%” surrounding the Occupy movements created a divide 
between the people and the greedy capitalist system. However, Cammaerts contends that the 
methods of division used by the populist right have not used words that create “inclusive 
equivalences,” rather they have been articulated in much more exclusive and divisive manners.80 
By highlighting the exclusive themes and content in right wing rhetoric, clear connections can be 
seen between these rhetorical devices, the psychological scholarship on outgroup anxiety, and 
the way politicians create in-groups and out-groups in order to induce divisions. 
While Cammaerts writes extensively on Dutch and Flemish national identities, he posits 
that the creation of “the people” as a community remains integral to the creation and 
normalization of extreme right-wing rhetoric beyond the European context. By creating the myth 
that a native population is somehow “better” and “more virtuous” than a group of perceived 
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outsiders, Cammaerts posits that the creation of a “convincing and imminent threat must be 
created.”81 This notion builds off Jacques Derrida’s idea of the “constitutive outside.”82 Derrida 
contends that social relations are born of “the construction of antagonistic relations between 
social agents inside and outside.”83 By creating such a harsh dichotomy, right-wing populist 
politicians create an evil that warrants a fear from the “people.” After the genesis of a fear, 
politicians then are able to justify “extreme measures and solutions” that are outlined in their 
extremist rhetoric.84 As long as a fear exists, right-wing actors argue that the use of normally 
uncouth rhetoric and policy can be justified  
In his work on the rise of far-right parties in Europe, Matt Golder argues that there are 
three primary motivators contributing to the appeal of far-right parties in the twenty-first century. 
He lists these as “modernization grievances, economic grievances and cultural grievances.”85 
Golder argues that from these factors, one can understand the rise of far-right politicians and how 
their professed policy resounds with the populations that have so recently voted them into power 
across the globe. 
Recent studies point that the far-right’s recent rise to power can be attributed to so-called 
modernization grievances felt by workers across the globe. Golder states that the stereotypical 
scenario that motivates such grievances is the story in which an individual is “unable to cope 
with rapid and fundamental societal change … and turns to the far right.”86 These persons, 
unable to keep up with the rapidly globalizing economy, feel left behind and, as suggested by the 
theory of economic scapegoating, are in search of someone or some group of people on whom 
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they can assign blame. Golder contends that these modernization grievances oftentimes affect 
lower skill workers who are “adversely affected by the shift to a globalized and postindustrial 
economy.”87  
This theory is directly linked to the notions suggested by Kenneth Scheve and Matthew 
Slaughter in the previous section on Economic Threat. While mainly speaking of motivations for 
anti-immigrant positions, Scheve and Slaughter, like Golder, contend that differences in skill-
levels among workers remains a potent reason influencing their political positions.88 These 
workers, who were able to maintain solidly middle-class existences in the postwar economic 
system lack the “human capital” needed to gain access into similar jobs in the newly globalized 
economy. This loss of employment engenders a rising feeling of resentment among populations 
that have been left behind by the changing economy and are subsequently left more open to the 
“simplistic and nativist appeals of the far right.”89   
Golder also suggests that persons in communities that feel left behind by the changing 
economy may also less likely to support mainstream political parties. He posits that persons may 
perceive a certain “inability” among politicians who profess to be part of the entrenched political 
establishment.90 As suggested by this literature, if a political actor utilizes rhetoric or takes 
positions that differentiate themselves from the political mainstream, they may find more support 
in communities that identify as being forgotten by the newly globalized economy.  
In terms of modernization grievances, Michael Minkenberg also posits that the process of 
modernizing the global economy has eroded away at people’s “traditional social and political 
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attachments.”91 With the loss of major industry in cities across the globe and the United States, 
workers, who formerly derived their place in society from identification with a certain job, 
factory, or employer, were left with no structure to bind themselves together either politically 
socially. Minkenberg contends that individuals who remain without their former social glue and 
who feel as though the economy or certain political leaders have left them behind will be more 
likely to be swayed by right-wing rhetoric and candidates that “promise an elimination of 
pressures and a simpler, better society.”92 
Golder posits that economic grievances are also motivating factors in the rise and 
subsequent normalization of right-wing populists and their rhetoric. In times of “economic 
scarcity” or in locales with limited economic opportunities, he suggests that politicians who use 
rhetoric to “exploit...economic grievances by linking immigrants and minorities to economic 
hardship” will see more support for the policies. However, Golder does make the important point 
that “the impact of economic contextual factors on far-right success has been undertheorized” 
and that there is a dearth of literature on the subject.93 He states the high unemployment may not 
always correlate into support for right-wing politicians’ anti-immigrant rhetoric if the labor 
market is so constricted due to “labor market rigidities.” However, Golder does contend that if 
there is a belief that unemployment is high because of immigration, support for right wing actors 
will rise. This suggests that simply looking at unemployment data may create an inaccurate 
depiction of the situation in a certain context. 
While imperfect at certain levels, Golder’s research does remain in line with the 
scholarship on economic threat’s influence on immigration. Citrin et al. state that if there is “less 
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to go around” in terms of a city’s economic opportunities, the propensity to support anti-
immigrant politicians will be higher.94  When combined with the work of Golder, this 
scholarship suggests that if politicians take advantage of an economic downturn in an area and 
blame an immigrant “other” for the woes of the native population, they will see increased 
support for their rhetoric. 
Finally, Golder underlines the power of cultural grievances in support for right-wing 
politicians. He uses the framework of Social Identity Theory to suggest that “individuals have a 
natural tendency to associate with similar individuals.”95 If far right parties or candidates are able 
to highlight the supposed “incompatibility” of a certain new group with the native residents, 
Golder posits that success will follow in terms of support for their platforms. The power of 
cultural grievances has been shown to be an especially potent motivator and a large reason for 
the rise of right-wing parties. Golder does suggest that cultural grievance and threat arguments 
may not function in areas where there exists a “widespread norm against prejudice and 
discrimination.”96 Scott Blinder, Robert Ford and Elisabeth Ivarsflaten posit that anti-immigrant 
politicians will remain unsuccessful in areas where they are not seen as legitimate or viewed as 
contrary to a majority party’s viewpoints.97 
Golder’s three main grievance arguments work to combine the already examined 
secondary literature and seek to put forth combined testable explanations that can explain the 
arousal and persistence of anti-immigrant rhetoric in this thesis’ chosen case studies. 
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5.B Paul LePage and Norm-breaking in Maine 
The rise of Donald Trump and the reformation of the Republican Party into one centered 
around right-wing populism has its roots in former GOP presidents. Ronald Reagan targeted 
“African-American welfare recipients to win northern suburban voters,” and George W. Bush 
played upon people’s unease with gay marriage in order to win election.98 The Obama 
presidency in conjunction with the rising power of the Tea Party movement allowed for right-
wing populist rhetoric to begin to make forays into the Republican mainstream. Trump, by 
repeatedly using phrases such as “illegal immigrants” or “Mexican rapists and murders,” has in 
turn succeeded on playing into the creation of an ingroup vs. outgroup dynamic as suggested by 
Cammaerts. While Trump has certainly thrust these right-wing views into every facet of the 
national media and conversation, the case study of Maine suggests that its former governor 
efficiently espoused formerly taboo right-wing rhetoric from an executive office before Trump 
was elected into office. 
Paul LePage, the former Republican Governor of Maine, has compared himself to the 
current president. Going so far as to say that “[He was] Donald Trump before Donald Trump 
became popular.”99 Like Trump, LePage and other right-wing political actors have seen recent 
electoral success across the globe. The scholarship suggests that the rise of such politicians can 
largely be attributed to the growth of media and the accessibility of said news. 
While “there is little systematic research on why the media adopts the strategies that it 
does,” some scholars contend that as media outlets compete for advertising revenue they are 
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more likely to cover far right actors in an effort to “obtain larger audiences.”100 With competition 
increasing to have larger market shares, media companies have been tempted “to adopt a 
sensationalist black-and-white style and to focus its attention on the more extreme and 
scandalous aspects of politics that are central to the far right’s populist appeal.”101 With 
increased media coverage, Stefaan Walgrave and Knut De Swert posit that media coverage does 
not solely help in terms of expanding a far right candidate or party’s visibility; rather, they 
increase the salient nature of the group’s viewpoints by simply covering their speeches, rallies, or 
campaign platforms.102 Walgrave and De Swert argue that with extended coverage by nationally 
recognized outlets, right-wing leaders are able to exacerbate the support for their party. They 
contend that “steady exposure to news media content [can] have a diffuse influence on attitudes 
and opinions” and thereby whom a voting public is likely to support in an election.103 With an 
increased prominence and reporting on such issues, the media has succeeded in catapulting 
formerly fringe candidate’s opinions into the mainstream thought. 
In terms of the context of Maine, with the help of increased media exposure, Paul 
LePage’s comments gradually brought him further into the mainstream throughout his candidacy 
and his term as Governor. Articles such as a 2016 piece in the New York Times entitled “How 
Controversial is Paul LePage? Here’s a Partial List” allowed for his comments to be dispersed 
throughout the state and the country. As suggested by Walgrave and De Swert, by simply 
commenting on such issues, the New York Times and other papers allowed for his rhetoric to 
become part of the mainstream dialogue. Further chapters of this thesis argue that LePage’s 
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election allowed for the normalization of his, as put by Wodak, “formerly taboo” rhetoric and 
professed policy. This thesis posits that his election and time in office allowed for issues such as 
severely racist, anti-immigration, and anti-immigrant viewpoints to become part of the quotidian 
discussion among lawmakers and citizens in the state of Maine. LePage’s time in office and the 
comments he made during this period allowed for the repeated election of Robert Macdonald and 
the saliency of his statements on immigrants in the city of Lewiston. 
 
Conclusion 
  This chapter has offered explanations as to how and when political actors may adopt 
either pro or anti-immigrant rhetoric or policy decisions. The research suggests that a nuanced 
approach must be taken to understand how such decisions are made. From this chapter, the 
immensity and complexity of the immigration question in the United States can be understood.  
Consequently, while there is a large breadth of testable explanations put forth by this 
chapter, this thesis will test only those that can be observed in the available data and can be 
answered within the boundaries of the question that this thesis asks. To restate, the goal of this 
thesis is to examine how economic development and cultural differences between the cities of 
Lewiston and Portland can explain the very different framing of immigrants in local politicians’ 
policy and rhetoric. The chapters to follow seek to verify these explanations with available data. 
As suggested by this chapter, the scholarship for how and when anti-immigrant policy and 
rhetoric is highly interlinked, and further chapters elucidate links between multiple sections of 
the existing scholarship. 
 Chapter One highlights the racialization of the immigration debate in the United States 
and then embarks on a detailed explanation of economic and racial factors that contribute to the 
rise of anti-immigrant policy and rhetoric from municipal politicians. Integral to this chapter is 
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the concept that differing levels of economic anxiety and the racial identity of a new group can 
play a large role in the framing of immigration in the local political context. Important as well is 
the work of Richard Florida which suggests that certain factors, populations, or events in a city’s 
past may make it more hospitable toward members of the creative class, and therefore experience 
more economic success and mitigated effects from the arrival of a racially different “other” in 
their midst. Finally, this chapter highlights how political rhetoric has changed over the past 
decade and how, as Golder suggests, politicians are capitalizing on cultural, economic, and 
modernization grievances in efforts to create stark divides between populations. Important to 
take away from this chapter is that the exacerbation of anti-immigrant sentiment is not the direct 
result of solely perceived economic or racial threats; rather, it is an amalgamation that engenders 
municipal politicians to adopt certain positions. 
 Through the understanding of these concepts, this thesis moves into an historical 
narrative of Lewiston and Portland in Chapter Two. By focusing on each city’s economic and 
immigration histories, this chapter seeks to highlight areas where the testable explanations 
derived from Chapter One may be applied. The following chapter serves as a narrative through 
which important events and decisions are highlighted – events and decisions that are explored in 




Chapter Two - Narrative History of Lewiston and Portland 
This chapter explores Maine’s immigration history and how different waves of 
newcomers, over the past 150 years, have been received by persons already resident in the state. 
It pays particular attention to how differences in religion, language, and culture present in 
specific cities have contributed to the rise of anti-immigrant policy or rhetoric. This chapter 
traces the economic histories of Lewiston and Portland in an effort to shed a light on the 
divergence in municipal politicians’ rhetoric between the two cities. By examining the 
immigration and local history of Maine and of its two largest metropolitan areas, this chapter 
highlights similarities between the two cities and also bring to light ways in which the areas have 
diverged over the past 25 years. This chapter is broken into three sections. The first part is a brief 
overview of Maine’s earliest populations and how original European settlement began. The 
second part concerns the history of Lewiston and its waves of immigration. The third part is an 
examination of Maine’s largest city: Portland. 
Within the discussion of Lewiston, particular attention is paid to the Franco-American 
and Somali communities in this area and how each group was treated upon arrival. It seeks to 
underline the city’s anti-immigrant past and the perceived threat that these newcomers have 
posed to people already resident in the area. This section highlights the economic fortunes of 
Lewiston, and how these factors have played a role in immigration and reaction to immigrants in 
the area. It concludes by discussing the conflicting political movements present in the city today, 
with an eye toward suggesting case studies of particularly important moments of junctures that 
help to explain how each city has trended in distinct directions in terms of its political rhetoric 
and policy toward immigrant populations. 
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The third section on Portland describes the city’s early settlement and population growth. 
It then looks to the sizeable Irish community in Portland and the discrimination faced by this first 
major wave of immigration into the city. This part of the chapter pays particular attention to the 
economic situation in the city and it describes how the city’s fortunes have importantly changed 
over the past 25 years. After the economic discussion, it describes the most recent arrivals to the 
city from racially diverse backgrounds and looks at recent developments with regard to policy 
and rhetoric directed toward immigrants from Portland’s municipal politicians  
This chapter finishes with a conclusion that highlights events and junctures present in 
Chapter Two that prove important in understanding how Lewiston and Portland have developed 
different trajectories in their urban policy and the rhetoric of their politicians. By bringing these 
specific cases to the forefront, this chapter puts forth a plan for the subsequent chapters to 
explain how and why these cities have responded differently to immigrants. Parallel but different 
events in the cities’ institutions, economic fortunes, and elections suggest a divergence over the 
past 25 years. In other words, Chapter Two sets the stage for deeper examinations in later 
chapters and offers context to examine the critical junctures that explain the divergence of 
immigrant-related policy and rhetoric in Lewiston and Portland. 
Using these junctures, the chapter sheds light onto the origins of difference in political 
rhetoric and professed policy from the two cities’ politicians. The conclusion again gives the 
reader indication as to the importance of the following case studies, and how the testable 
explanations derived from the literature examined in Chapter One can be applied to these two 




1. Maine: A State Built on Immigration 
 Maine, much like the rest of the United States, has been built on the backs of various 
waves of immigration. Its immigration history began with the earliest occupants of the American 
continent who migrated across the Bering Strait and traversed vast territory to begin to populate 
what would become Maine. This area’s first inhabitants were Native Americans of the Wabanaki 
Confederacy who bound together to “decide mutually advantageous policies, and to better deal 
with Iroquois threats from the west.”1 Maine’s native population was first threatened by 
European coastal explorations in the sixteenth century, and subsequently in the early-seventeenth 
century the first trading post was established by the English in coastal Maine. The arrival of 
English and French traders in the more northern parts of the territory signaled the fall of the 
Native American population, and the state’s original inhabitants were quickly reduced in 
numbers due to war and disease.2 
 Conflicts between the French and the British reached a breaking point with the French 
and Indian War in 1763 and followed with the subsequent expulsion of the French from New 
England. The lack of French influence in eastern and northern Maine opened up much more of 
the state to settlement and the area was settled by mainly English colonists. This first major push 
into the state’s interior brought with it the first major wave of immigration into Maine and 
defined the state’s Yankee Protestant hegemony for much of the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries. However, as this chapter further explains, changing economic conditions and 
international events brought with them new waves of immigration and different peoples into 
Maine from the middle of the nineteenth century to the present day. 
                                               






2. Lewiston’s History 
Up until the latter portion of the nineteenth century, Lewiston and its environs had 
changed little in terms of demography, population size, or industry. It was a community centered 
around agriculture that had seen very little expansion since its original incorporation as a 
settlement by the first Europeans, mainly people of English ancestry. The city’s overall 
population was merely 900 people in 1800, and it took another decade to raise the population by 
another 100.3 However, the advent of the Civil War and the years leading up to this great conflict 
brought with them rapid change, expansion, and new arrivals to the city. In 1819, Michael Little 
made the first forays into harnessing the Androscoggin River’s potential, and he established a 
site on the banks for a “carding and woolen mill.” Following Little’s construction of a small 
factory, larger industry began to follow.  
Soon afterward, a group of local men founded the Great Androscoggin Falls, Dam, Lock 
and Canal Company and began to investigate the possibility of constructing an establishment on 
a much larger scale that what had been seen before in Central Maine. However, they lacked the 
expertise and capital to fund and fully plan such a project. Changing tactics, they renamed their 
business the Lewiston Water Power Company and began to work to attract the money of 
important East Coast businessmen by selling shares in said company. Investors recognized the 
manufacturing potential of the Androscoggin River and by the 1850s the Lewiston Water Power 
Company “owned most of the land, the mill sites, and the rights to the river power.”4 By the eve 
of the Civil War, a number of mills had been established on the banks both by the original 
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company, spearheaded by the Boston industrialist Benjamin Bates, and by companies who had 
leased spots and built mills of their own.  
The start of the Civil War created an industrial boom in Lewiston, as the millowners had 
cleverly stocked up southern cotton before the first shots were fired in the chance that a conflict 
broke out.5 Due to this shrewd decision making, the mills of Lewiston were able to corner the 
cotton market in the northern states and create sustained economic success that positioned 
Lewiston as one of the foremost economic powerhouses in New England. The lack of cotton 
being exported from the South turned the Lewiston mill owner’s reserves into a valuable 
resource that gave the city an enormous advantage.  
The fast expansion of the mills and Lewiston’s unprecedented economic success created 
a need for labor. The original millworkers were mainly women and children from the Yankee 
community that had settled the city and the surrounding countryside. These Yankees were 
mainly made up of the original English and other northwestern European Protestant peoples who 
had come to settle Maine after the expulsion of the French presence in the late-eighteenth 
century. However, as Lewiston’s economy its need for more workers grew as well. 
 
2.A Growth of the Immigrant Community 
The incredible demand for labor created a draw that was felt around the Northeast and the 
world. Indeed, by 1870, Lewiston’s population had almost doubled from 7,000 to 13,700. Many 
different immigrant groups were drawn to the mills, with the Lewiston School Department 
census of 1913 taking note of families from “American, Irish, French, German, Italian, Greek, 
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Jewish, Polish, Dutch, Belgian, Syrian, Albanian, ‘Canadian’ (indicating Anglo- and Irish- 
Canadians) and ‘colored.’”6  
The first major wave of immigration to the city was “a large influx of Irish” during the 
1840s. These arrivals built many of the canals and mills in Lewiston and took on jobs that were 
seen as unsavory to the Yankee community. However, they were quickly followed by an even 
greater influx from Canada.7 The post-Civil War population boom was the first time that French-
Canadians began to arrive en-masse in Lewiston to work in the mills. In 1870, only a couple 
hundred Franco-Americans lived in the city; however, by 1875 there were over 3,000, and their 
impact on both Lewiston and the surrounding area was unprecedented.8 Their arrival forever 
changed the demography and culture of the city and created a distinctly French flavor that has 
extended into the present-day. The Franco-American presence and their conflicts and interactions 
with the existing community in Lewiston set the stage for the complex immigration history of the 
cities. 
The original Franco-American arrivals were an already “geographically mobile” 
population that had important roots on both sides of the Atlantic and had made journeys across 
both Canada and the United States before coming to Lewiston permanently.9 The first forays of 
French-Canadians into Maine occurred during the early-nineteenth century to work in lumber 
camps.  These original short-term voyages in the state allowed the French-Canadians to realize 
the budding economic potential and opportunities for employment.10 The extension of the Grand 
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Trunk Railroad to reach into downtown Lewiston from Canada, allowed for the quick and easy 
arrival to the area for a multitude of French-Canadian families. Originally the tracks had gone 
directly from Montreal to Portland, bypassing Lewiston, but, in 1874, the completion of a direct 
line into the city from the original railroad, allowed for a link between Canada and the area.11 
Early arrivals were mainly migrants looking for brief periods of work rather than families 
looking to lay down roots for extended periods of time, and many of the early immigrants left 
during any slight economic downturn. However, as the mills became more established, family 
units of Franco-Americans began to arrive in Lewiston. This was a distinct difference from 
similar migrations to other New England mill cities by French-Canadians and was also different 
from other immigrant group arrivals to the area as a whole.12  
Such a pattern of family migration created a vibrant, permanent community of French 
speaking residents who mainly settled in a downtown area of Lewiston positioned between the 
mills’ canals and the Androscoggin River. The arrival of families created a close-knit 
community, and this part of town came to be known as Petit Canada – a group of “hastily built 
tenements” near the city’s centers of industry.13 These early Franco-American immigrants lived 
at levels of extreme poverty and experienced incredibly difficult financial times during their 
early years of living in Lewiston.  
These Franco-American families in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries were 
marked by a traditional patriarchal structure where the men were heads of the household. 
Children of these families tended to begin work in the mills earlier than similar Irish immigrant 
families, and they “were expected to give the bulk of their wages to their parents to support their 
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families.”14 Prejudice against Franco-Americans was often directed at the large size of their 
families and the nature of their religion. As practicing Catholics in a traditionally Protestant state, 
Franco-Americans experienced much discrimination on the basis of their faith. 
 
2.B Early Discrimination in Lewiston 
The city’s first major anti-immigrant event occurred in 1855 with the burning of 
Lewiston’s Irish Catholic-built church by members of the nativist Know-Nothing Party.15 This 
was a direct attack on the sect of Christianity practiced by the Irish immigrants and suggested a 
sense of unease among the predominantly Protestant native residents of the area. The First World 
War and the Russian Revolution of 1917 both acted as “catalysts for widespread anti-immigrant 
feeling” throughout the country, and the Franco-Americans of Lewiston, while having already 
seen opposition to their arrival, experienced increased targeting due to their religion, their 
language, and the fact that they were still relatively recent arrivals to Maine. Due to this increase 
in nativism, the state’s politics in the early-twentieth century were marked by the rise of the Ku 
Klux Klan as a “powerful political force.”16  
The rise of the Klan in Maine originated as a “Protestant backlash” to the growing 
populations of Catholics in the industrial centers of the state.17 By 1925, there were 175,000 
Catholics in the state, a number significantly larger than the sizes of the state’s two largest 
Protestant denominations. As the numbers of French-Canadians grew and became more 
established in the Lewiston metropolitan area, they begin to create a larger perceived threat to the 
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Protestant church’s hegemony in both religious and political institutions. The Klan’s response in 
Maine suggests the perceived potency of such a threat, as the group’s professed goal became to 
keep “Protestant Americans in the lead, not only in number, but in fact.”18  
Their vehement opposition is also in line with concept that the “American” identity has 
been defined by the ascription to a Protestant Christian nationalism. As the Franco-Americans 
practiced a religion other than the predominant school of worship in the United States, already-
established Mainers were motivated to oppose their presence, because they did not fit into what 
was thought of as being the predominant identity. The Franco-Americans and Irish also 
presented a direct affront to the “Protestant’s desire to reassert control over their communities.”19 
Even faced with this discrimination, the early-twentieth century brought with it the first major 
forays of the Franco-American population into Lewiston municipal politics, and thus created a 
continued sense of fear among the predominantly Protestant political elite. 
In 1923, F. Eugene Farnsworth, the King Kleagle of the Maine Klan chapter spoke to an 
audience in Lewiston, where he attacked Roman Catholics and all “hyphenated Americans” and 
gave a speech that focused on how the U.S. “always has been and always will be a Protestant 
nation.”20 While the Klan’s influence in actually engendering real political change was limited, 
the group’s actions suggested the rise of nativism and highlighted the ability of political actors to 
use such factors as cultural and religious threats to garner support.  
Even though the Klan enjoyed limited overall political success, their apogee was in 1925 
with the election of Owen Brewster to the governorship of Maine – a candidate whom they had 
openly supported. Brewster ran on a platform of “defending” the state’s public schools against 
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the threat of Catholic parochial schools. These schools, of which many existed in the Lewiston 
area, utilized a bilingual education curriculum where classes were taught in both English and 
French. While the Brewster and his compatriots were unsuccessful in causing the total downfall 
of parochial schools, as was their goal, supporters of the movement had already minorly 
succeeded in 1919 when the Maine state legislature passed a law “prohibiting children and 
teachers from speaking French in public schools.”21  
The Ku Klux Klan also had little success in preventing the Franco-Americans from 
making a permanent mark on city politics in Lewiston. In 1884, before the rise of the Klan in 
Maine, Dr. Louis J. Martel, a prominent Franco citizen of Lewiston was elected to represent the 
city in the Maine State legislature. More Franco-Americans quickly followed Dr. Martel into 
political office, with members of the group serving as chair of Lewiston’s Board of Aldermen 
and as City Clerk during the late-nineteenth century. While Dr. Martel narrowly lost the race for 
Mayor of Lewiston in 1893, it was not until 1914 that a Franco-American was elected to the 
city’s top office. Robert Wiseman, originally of Stanford, Quebec, became the city’s first mayor 
from the rapidly growing ethnic group, and his election signaled the beginning of an era, 
continuing to the present-day, during which members of the Franco-American community have 
“held the majority of local municipal offices, as well as many at the county and state level.”22 
 
2.C Lewiston’s Economic Downturn 
The end of World War II signaled the beginning of the end for the great mills of 
Lewiston, and the start of what would become a long slide into economic downturn. At the 
beginning of the 1950s, the Bates Manufacturing Company of Lewiston remained the “biggest 
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employer in the state” of Maine and the largest taxpayer in the city of Lewiston; integral to the 
city’s economic lifeblood.23 The first major mill closure came in the mid-1950s with the 
boarding-up of the Androscoggin Mill in Lewiston. This left 1,000 people out of work and 
created the first “downward trend in Lewiston population” since the start of the Industrial 
Revolution in the Twin Cities.24 During this time period, the Maine Central Railroad began to 
significantly cut down on its passenger and freight service to the area – symbolically a major 
blow to a city that had built its success on its access to the state and region’s train network.25 
These events signaled the first failings of Lewiston’s mighty economic engine and the end of 
continued steady migration to the Twin Cities. As the mills began to close and textile 
manufacturing began to move to the south, immigration to Lewiston slowed down and people 
began to move out of the city in droves rather than enter into it looking for work.  
As these major businesses closed up shop and people began an exodus out, local leaders 
searched for ways to revitalize and diversify the area. Bates Manufacturing downsized 
dramatically and switched its production toward the making of high-end bedspreads, rather than 
products for everyday life. City officials created the Industrial Development Department to 
promote the “Industrial Heartland” of Maine and moved toward efforts to revitalize the 
manufacturing potential of the area.26 The endeavors provided Lewiston with some new 
businesses in the realm of light manufacturing, however nothing on the scale that the mills had 
once provided. Lewiston was also a recipient of the federal Model Cities Program whose goal 
was to revitalize urban areas across the country. However, this program was not fruitful in 
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breathing life back into Lewiston’s downtown. Further chapters of this thesis examine the 
repercussions of this program in much more depth. 
Raytheon Inc. briefly opened and then closed a semiconductor plant in the city and other 
smaller industrial operators erected offices or plants in the surrounding area. The two major 
hospitals in the city, Central Maine Medical Center and St. Mary’s, also made important growths 
and established the presence of a robust healthcare economy.27 However, no effort was able to 
match the tax-paying and job potential offered by the 41 separate mills that used to dot the area. 
The 1980s proved to be the bleakest time period for the city and, while recent indicators suggest 
an uptick in the city’s economic health, Lewiston is still the “least wealthy of Maine’s large 
cities.”28 
 
2.D Changing Immigration in Lewiston 
After years of people leaving Lewiston, immigration to the area was forever changed in 
1999. Almost fifty years after the mills first began to close, a group of Togolese refugees were 
settled in the area with the help of Catholic Charities of Maine. Their arrival began an era where 
the very fabric of the community would be permanently changed. While met with some 
hesitation from native residents, this first new group of immigrants were French-speaking 
Catholics who eventually found support from local partners in making connections and 
becoming acclimated to Lewiston.29 While the Franco-Americans themselves had entered into an 
environment where they spoke a language and practiced a religion vastly different from the 
people living in Lewiston in the late-nineteenth, the Togolese refugees shared two of these 
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important pillars with the community they entered, by now predominantly of Franco-American 
ancestry. 
Even though these original Togolese arrivals did share a common language and religion, 
their arrival was met with some blowback. In an article published on December 21, 1999 in the 
Lewiston Sun Journal, the author painted a picture of a city that felt opposed to the arrival of 
newcomers in its midst. It suggested that residents of Lewiston were “uneasy” about the plan to 
settle West African refugees in the area.30 Residents complained about the fact that the city was 
about to welcome even a small number of refugees. A former city councilor was quoted saying 
that he did not know “one person in the general public who supports” the arrival of the Togolese. 
Even though the director of Catholic Charities Maine made it clear that their organization would 
help the refugees and support them financially for the first eight months in Lewiston, the 
community became most upset by the fact that they might have to “foot the bill” for the 
newcomers.31  
The reaction from the community in Lewiston highlights the potential for certain 
perceived threats to elicit anti-immigrant rhetoric. The city, at the end of the twentieth-century, 
was still in a tough economic predicament and lacked the abundance of jobs that greeted the 
Franco-Americans when they arrived a century earlier. As suggested by the secondary literature, 
when a perceived outgroup enters into a society that is experiencing an economic downturn, 
members of the ingroup will be quick to blame the outgroup for economic woes and will be less 
likely to support the sharing of public services or welfare systems. Scholarship also suggests that 
community support may have been lacking due to the fact that the newcomers were also racially 
                                               





different than the majority of the native residents. However, the Togolese arrival merely heralded 
the onset of a new wave of immigration from the African diaspora that would change Lewiston 
completely. 
 
2.E Somali Arrivals 
In the late-1990s, fleeing civil war in their home country, many Somalis began arriving in 
the United States. Originally settled in major urban areas across the country, the budding 
communities became disenchanted with the poor schools and high levels of crime. A significant 
number of Somalis arrived in Clarkston, Georgia, a suburb of Atlanta. Here, they saw “prejudice, 
police brutality and a small community...shattered under the pressure of a broken refugee 
settlement system.”32 Somalis tend “to settle in communities with other Somalis” and after 
Maine was first identified as a potential relocation site, families began to flood in.33 Somalis 
have a history of being a mobile people with “dense kin and clan networks” connected through 
traditions seeped in oral culture and contact. When people first found Portland, then Lewiston, 
and the benefits offered by the state, news travelled quickly throughout the entire Somali 
community in North America.34 
A small Somali community began to develop in Portland during this time period, 
however the city had little “adequate housing” for the mainly large Somali families.35 Portland 
and Lewiston housing officials and Catholic Charities approached Somali families and suggested 
looking northward and taking advantage of the high vacancy rates of large apartments in 
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downtown Lewiston. Originally drawn by the housing opportunities, Somalis across the U.S. 
began to gravitate toward Lewiston because of the quiet streets, low crime rates, and city 
officials who were “willing to work with them.”36  
While identified as a safer and quieter location for settlement by Somali elders, other 
factors also played into Lewiston’s attractive nature for the well-travelled refugees. The Somali 
relocation to Lewiston occurred at an “historical moment when the population decline was at its 
most severe and the availability of housing was respondingly high.”37 The city that the Somalis 
entered was a shadow of the former glory experienced in the area, and they were met with a 
Main Street with many boarded-up doors, a symbol of Lewiston’s economy. 
Mainly by the power of word of mouth, Somalis began to arrive in the community. While 
many have attributed their coming to Lewiston as being directly linked to the state’s more 
extensive welfare benefits as compared to other states in the U.S., research suggests that factors 
such as “increased social control, good schools, and affordable housing” were the main reasons 
the community decided to move to Lewiston.38 Regardless of their reasons, Somalis continued to 
arrive, and the most recent estimates gauge the population at being between 6,000-7,000, out of 
36,000 residents in the city  
 
2.F City’s Reactions 
 The reaction to such a drastic change to the population of Lewiston has been mixed. 
Municipal government and citizens’ reactions in the city presents a divided story, where support 
for the immigrant community has remained strong amidst an equally aggressive anti-immigrant 
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viewpoint. Rumors spread quickly among the economically depressed Lewiston community that 
the Somalis were being given free cars by the city government upon their arrival in the city, and 
a town-hall organized by municipals officers and Somali leaders in 2002 did little to dissuade 
these rumors.39 Soon after this, the Franco-American mayor of Lewiston, Larry Raymond, in an 
“open letter to the Somalis of Lewiston,” asked the greater Somali community to stop coming to 
the city, as it was too stressed financially to handle the arrival of anymore.40 This sparked 
national outrage and had “ripples across the state and beyond.”41 In support of the letter, a rally 
was organized by a radical white supremacist group, however this was overshadowed by a large 
counter-rally in solidarity with the Somali community. 
 Regardless of such outpourings of support for the immigrant community, Lewiston, as a 
city, has moved firmly away from the Democratic stronghold that it once was and further toward 
leaning Republican in state and federal elections. It backed Republican Governor Paul LePage in 
both 2010 and 2014, a candidate famous for threatening to withhold funding to cities that offered 
welfare money to undocumented immigrants.42 More recently, the Lewiston mayoral race in 
2015 again sparked debate over the municipal government’s stance toward immigrants. The 
election pitted the conservative incumbent, former police detective Robert E. Macdonald against 
the young, progressive activist Ben Chin. Macdonald, an opponent of welfare, and famous for 
saying that Somalis “should leave [their] culture at the door,” easily beat Chin in a runoff 
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election.43 The campaign sparked debate on both side of the immigration argument, but 
Macdonald’s win suggested a continued leaning towards a municipal government exhibiting 
more anti-immigrant policy and rhetoric. 
 These events suggest that Lewiston still has a contentious relationship with immigration 
within its boundaries. While people and organizations have risen up in support of the city’s 
immigrant community, municipal political actors have still suggested that they perceive the 
immigrant population to pose a significant threat to the city. Indicators do suggest that Lewiston 
is on the verge of experiencing an “economic and social renaissance,” however the question 
remains how a city, long defined by immigration and years of tough economic times, can adapt 
to this new wave of culturally different immigrants, even as they contribute to this growing 
economy. Further chapters of this thesis seek to examine what factors exist in the Lewiston 
context that make local political actors more willing to adopt anti-immigrant policy and rhetoric. 
 
3. Portland’s History 
 The city of Portland was originally a quiet coastal town; a minor player in an area that 
was part of Massachusetts. The first settlement was established by European fishermen searching 
for fruitful fishing waters and the first charter was granted by King Charles the I of England in 
1639. The settlement, originally named Casco, expanded slowly throughout the seventeenth-
century and was twice destroyed by Native American and then French forces.44 By the end of the 
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American Revolution, the city had a population of 2,240, however, much like Lewiston-Auburn, 
a period of rapid change occurred in the years leading up to and following the Civil War.45  
 At the end of the Revolutionary War, the city of Portland was smaller in size than the 
neighboring towns of Gorham, York, and Falmouth, and it was still a small player in the 
economy of the eastern seaboard.46 However, directly after the war’s final shots, the city began a 
period of unparalleled growth. Portland quickly became “a lively maritime center” with an 
economy centered around the trading of goods with both states to the south and European 
countries. After the state capital was moved to Augusta in 1832, Portland officially incorporated 
as a city and the community’s population hit 13,000.47 By this point, Portland’s commercial 
shipping fleet had grown to become the largest on the east coast. In these days, before the “age of 
steel, timber from Maine was an incredibly important commodity and Portland became a major 
site for its shipment across the country and the world.  The trade of both timber and molasses, 
used as a “sweetening agent and to produce rum,” gave the city great wealth and began to attract 
residents from across the globe. 
 With the expansion of the country’s railroads in the mid-eighteenth century, businessmen 
in Portland became determined to secure the city’s designation as Montreal’s winter port. With 
the icing over of the St. Lawrence River during the winter, Montreal required access to the ocean 
to be able to ship its important agricultural products. In 1845, Portland was chosen by officials in 
Montreal to be the Canadian city’s winter port. With this act, Portland solidified its reputation as 
being one of the East Coast’s most important ports.48 The securement of a constant stream of 
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products, even during the winter months, enabled Portland to continue its steady economic 
growth. Ships frequently docked in Portland’s harbor to pick up shipments of Canadian grain, 
and this steady stream of maritime labor provided a draw for workers.49 
 Following the end of the Civil War, a large fire devastated Portland in the summer of 
1866. It particularly affected the “business and financial sections of Middle and Exchange 
Streets,” however the rebuilding of the city created more space for businesses in the downtown 
areas and created important, larger avenues throughout the center. The arrival of steamships in 
the harbor in the years following the Civil War and the regular railroad service from Montreal 
spurned even more growth, and a budding industrial sector also developed (though never on the 
scale of Lewiston). These healthy economic factors contributed to the rise of immigration into 
Portland, as people from Canada and Europe began to arrive by boat and train to partake in the 
city’s robust economy. 
 
3.A Immigration to Portland 
 Up until the end of the nineteenth century, the majority of the working class in Portland 
came from “rural New England, Ireland, and Canada.”50  A large number of immigrants who had 
arrived in the city around this time were from the Canadian provinces, with French Canadians, 
“second-generation Irish as well as British-born Canadians” making up a large portion of the 
immigrant community.51 However, as time progressed, the Irish made up the largest arriving 
ethnic group from 1870 to 1890, with small numbers of European Jews, Italians, and Armenians 
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arriving as well. Portland did lack the massive manufacturing economy of other cities in the 
United States as it was primarily a maritime-focused economy, and the city proved largely 
“uninviting” to the waves of immigration into the country from Eastern Europe.52 While the city 
lacked the immense numbers of immigrant arrivals prevalent in the U.S.’ more industrialized 
cities, immigration from Ireland in particular continued at a steady rate throughout the nineteenth 
century. By 1890, Portland’s Irish population made up 58% of the city’s residents; other ethnic 
groups, while present, were “negligible” in number compared to the Irish. 
This steady increase in the Irish population can be explained by how, toward the middle 
of the nineteenth century, large steamships began to arrive in Portland more regularly, offering 
steady work to dockhands. This increase in employment opportunities in the city coincided with 
the mass exodus from Ireland in the years following the Irish potato famine.53 Irish immigrants to 
Portland during the latter half of the nineteenth century were mainly from “the poorer western 
regions of Ireland,” and most immigrants to Portland specifically were from County Galway, an 
area where Gaelic was still widely spoken as the lingua franca. These newer Irish immigrants 
were also Roman Catholic, different from the earlier Irish settlers to Maine who were 
predominantly Scots-Irish Presbyterians from Ulster.54 As these newer Irish immigrants both 
practiced a different religion and spoke a different language than the Yankee majority and even 
the older Irish immigrants, a rise in the cultural threat perceived by the residents of the host city 
ensued. Similar to the rise of the Franco-Americans in Lewiston, the increase in the population 
of the Irish Catholic community posed a serious threat to the Yankee Protestant elite who 
controlled the city’s political functions. While the Irish failed to achieve much political headway 
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in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, they did slowly emerge as a powerful 
political force who ruled the city’s waterfront and often won key political battles against 
Portland’s Yankee elite.55 
The continued arrival of Irish, Italian, and Eastern European immigrants into Portland 
during the start of the twentieth century greatly alarmed the leaders of Portland’s city 
government. In 1913, a committee was created in order to tackle the “immigrant-contaminated 
commercial culture of the modern city.” The group was headed by an Episcopal priest whose 
goal it was to combat against the cultural threats posed by Portland’s newcomers. This sense of 
an increased threat only continued with the advent of World War I, which served to exacerbate 
the community’s backlash toward the immigrant population in much the same way as what was 
occurring in Lewiston and at the national level. While the Great War “considerably slowed the 
tide of European immigration,” to many, Portland’s working-class immigrants “challenged the 
Longfellowian image of the city as a sparkling, healthy, seaside vacationland” and in particular 
posed a threat to the major political actors in the city.56 
 
3.B Backlash to Immigration 
 While some members of the political elite did support the immigrant population in 
rhetoric, the actual municipal policy of the city reflected a more exclusionary viewpoint. This is 
suggested by how, in the early-twentieth century, the Portland police “still disproportionately 
arrested the Irish” highlighting a certain amount of racial profiling and viewing immigrants as a 
security threat.57 The perceived “moral and social decay” of the twentieth century, “with the 
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dawn flappers and speakeasies,” the Red Scare, and majors strikes in both the coal and steel 
industries all contributed to a sense in Portland that the city was losing its identity and was being 
poisoned by outsiders, in this case the immigrant population. This general unease, as was similar 
throughout the nation, allowed for the rise of the Ku Klux Klan. The group, just as they did in 
Lewiston, highlighted a rise of nativism in the country and an increased opposition to the 
immigrants within the cities’ boundaries.  
 Speaking to another packed crowd in Portland, F. Eugene Farnsworth gave a speech 
much like the one he gave in Lewiston and directly attacked the city’s Franco-American and 
Irish-Catholic communities.58 The Klan in Portland could count 2,700 members in its ranks, and 
while only in existence and empowered for a few years, they achieved significant political 
success.59 Most important was their changing of the city’s “weak mayor, bicameral legislative 
system for a five-person unicameral council elected by voters at large (not by ward.)”60 Of 
particular concern to the Klan members in political positions was the dangerous effect 
immigrants were having on electing “morally impaired” representatives into city government. 
Concentrations of immigrants in certain areas of Portland gave them increased political voice in 
elections under the old system, and as immigrants continued to flow in and become citizens their 
power only grew. By changing the election process and using city-wide voting and not wards 
electing their own representatives, the Klan achieved its goal of lessening the influence that 
immigrants had on Portland’s governance.  While Portland has since changed in how the city’s 
population is represented, the Klan’s success suggests a conscious effort to disenfranchise the 
immigrant population at this time. 
                                               
58 Robinson, A Concise History of Portland, Maine, 86. 





3.C Portland’s Economic Woes and Future Investment 
As the twentieth century progressed, Portland began to experience a downturn in its 
economic prospects. It “lost its designation as Montreal’s winter port,” an integral part to its 
economy, and the Great Depression hit industry within the city hard.61 While World War II 
offered a temporary fix to Portland’s economic problems, the success was ephemeral, and the 
boost given to the city through the construction of ships and the hundreds of sailors spending 
their money evaporated as soon as the war ended. The city’s commercial port, having lost the 
ability to ship Canadian grain, developed into a hub for oil; an industry that required many fewer 
laborers for its smooth operation. The following twenty years were filled with mixed plans of 
urban rejuvenation and a downtown that had become more blighted by the exodus of middle 
class families to the suburbs.62 The 1960 census found that the loss of industry in Portland and 
the slowing down of the economy had contributed to the fact that many from the “Yankee class” 
had left for the burgeoning suburbs in the years following the war. Due to this exodus, 
“Portlanders of immigrant stock [at that time made up] more than 30 percent of the city’s 
population.”63 
 After years of economic downturn, the city saw its luck change by the mid-1960s. These 
years brought rapid social and political change across the country, and, in Portland specifically, 
signaled the end to the “historic Yankee grip on the city’s political culture.” Portland, once a 
“staunchly fiscally conservative Republican” city also began to change during this time as a 
more liberal City Council came into power supported by Maine Senator Edmund Muskie and his 
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policies.64 The Portland City Council began to change its makeup and by the mid-1960 was 
comprised of both an Armenian-American and a Irish-American who had risen through the 
political ranks as many Yankees left for the suburbs.65 The “broad social and political currents of 
the 1960s” and the exodus to the suburbs created a “new social and political fermentation” 
within the city.66 Republican leaders, who were once opposed to accepting federal dollars, were 
replaced with different leaders who were more willing to work with “local pro-growth 
entrepreneurs and Washington bureaucrats alike.”67 During this time the city was made a 
recipient of the federal Model Cities Program. Further chapters examine the importance of this 
event in more depth. 
Both federal and state money was poured into the city to help redevelop with the goal of 
becoming a “well-clad service [industry] provider.”68 With smart investments, good planning 
and concentrated focus at moving the economy away from the traditional industry focused 
around the waterfront and toward expanding other markets. Unlike Lewiston where city officials 
had tried to woo back more a more industrial-focused economy after the closing of the mills, 
Portland, with the decrease of its power as a port or a railroad hub, embarked on a mission to 
expand and revamp its reputation as being the “gateway to Vacationland.” Portions of Portland’s 
harbor were redesigned and refurbished with the explicit intention of creating a more welcoming 
environment destination for cruise ships in the Atlantic. The city also changed waterfront zoning 
to allow for non-marine businesses to open shop near the docks, creating more opportunities for 
entrepreneurs and offices and slowly decreasing the fishing industry’s presence.69  
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These many thought-out and well-planned changes to Portland positioned it to slowly 
move away from relying on an industrial, maritime economy, and the city began to be defined by 
the New-England charm of its downtown and its burgeoning finance, law, and service sectors. 
Further chapters examine the repercussion of Portland’s economic development in more depth 
and how it plays a role in how municipal politicians frame immigration debates. 
By 1987, Portland had transformed itself into a modern city geared toward tourists. A 
redesigned Old Port district, an international airport, and a revamped highway system allowed 
Portland to regain its status as a popular destination. The city found itself positioned itself to 
attract a younger, more educated crowd as it highlighted the development of its finance, real 
estate, and service economy. An influx of members of the educated creative class has potentially 
influenced how Portland and its politicians respond to the arrival of immigrants in its midst.  
 
3.D Recent Immigration to Portland and Subsequent Reactions 
 While immigration to Portland did slow during the decades immediately following World 
War II, rates of immigration increased in the 1970s and 1980s, drawing “from Southeast Asia, 
Eastern Europe, Cuba, and the former Soviet Union” through major federally funded refugee 
resettlement programs.70 Unlike its neighbor to the north, Portland became a major site for 
immigrant arrivals at an earlier time. This suggests earlier rising levels of diversity in the city 
and a higher familiarity in dealing with immigration-related issues. More recent immigration in 
the twenty-first century has included persons “from Afghanistan, Somalia, Sudan, and other 
African countries.”71 The majority of these refugees have come to Portland due to Catholic 
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Charities Maine an established non-profit organization that works to settle displaced persons. 
During these most recent waves over the past 30 years, the immigrant community in Portland has 
been defined by refugees coming from war torn areas of the globe. Data suggest that in the years 
from 1981 to 2003, over 10,000 refugees have arrived from a total of 23 different countries.72  
These newcomers have also had the important effect of diversifying the population of 
Portland, and 8% of the city’s population is foreign-born, compared to the state average of 3%. 
The influx of more recent immigrants has also lowered the city’s average age to 35.7 years, 
compared to the state average of 38.6.73 These numbers suggest a younger, more diverse 
populace in the city. The boom in immigration has had an immense cultural and economic 
impact on the city, and Portland’s municipal government and its citizens have responded 
differently from Lewiston’s in terms of its reactions toward newcomers. Recent African 
immigrants to the city have been drawn by the state’s General Assistance program, but also by 
the “city’s reputation as a safe and welcoming community.”74  
This reputation is fueled by the fact the Portland has social workers on staff who are 
specially trained to deal with immigrants who are fleeing violence and oppression in their home 
countries. The city’s image is also aided by the important non-governmental organizations in the 
area. Institutions such as the Immigrant Legal Advocacy Project and Catholic Charities have 
aided Portland in creating a welcoming environment for recent immigrants. In another example 
of Portland’s more inclusive recent environment toward immigrants, in 2016, Pious Ali, an 
African-born Muslim was elected to Portland’s City Council. With the election of Ali, a “Ghana-
                                               
72 Vaishali Mamgain and Karen Collins, “Off the Boat, Now off to Work: Refugees in the Labour Market in 
Portland, Maine,” Journal of Refugee Studies 16, no.2 (2003): 113. 
73 State of Maine Department of Labor, Employment and earnings outcomes for recently arrived refugees in 
Portland, Maine, by Ryan Allen. Augusta: State of Maine, 2006. 
74 Tom Bell, “Central Africans become city’s fastest growing immigrant-group,” Portland Press Herald, April 
2, 2012, https://www.pressherald.com/2012/04/02/for-havens-sake_2012-04-02/. 
 
77 
born school board member,” to City Council, the voters of Portland delivered a resounding blow 
to the anti-immigrant rhetoric and potential policy being described by Donald Trump on the 
campaign trail for president.75 
This is also suggested by the protests that occurred in June of 2018, in response to the 
Trump Administration’s proposed immigration policy changes, and over 200 people gathered in 
downtown Portland to make their voices heard.76 Portland’s municipal government’s more 
inclusive policy and rhetoric toward immigrants is also supported by the very recent debate 
within City Hall as to whether or not non-citizens should be allowed to vote in municipals 
elections. This policy would include those who are legally present within the U.S., like asylum 
seekers or refugees.77 Regardless of the success of the policy, it suggests a city with political 




 While this chapter does offer a broad overview of histories of Lewiston and Portland, it 
also crucially sets the foundation to understand the more detailed case studies in the following 
chapters. This chapter has offered brief histories of both cities, described the different waves of 
immigration into each and the subsequent reactions by the community, and also paid specific 
attention to the economic circumstances of both cities. By including this narrative of both cities, 
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this chapter has highlighted both historical factors and recent events that prove important in 
understanding how the two areas have taken different paths in terms of their politicians’ rhetoric 
and policy toward newer immigrant arrivals and the immigration question more broadly. The 
chapter has painted a picture of Lewiston and Portland’s shared historical experience of anti-
immigrant rhetoric and how the two cities have since diverged. A deep understanding of the 
nuanced history of Lewiston and Portland is necessary to the full comprehension of the situation 
in the two cities over the past 25 years. This chapter has summarized the immigrant histories of 
Portland and Lewiston in order to provide context for the following case studies. 
 This chapter has also highlighted an important explanation laid out in the secondary 
literature: that a city with higher levels of economic anxiety and an immigrant population that is 
both racially different and also large in comparison to the existing population will see increased 
anti-immigrant policy and rhetoric. The historical effects of diversification have had the effect of 
making Portland more adept and familiar with people coming from a myriad of different 
cultures. The city has had a slow but steady flow of racially different immigration to the city 
since the conflict in Vietnam. While the more recent influx of African immigration to the city 
has redefined the landscape and presented new issues and opportunities, Portland has had a 
longer history with dealing with immigration issues than Lewiston. Writing in 2003, Vaishali 
Mamgain and Karen Collins note that Portland, in the 22 years prior to their article’s publication, 
experienced arrivals of immigrants from countries around the globe.78  
By contrast, Lewiston remained mainly culturally homogenous before the arrival of 
Somalis in 2001. The 2000 Census noted that of the 36,690 residents of the city, 16,000 claimed 
French Canadian ancestry and only 1,500 identified as non-white.79 The secondary scholarship 
                                               




suggests that politicians and people in a city are more likely to support anti-immigrant policy and 
rhetoric if the immigrant, “other,” population is larger and thus more visible when compared to 
the native residents of a an area. This supports the claim that Portland, with an historically larger 
existent immigrant population and a thus a more visible non-white community, has politicians 
and a voting population that is more supportive of pro-immigrant rhetoric.  
This chapter is also important in the way it traces the economic histories of both cities. 
While the cities share similar immigration histories and anti-immigrant pasts, specifically during 
the twentieth-century, their more recent different economic developments present themselves as 
potential explanations for differences in municipal political actors’ policy and rhetoric. Chapter 
One made the distinction that while the economic model is an imperfect explanation of the 
arousal of anti-immigrant policy and rhetoric on the national scale, scholarship on a local level 
suggests that it may play into political actor’s decisions on the municipal level, when it is 
combined with a perceived racial threat. By detailing the economic history of Lewiston and 
Portland, this chapter has sought to suggest how the two cities development, specifically over the 
past 25 years, has differed in certain ways. In showing the movement in Lewiston toward light-
industry and the healthcare sector/service sector and Portland’s establishment as a major tourist, 
financial, and business destination, Chapter Two has highlighted ways in which the testable 
explanations derived in Chapter One can be applied to the case studies. 
Chapter Two has shown that cities with similar backgrounds in terms of waves of 
immigration and economic histories can diverge greatly with regard to their municipal 
politicians’ policy and rhetoric toward new populations. Chapter Three begins this deeper dive 
into the factors that explain this divergence by examining the history of the Model Cities 
Program in Lewiston and Portland. 
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Chapter Three - Model Cities Program 
This chapter highlights and explains the important economic divergence that occurred in 
Portland and Lewiston after both cities lost their respective major industries. While the two cities 
have recently experienced or are experiencing economic renaissances in their own right, this 
chapter suggests that certain critical events in the history of Portland and Lewiston were integral 
in shaping them into the areas they are today; in the terminology of historical institutionalist 
approaches, this chapter identifies a “critical juncture” that put the economic trajectories – and 
thus the levels of economic anxiety that may affect or even inspire anti-immigrant policy and 
rhetoric – of these two cities on different paths.  
Building on the historical discussion in Chapter Two, Chapter Three situates the reader 
within the decisions made by city officials, the urban planning designed for potential 
revitalization efforts, and the presence and magnitude of outside injections of resources. By 
describing these timelines and detailing the repercussions of events in conjunction with the 
testable explanations derived from the secondary literature on economic threat and its 
relationship to anti-immigration rhetoric and policy, this chapter examines how economic factors 
played a role in the development and saliency of municipal politicians’ rhetoric toward 
immigrants.  
 This chapter employs a theoretical framework derived from the scholarship on path 
dependency and the critical junctures that induce change in institutions. As Paul Pierson writes in 
his book Politics in Time, “outcomes at a critical juncture induce path-dependent processes.”1 
Pierson states that path dependence is the idea that “specific patterns of timing and sequence 
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matter” in how institutions, and in this case cities, develop.2 Moreover, it refers to the “causal 
relevance of preceding stages in a temporal sequence.”3  
Path dependence theory attempts to highlight how “history matters” in the development 
of political institutions and, with regard to the topic of this thesis, how the rhetoric and professed 
policies of certain elected officials in Portland and Lewiston has differed over the years and 
come to be the way it is today. However, path dependence theory is not simply a claim that 
“history matters.” Perhaps more importantly, as Jacob Hacker posits, “timing and sequence” of 
certain events remain integral to the concept as well. These crucial events – events that may be 
“seemingly trivial” in the moment – create pathways that politicians and other elite political 
actors may follow, which can make subsequent choices or paths more difficult to take. In the 
context of Lewiston and Portland, the theoretical framework of path dependency further suggests 
that these specific moments, such as the differing implementations of the Model Cities Program, 
created “distinctive historical route[s]” for both cities.4 With differing levels of capital injections 
and support from City Hall, the events occurring in the time span examined in this chapter 
suggest that the two cities in questions were set on very different paths toward economic 
development.5 
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Pierson makes the case that certain events can lead to “divergent outcomes” even when 
cases in questions have “initially similar conditions.”6 Building on the work done by Pierson, this 
chapter also uses the theoretical framework put forth by Giovanni Capoccia in his writing on 
critical junctures. Similar to Pierson, Capoccia defines critical junctures as “short periods of time 
during which there is a substantially heightened probability that agents’ choices will affect the 
outcome of interest.”7 Using this framework, Capoccia contends that events, which may be 
“exogenous to the institution of interest,” can lead to periods during which “radical institutional 
change may occur.”8 He also contends that “contemporaneous” events have the power to change 
political institutions in years following.9  Capoccia’s scholarship suggests, and is supported by 
the previously examined secondary literature, that changes in the economies of a city can have a 
large effect on its political atmosphere. Pierson also contends that “large consequences” may 
result from “relatively ‘small’ or contingent events.”10 He notes in his work that this goes 
directly against the prevailing notions among the social sciences that only “large” events can 
have “large” outcomes.11  
These ideas are important in order to understand the economic anxiety that may persist in 
Lewiston and Portland and to comprehend how that anxiety may provide a foundation for 
indifference, if not open hostility, toward immigrant communities. While both cities have similar 
institutional structures and similar stories of economic success followed by ruin, the rhetoric said 
by officials who have been repeatedly been elected to high offices, especially the office of the 
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mayor, in both cities is different. In other words, in comparison, certain Lewiston public officials 
have embraced a rhetoric that is far more critical of immigration than their counterparts in 
Portland. This chapter uses the theoretical concepts set forth by Capoccia and Pierson to argue 
that certain contemporaneous events in the cities’ histories had large and lasting effects on their 
political development, that these distinct pathways have contributed to higher levels of economic 
anxiety and instability in Lewiston, and that such economic circumstances may be an inspiration 
of elected actors’ anti-immigrant positions.  
Portland and Lewiston shared periods of intense economic prosperity, anti-immigrant 
sentiment, and lulls in their economies; however, city officials, over time, have occupied distinct 
positions and offered very different rhetoric about immigrant communities. Anti-immigrant 
rhetoric is far more prominent in Lewiston than in Portland. This chapter contends that the 
economic development history and vitality of the two cities can help to account for this 
divergence in municipal politics. It highlights that the different funding and implementation of 
the Model Cities Program in each city was a critical juncture that explains the differing 
development and treatment of immigrants by certain municipal politicians.  
Chapter Three is divided into four sections. The first begins by offering a brief overview 
of the Model Cities Program in the United States. By tracing its genesis and its central tenets, 
this section describes the benefits to the program and how it was designed to help rejuvenate 
cities across the country. An understanding of the program’s function and goals helps to make 
better sense of the following examinations of the Lewiston and Portland case studies.  
The second and third sections delve into a brief history of both cities leading up to the 
introduction of the Model Cities program. They then describe, in detail, the programs in 
Lewiston and Portland. Through the use of city government documents, interviews, and other 
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parts of the secondary literature this section paints a picture of each city’s respective program. It 
seeks to examine important differences between the implementation and success of the 
programs. By looking at different levels of funding, different organizational structures, and 
different physical successes, this section highlights how Model Cities in Lewiston and Portland 
represents a critical juncture in the cities’ economic development and political climate.  
The final section of this chapter examines data from recent economic development 
reports and U.S. Department of Labor and Census to create an accurate depiction of the 
economic fortunes of the two cities from the first major arrivals of African immigrants in the 
1990s to the present day. Focusing on testable explanations derived from the secondary 
literature, this chapter contends that decisions in the economic development histories of Maine’s 
two largest metropolitan areas have had lasting repercussions on how municipal politicians frame 
their rhetoric and policy toward immigrant communities.  
Chapter Three builds on the scholarship discussed in Chapter One by applying certain of 
the defined testable explanations to the cities in question. Of particular salience to the case 
studies of Portland and Lewiston is the explanation that if there is an economic downturn in an 
area, then we can expect an increased chance of anti-immigrant policy and rhetoric.12 This 
explanation is closely tied to the idea that if more motivators of economic fear are present, such 
as the belief that an immigrant population is using more than their fair-share of public services, 
then anti-immigrant policy and rhetoric may increase. This chapter seeks to use both the 
historical economic development of Lewiston and Portland and data on median household 
income and median house prices to test the hypotheses. 
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1.History of the Model Cities Program 
In 1960, the then-presidential candidate John F. Kennedy addressed the country in a 
speech saying that over 17 million residents of the United States went to bed hungry each night. 
This sparked a sudden realization of the “extensive destitution in the richest nation on earth” and 
elicited a widespread outpouring of support to address inequalities in the country and“[to] 
provide greater opportunities for America’s poorest citizens, and [to] rebuild crumbling cities.”13 
Capitalizing on the sentiments inspired by Kennedy, President Lyndon B. Johnson made the 
tackling of such issues a priority during his time in office. He called for an “unconditional war on 
poverty” and decided to specifically focus on urban areas across the country as locales that 
would be the recipients of new programs and funding. 
This focus on combating urban poverty and enabling regeneration helped to spur the 
passage of the Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act was passed in 1966 as 
part of Johnson’s Great Society initiative.14 This act created the Model Cities Program and 
outlined what chosen cities would have to accomplish. It mandated more collaboration between 
“local bureaucracies and human service agencies; the development of new and improved 
community development practices; enhanced infrastructure and development systems; better 
housing, employment, and educational opportunities; reduced welfare tolls; lower crime rates; 
[and] greater participatory democracy.”15 These areas of focus were to be worked on over the 
course of a five year process of implementation. These goals were ambitious in design and were 
certainly not seen to completion in every city that was chosen for the program. After its passage, 
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cities were required to submit proposals to the newly created Department of Housing and Urban 
Development for approval, and in 1969 the first programs began operation.16 
 The program originally had as its goal to fund “approximately 70 cities” across the 
country; however, this number was increased to 150 by the programs’ start in 1969.17 Important 
was the designation of a “model neighborhood” within each chosen city. This area was 
designated the focal point for the program’s actions and the Model Cities committee in each city 
was tasked with addressing the “social, economic, or physical problems” facing the chosen 
zone.18 
The Model Cities Program also had a distinct connection to Maine. The state’s Senator 
Edmund Muskie played a large role in the creation and development of the program. Building on 
his strong record of bipartisan work on environmental issues, Johnson had Muskie save the bill 
as it was floundering in Congress. With Muskie’s guidance and support, the bill was streamlined 
and given “added language to strengthen metropolitan planning and review, emphasize local 
initiative, and ensure citizen participation” in local governments.19 
 With the election of Richard Nixon in 1968 to the presidency, some of the original parts 
of the Model Cities Program were dismantled and its successes in major cities was broadly 
considered a failure. It failed to address issues of “urban unrest” and racial tension in these larger 
metropolises; however, in some smaller cities, it did succeed in creating greater citizen 
participation in local government and engendering stronger communities overall.20 While it did 
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not achieve every single one of its aforementioned greater goals, in smaller cities such as 
Portland, the program engaged the population, revitalized the downtown, and contributed to an 
already “vigorous historic preservation movement.”21 Portland itself emerged as a city reborn 
and was an exemplary model of using the federal funding from the Model Cities Program to 
change its downtown and the community overall. 
 
2. Portland’s Post-War Decline 
 The crest of Portland prominently displays a phoenix rising from the ashes, with the Latin 
word “RESURGAM,” meaning “I shall rise again,” boldly standing out at the top. While these 
additions are most commonly thought of as reference to Portland’s miraculous recovery from the 
multiple devastating fires in the nineteenth century, the phrase also works well as a metaphor for 
how the city has recovered and entered a new renaissance since its post-World War II economic 
downturn. This chapter seeks to dispel the notion that Portland has always been the bucolic and 
somewhat “hipster” city it is known as today. In tracing the choices made by developers and City 
Hall during this time period, this chapter suggests that conscious and planned decisions in 
decades prior resulted in the city that is so heralded today.  
As previously discussed in Chapter Two, World War II brought a temporary boom back 
to the city that had recently lost its designation as Montreal’s winter port. However, a decline 
slowly occurred in the years following the war’s end. This section seeks to understand how a city 
in a state of economic decline with a downtown that had been described as a “rogues gallery of 




scoundrels and characters” became to be recognizable as one of the most livable cities in the 
United States.22 
 Decline in Portland was slow; during the years directly following the war the downtown 
remained a bustling center of commerce and shopping. However, a slow migration by middle-
class families to the “modern planned housing subdivisions in Deering, Falmouth, Yarmouth, 
Cumberland, and South Portland” began to draw away the vitality from Portland’s main 
downtown thoroughfares.23 This exodus, coupled with little to no investment in the city’s 
waterfront areas, housing, and major infrastructure, created a city that was lacking in the energy 
it had once enjoyed.24 As detailed in Chapter Two, the latter years of the twentieth century in 
Portland brought with it drastic changes in the city’s politics and the course of the city’s 
economic development.25 
 
2.B Portland’s Revitalization 
 The period from 1964 to 1985 proved particularly important for Portland’s economic 
renewal. In these years the city experienced an influx of federal money and a coalition of both 
political, social, and business leaders who bonded together with a vision for the city’s 
revitalization. This section contends that these factors had a large impact on Portland’s 
development as a city and had important repercussions down-the-line as the city began to 
welcome more and more immigrants to its midst. Utilizing the scholarship on economic anxiety 
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and its influences on how a community and its politicians frame immigration, it posits that events 
occurring in Portland during the late 1960s and early 1970s made it a more hospitable and 
welcoming place to newcomers even in the twenty-first century as immigration has become a 
hot-button issue within the United States. 
Beginning in 1964, Portland’s municipal government and its Chamber of Commerce 
joined forces to hire the “renowned Viennese-born architect planner” Victor Gruen and his New 
York-based consulting firm to devise a plan to recraft the city’s downtown into a vibrant area.26 
Gruen’s designs were focused around devising a city wherein “socially disconnected 
people...could share a common social, cultural, and recreational experience while shopping.”27 
Key to Gruen’s plans was the building of a ring road encircling the city and the creation of an 
integrated traffic plan with key parking garages situated throughout. In 1967, the city embarked 
on widening Franklin Street, a main thoroughfare, to provide “unobstructed access to 
downtown.”28 Gruen’s plan also laid the groundwork for what was to become the vibrant Old 
Port shopping district that is well-known today. His central ideas espoused a commitment to the 
“Downtown as Mall,” in direct opposition to the post-World War II boom in the construction of 
strip malls and massive shopping complexes that so plagued the country’s Main Street 
economies.29 
Portland also began to focus on the demolition and rebranding of areas the city deemed 
“obsolescent, overcrowded, and unsightly.”30 The Bayside neighborhood was an excellent 
example for how the city government began to meticulously and consciously plan the city. The 
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1951 creation of the Slum Clearance and Redevelopment Authority (SCRAP) began the process 
of slowly shifting areas of the city away from its working class roots.31 In the 1960s, under the 
auspices of SCRAP, the City of Portland demolished 245 units in Bayside Park and an additional 
289 units in Bayside.32 Using Gruen’s plan as a guiding light and as justification for their actions, 
the city razed structures to provide for economic development. These destructions reduced key 
affordable housing located in the city but did provide for important zones of development in the 
1980s.33 
The decision to raze the units in the Bayside area and to construct the Franklin Street 
arterial were not met without opposition and were indicative of a pointed plan of “rampant 
neighborhood destruction.”34 The Bayside neighborhood was historically working class and was 
filled with a variety of different structures, including many ubiquitous New England Triple 
Deckers – a symbol of the working class. As Portland experienced its war-time boom, Bayside 
became the crowded with people seeking work in the shipyards and it became known as a 
“decaying section” of the city. The neighborhood was repeatedly associated with a moral 
deterioration occurring within the city’ boundaries35  
Bayside represented the antithesis of the new, modern image of Portland held by many in 
city government. Lacking political agency and without support in city government, the residents 
of Bayside were left powerless as the crusade to destroy their neighborhood advanced and their 
pleas fell on deaf ears. By embarking on this plan, Portland’s city government’s actions razed a 
large section of the city’s affordable housing, preferring instead to focus their efforts on 
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attracting a new, creative class to support Gruen’s vision of an economically diverse, 
cosmopolitan downtown. 
The main points of Gruen’s plan formed the foundation of Portland’s application to 
President Lyndon B. Johnson and Senator Edmund Muskie’s Model Cities Program. The 
underlying key to Portland’s success was a commitment to adaptability and enhancement of the 
city with an eye always turned toward honoring the area’s “historical fabric.”36 The early strides 
made by SCRAP and the Gruen plan laid the groundwork for Portland’s economic development 
– a process that was further kick-started by the Model Cities Program. 
 
2.C Portland’s Model Cities Program 
 In 1967, Portland received an initial grant of over a million dollars to begin a process of 
urban renewal through the federal government’s Model Cities Program. The program had as its 
goal to revitalize a specific area in downtown Portland that its leaders called “Portland West.” 
This area, reaching from the West End to Munjoy Hill neighborhood, became the city’s primary 
focus – its model neighborhood. This swath of land on the Falmouth Peninsula included 
important sections of waterfront real estate as well as “rich, early nineteenth-century Federal and 
Greek Revival-style architecture.”37 The diverse and historic architectural makeup of this area 
would later play an important role in the area’s revitalization, as further chapters show the area’s 
cultural importance in the city’s economic development. Portland’s Model City’s proposal area 
was unique, as it included both low-income neighborhoods and also wealthier ones surrounding 
the Western Promenade.38 The plan also had within its bounds the Maine Medical Center. This 
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inclusion helped medical issues facing the city to be put at the forefront of discussion as people 
involved in the hospital were directly keyed into the Model Cities initiative.39 
The Model Cities legislation, hashed out by Senator Edmund Muskie and other members 
of Congress, provided for “novel and imaginative housing and renewal programs and...that 
surveys of historic resources and efforts at historic preservation” would be intensely considered 
before any demolition was to occur.40 This emphasis placed on new housing projects and urban 
renewal proved particularly important for Portland as its wealth of architectural heritage would 
make it a desirable location for tourism and business development in later years. The Model 
Cities Program injected money into downtown, and its funding, in conjunction with the newly 
passed National Preservation Act of 1966 worked to maintain buildings that might have 
otherwise been razed.41 
As noted by John Bauman in his work on Portland’s Model Cities Program, the city was 
unique in the way it made “Model Cities a part of its downtown renewal.”42 Building on the 
vision set forth by Victor Gruen, the city “wove Model Cities into the very fabric of its brick and 
mortar revitalization process.”43 This was accomplished in part by the use of Model Cities funds 
to create a new Department of Housing and Urban Development in the city. By tying in the 
program to Portland’s greater goal of downtown revitalization, city leaders made one of the 
program’s specific goals to use its funding to tackle developmental issues.44 
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2.D Provision of Social Services 
The Model Cities Program in Portland enabled the city to tap into $31 million worth of 
federal funds from a range of agencies to improve the lives of everyone living within its 
boundaries.45 Jadine O’Brien, the director of Portland’s Model Cities program from 1970 to 1974 
noted that the plan enabled the city to put large amounts of capital into the improvement of 
childcare centers, health clinics, and recreation programs.46 By not only tackling housing and 
economic development, Model Cites put in place programs that sought to create a more active 
and well-served population. These community programs would later help integrate Portland’s 
burgeoning immigrant community and help to build cross-cultural bridges in line with Thomas 
Pettigrew’s intergroup contact theory.47 The creation of structured programs that would help aid 
the entire community at-large, Portland’s Model Cities Program made early strides in making the 
city more welcoming toward immigrant populations. 
As suggested by the work of Pettigrew and Herbert Blumer, Model Cities and its 
associated educational and healthcare programs enabled cross-cultural bridges to be constructed 
in decades to come. These neighborhood organizations continue to be a presence in the former 
model neighborhood and were integral to the effective integration and support of immigrant 
communities that came into the city after the program’s closing. School programs that were 
created as a result of Model Cities are still “centers of learning” for immigrant children from 
“Africa, Southeast Asia, Eastern Europe, and the former Soviet Union.”48 Scholarship suggests 
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that “much of Portland’s success in welcoming and integrating diverse immigrant groups is 
traceable to the philosophy and practices” of these programs.49 
Joseph Gray, a member of Portland’s Model Cities Program, noted that this groundwork 
of social services laid by the initiative was, potentially, the most beneficial aspect of Model 
Cities to Portland for its long-term future. Through establishing “day care programs...elderly 
support programs...[and] a lot of health programs” the city was able to provide space for 
educational development, healthcare, and structured social contact among the residents of the 
city. This again supports the explanation set forth by Pettigrew and Blumer that the increased 
presence of methods for structured social contact between native residents and immigrants would 
engender more pro-immigrant stances in the electorate and thus the local government. 
 
2.E Institutional Structure and Support of the Program 
A distinguishing feature of the program in Portland was that its City Hall was responsible 
for running and implementing all aspects of the Model Cities initiative.50 While other locations 
had funding handed to community partners in different areas of the neighborhood by an 
independent body that was associated, but not directly run by, the municipal government, the 
Portland program was directed in a top-down manner under the auspices of City Hall. The 
director of Portland’s Model Cities initiative oversaw a staff that were all “employees of the 
city.” This transparency and effective method of management inspired cooperation between 
different departments within Portland’s city hall, such as the parks and recreation and health and 
human services department.51  
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The program in Portland was structured so that the Model Cities Program director would 
report directly to the City Manager. Consequently, the program’s institutional structure was 
designed so that the program director could defy “the use of simple organizational charts and 
neatly divided spheres of authority.”52 The institutional structure of Portland’s Model Cities 
Program also stressed the fact that the program director was the “front man” for all topics 
regarding its implementation and was given a “responsibility that [exceeded] his formal or line 
authority.”53 This suggests that Portland’s program director was given a great degree of latitude 
in the day-to-day running of the system. By stripping away layers of bureaucratic red tape and 
allowing the program director to directly report to the City Manager, the institutional structure of 
the Model Cities Program allowed for a nimble and adaptive program. 
Research also suggests that the new, more progressive generation of leaders within 
Portland’s city government gave the Model Cities Program and its leaders greater latitude and 
increased support in their plans.54 Instead of maintaining and preaching to a certain status-quo of 
what the city should look like, Portland’s leaders looked forward and, rather than trying to 
reinvigorate the city’s historical past, preferred to adapt to the changing times. 
Model Cities put in place a strong belief in citizen participation in decision making, and 
its funding and programs enabled local organizations, non-profit directors, and school programs 
room and capital to grow and flourish.55 From its earliest origins, the Portland Model Cities 
program was “based heavily on citizen participation.”56 A 25 person advisory committee 
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oversaw aspects of the program  and the majority were residents who lived within the defined 
neighborhood. Additionally, multiple task forces were created concerning a variety of different 
issues each half comprised of city residents.57 By involving a wide swath of the populace, this 
program gave agency to citizens. 
 
2.F Program’s Repercussions 
While the Model Cities Program in Portland only lasted a brief four years, it allowed for 
Portland’s Metropolitan Council on Housing to receive $672,000 in grants.58 Using this money, 
the council began to enforce residential housing code in the Portland West neighborhood and 
also allowed “owners of substandard, nineteenth-century housing to correct major interior and 
exterior code violations.”59 This updating of Portland’s buildings laid the groundwork for 
economic development to come.  
This redevelopment of housing downtown was, arguably, the greatest success of the 
Model Cities Program in Portland. Prior to its genesis, “the quality of housing stock had 
deteriorated” within the city.60 Before the program, there had been a migration away from the 
city’s West End; however, after the injection of federal capital and the redevelopment of 
buildings in the chosen neighborhood the city became more “stabilized” with regard to its 
housing options.61 The Model Cities Program in Portland, in conjunction with a separate grant 
called the Code Enforcement Program, successfully forced landlords throughout the city to fix 
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properties and to reduce the areas of the city once considered as slums. Through a process of 
demolition and renovation, the city opened up important housing opportunities.62 
 Key to the success of this new program was the aforementioned presence of a generation 
of new, progressive leaders in Portland’s city government who attacked the city’s recent 
economic shortcomings with a “non-sentimental, non-romantic, efficiency-driven approach.”63 
Regardless of the morality of their approach to certain aspects of development, this new 
generation of leaders were different from the former Yankee Republican hegemony and utilized 
a more “robust, non-partisan, grassroots leadership” style.64. Their approach to the urban 
revitalization suggested a commitment to moving the city forward and a pledge to helping the 
“civic-minded leaders in the business community.”65 
 Overall, the program in Portland received $7,594,429; however, when other funds from 
federal agencies were factored in, the city’s Model Cities Program was the beneficiary of close to 
$31 million. This large amount of additional federal funds represents an important difference 
between the program in Portland and Lewiston. While the Lewiston’s Model Cities basic funding 
was similar to Portland’s, no documents make reference to large amounts of outside federal 
funding from multiple agencies.  
The Portland program not only injected a large amount of capital into the city, but it also 
“stripped away burdensome layers of red tape” that had long plagued plans for urban renewal in 
the city.66 As has been previously mentioned, the fact that Portland’s Model City director was 
selected by the City Council, reported to the City Manager, and was closely supervised by both 
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bodies created a dexterous program that was able to tackle the urban renewal issues at hand. This 
couple with the new progressive and activist City Council that had been elected into office in 
1967 lead by Democrat Harold Loring made Portland’s Model City Program ruthlessly effective 
in its efforts. 
The implementation of Model Cities was an important critical juncture that explains the 
diverging paths of Lewiston and Portland in terms of their municipal politicians’ professed 
treatment of immigrants in the twenty-first century. While never explicitly addressing the needs 
of an immigrant community, Model Cities in Portland laid an important groundwork that future 
events and leaders would build upon. This injection of federal funds gave Portland its first 
lifeblood to recover from its economic depression – a source of capital that was never present in 
the Lewiston context. While the federal government also chose Lewiston as part of the Model 
Cities Program, it was not given the same amount of funding as the program in Portland, its city 
leaders lacked the progressive vision seen in Portland, and it failed to address issues of 
downtown regeneration in the same way as Portland’s program. 
 
2.G Changing Downtown 
Even with the protection given through the Model Cities funding, some of Portland’s 
major downtown landmarks were still at risk of being taken down. In an effort to preserve the 
historical edifices being razed intermittently by the brazen city government, real estate investors 
bought many of the city’s “large historic buildings at sharply decreased prices.”67 This loose 
group of developers organized themselves into the Old Port Association and were able to 
successfully challenge aspects of the city’s development plans and lobby for “sidewalk repairs, 
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street lights, tree planting, and a new parking garage” that allowed for the neighborhood to 
become more and more viable as a cultural, shopping, and economic hub for the city.68  
This community organization remained integral to the preservation of Portland’s identity 
as a quaint New England city, and they were able to halt any further destruction of the area’s 
most significant buildings. Their original purchasing of real estate and grouping together would 
lay the groundwork for the tourism hub that the Old Port would become in later years. The 
advent of both the Historical Preservation Act of 1966 and the Model Cities Program’s 
commitment in Portland to downtown development aided this group in solidifying its renewal 
efforts of the Old Port. 
After the phasing out of Model Cities, Portland became a changed city and one ready to 
tackle the quickly changing global economy. The influx of capital into downtown and the 
continued investment in business and buildings began to change the city into a “service-oriented” 
regional hub.69 Employment in the finance and service industries increased from 1960 to 1970 
while jobs in fishing and manufacturing declined. The city was beginning to move away from its 
aforementioned traditional industries, and in 1971, in the midst of Model Cities, Portland 
embarked on an ambitious new plan entitled: Maine Way. The plan’s goal was to further 
transform the downtown and create a pedestrian friendly area filled with “open spaces...plazas, 
courts, and arcades.”70 Enacting this program, Portland city government again embarked on a 
path of destruction and they condoned the taking down of aged commercial real estate and the 
revitalization of more attractive historical buildings.71   
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In 1972 alone, a total of $42,000,000 worth of new investment was injected into the 
downtown. This included sixty new buildings to house the many new corporations that had 
opened in Portland. Buildings housing Casco National Bank, Maine Savings Bank, and the new 
University of Maine Law School rose across the city as employment opportunities and sources of 
employment grew.72 In the 1980s, the amount of office space in downtown massively increased 
and was quickly occupied by the expanding finance, insurance, and real estate industries.73 By 
1986, Portland’s downtown was labelled as “one of the hottest real estate markets in the 
country.”74 However, in 1988, much like the rest of New England, Portland “experienced a 
substantial downturn in its economy.”75 Particularly hard hit were the city’s financial and real 
estate sectors, and between 1988 and 1989 home values in the city only increased by 1.8%.76 
However, this period of economic downturn was largely short-lived thanks to other large 
injections of outside capital into the city. This second injection of capital and the power of 
political entrepreneurs is discussed in more detail in Chapter Four. The success of Model Cities 
in Portland set up the city to become a hub for the creative class of individuals, and in turn a city 




As detailed in Chapter Two, the story of Lewiston is one of rapid expansion, incredible 
success, and then a steep nose-dive with the loss of the city’s major industry. While Portland’s 
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history is well-documented and lauded as a great success of urban planning, federal money, 
innovative design, and economic renewal; Lewiston has a slightly murkier history with regard to 
its development. This section details the city’s economic development with special attention paid 
to critical junctures that explain the divergence in Lewiston’s economy compared to Portland. 
Lewiston, unlike Portland, was not the recipient of large amounts of federal dollars from many 
different Washington agencies in its early redevelopment process, and, while still a participant in 
the Model Cities Program, the plan’s implementation and funding was not as successful as its 
counterpart in Portland. And, the institutional structures created to use the funds were designed 
quite differently and less effectively in Lewiston than in Portland. This section examines 
Lewiston’s Model Cities Program and suggests how the differences between Lewiston and 
Portland set the cities on different paths toward economic revitalization.  
 Throughout Lewiston’s heyday in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century, Bates 
Manufacturing, the proprietor of many of the city’s mills remained a dominant force in the 
Lewiston community. However, at a time even earlier than Portland, in the 1920s and 1930s, the 
city’s mills and their owners began to feel the pressure from competitors in the southern United 
States. The country was beginning its reliance on electricity as a source of power, and the 
obsolete and complex system of canals that had once so innovatively powered Lewiston’s mills 
became a relic of the past.77This period of time also heralded the loss of major transportation 
services to the Lewiston metropolitan area. In 1932, train service to Brunswick was cancelled 
and the Androscoggin & Kennebec Street Railway that had once linked the area with a series of 
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trolleys shuttered its offices downtown. In the 1950s, the Maine Central Railroad would finally 
cut the final passenger service to the region.78 
While the period surrounding World War II and its direct aftermath did bring some 
prosperity to the city through the large textile orders placed by the armed services, the city would 
never regain its former glory as the New England capital of textile manufacturing. Cognizant of 
competition from the south, in the middle of the 1950s, the Bates Manufacturing Company 
embarked on an ambitious and last-ditch attempt to revitalize and improve the mills. In the years 
directly after the war, they invested more than $11 million in technological improvements.79 This 
did not prove fruitful, and in 1955 the Bates Company closed the Androscoggin Mill in 
Lewiston, leaving close to 1,000 workers out of a job. This closure marked the first downward 
trend in Lewiston’s population with a similar loss of around 1,000 people.80 The closing of the 
Androscoggin Mill heralded the beginning to the end, and, in the coming years, all the other 
major mills in the area would also close their doors for good. This loss of the city’s major 
industry and the downfall of Maine’s once largest employer suggests the first waves of economic 
anxiety in an area that had for so long depended upon the mills for its vitality. 
As leaders in Lewiston began to realize the ominous future ahead, development efforts 
became concentrated on bringing employment back to the area. In 1952, the Lewiston 
Development Corporation (LDC) was founded.81 This group consisted of individuals from 
various interested parties in Lewiston’s economy, and they quickly began to dive into the city’s 
economic troubles. In 1964, a subsidiary of the LDC purchased 4 of the mill buildings once 
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owned by the Bates Corporation. These buildings were originally leased back to the Bates 
Corporation by the LDC before the mills finally closed up shop in the early 1970s.  
The LDC began by focusing its efforts on enticing manufacturing businesses to open in 
the area. Raytheon Inc. briefly opened a plant outside of downtown, and other companies 
followed suit.82 These first attempts at revitalization did not last and they were unable to fully 
bring back the same steady labor once provided by the mills. However, the LDC did succeed in 
attracting a large printing business to the area, and they were relatively successful as acting as a 
“conduit for capital resources for new and expanding industry.”83 Developers in the city also 
concentrated their efforts on the offering of retail options. Shopping centers began to pop up 
around the city outside of downtown, and in 1963 a large one was created on the corner of East 
Avenue and Sabattus Street in Lewiston. This further pushed the core commercial areas away 
from the once lively downtown toward the edges of the city and the burgeoning suburbs. 
The 1960s were defined by this exodus from downtown, as the centers of shopping 
moved further and further away from the traditional hub of Lisbon Street. In 1964, Lewiston, 
Auburn, and many of the area’s surrounding towns published the Androscoggin Area 
Development Corporation Report. This plan had as its goal to “reduce the rate of unemployment 
in the area” and to ensure the economic prosperity of the region.84 This plan chose to highlight 
the industrial capacity of the region and focused on the development of industrial parks in the 
Twin Cities community. Instead of taking the tack of Portland’s developers and focusing on the 
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revitalization of the downtown, Lewiston’s joint plan suggested a further commitment to the 
same industrial practices that had originally led to the city’s rise.  
 
3.A Lewiston’s Model Cities Program 
In 1968, Lewiston was identified as a target city for Model Cities funding and was 
eventually included in Edmund Muskie’s ambitious program. However, the city was never given 
access to the same amount of money as the program in Portland.85 The program in Lewiston was 
always “much smaller” than that of Portland and was not able to gain the same traction as its 
southern neighbor.86 Joseph Gray, a member of Portland’s Model Cities committee, noted that it 
was unusual for a state to have more than one program within its boundaries, potentially 
explaining some of the funding differences between the two cities. However, he attributed 
Maine’s fortunes to the fact that Edmund Muskie, a primary proponent of the initiative, was, 
himself, Maine-born and a graduate of Bates College.87 In other words, Gray contended that 
Muskie may have personally requested for Maine to be the recipient of more than one Model 
City. Lewiston’s existence as an outlier second program in a state may partially explain the 
overall lack of funding that went into the city’s Model Cities plan. 
Unlike the Portland program that had Gruen’s Plan as a roadmap highlighting some of the 
main goals as urban development and the changing of the city’s downtown, Lewiston originally 
applied for Model Cities designation in order to receive funding for new roads and sewers.88 This 
difference in original ambition and scope between the two programs suggests that, even from the 
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its start in the two cities, the Model Cities Program in Portland had its eyes set on loftier goals 
and projects that would permanently change the downtown.  
 The program lasted in Lewiston from 1968 to 1974 and was primarily focused on 
making improvements to the city that were not, in the end, visible to the average citizen. While 
the city did receive its new sewer system and was able to revamp its fire truck fleet, Lewiston did 
not achieve the same success that Portland had in blending the Model Cities Program with its 
ongoing efforts of aesthetic and physical downtown revitalization. While Portland’s program laid 
the preservation seeds for the genesis of the current Old Port district, Lewiston was never able to 
inject new economic lifeblood into the city’s plethora of mills and historic downtown during this 
time. 
 
3.B Institutional Structure and Support 
Critically and unlike the program in Portland, Lewiston’s Model Cities initiative was not 
institutionally supported in the same way as in Portland. While Portland was experiencing a new 
wave of city administrators and council members who had made the important transition toward 
more modern, progressive, and activist stances, as noted by a former member of Lewiston’s 
Planning Board during the Model Cities epoch, city leaders in Lewiston were still believers in 
the “status quo” – a status quo that did not inspire the same commitment to rapid changes as in 
Portland.89 
While the Model Cities director in Portland was given a greater ability to act as an 
independent party but still be fully supported and watched over by the city’s governmental 
leaders, Lewiston’s program was not given the same amount of leeway. The Lewiston program 
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was structured so that the Model Cities director was overseen by the Mayor himself and by the 
Department of Economic Development. The city’s application for funding also clearly stated that 
the Mayor of Lewiston was the “Chairman of the Model City Agency.” Instead of having a 
powerful program director who was permitted to act and speak on behalf of the agency, like 
Portland, the structure of Lewiston’s plan did not provide for this greater latitude.90 While the 
city did still provide for a director of the program, this person had to first report to the head of 
the Department of Economic Development and was still under the direct control of the Mayor of 
Lewiston. This suggests that Lewiston’s program was not able to function with the same agency, 
power, or flexibility as the Portland program.  
By restricting the director’s ability to cut through layers of bureaucratic red tape, the 
institutional structure of the Lewiston program was another way in which the Model Cities 
Program within the city was not as effective as the program in Portland. Figure 3.1 below shows 
how the many bureaucratic hurdles needed to jump through by the Model Cities director in 
Lewiston and further suggests the programs inability to act. According to the flow chart present 
in Figure 3.1, the Model Cities director in Lewiston was required to report to multiple 
committees and was left with little agency. Comparatively, as laid out in the previous section of 
this chapter, the Portland director was given a much longer leash and greater ability to make 
decisions on their own. 
 
                                               
90 Board of Mayor and Aldermen, City of Lewiston, Maine “Part V Administration,” Model Cities Program, 
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Figure 3.1 Institutional Structure of Lewiston’s Model Cities Program91 
 
 The primary plan of Lewiston’s Model City Program was to construct a “galleria” on 
Lisbon Street.92 As detailed in city plans from this era, the galleria would create an attractive 
shopping area in the heart of Lewiston.93 This was an effort to revitalize the city’s downtown and 
to bring back in commercial businesses that had since migrated to the city’s outer suburbs in the 
early 1960s. However, this plan encountered “obstruction after obstruction” during its 
development.94 Again, unlike the program in Portland, the directors of Lewiston’s Model Cities 
initiative were required to pass through City Hall instead of working in a symbiotic relationship 
with the city government.  Instead of taking heed from Portland’s Gruen Plan and its 
commitment to being to turn its downtown into a shopping and residential area, leaders in 
Lewiston proved intransigent on making headway at attempts to revitalize Lisbon Street.  
Maurice Goulet, a Lewiston Planning Board official during this time, stated that when the 
city’s Model Cities committee would bring forth a new plan “half the people [in City Hall] 
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would go against us, and so we’d be back to square one.”95 Goulet’s statements again suggest 
that Lewiston’s program did not have a harmonious relationship with City Hall, but rather one 
that was contentious and lacking a shared vision. He noted that the people he encountered in City 
Hall were preoccupied with a “status quo” of what Lewiston should look like. As evidenced in 
their attempts to re-attract manufacturing jobs to the city on the eve of the mills closing, Goulet’s 
comments suggest an unwillingness in Lewiston’s City Hall to adapt to the winds of change that 
had already blown through Portland. 
Similar to the program in Portland, Lewiston’s Model Cities plan identified a Model 
Neighborhood in which it planned to develop and put into place many of its key programs. 
Lewiston’s Model Neighborhood was a swath of land comprising the “city’s principal 
manufacturing facilities and central business district, as well as numerous residential 
properties.”96 This area was chosen primarily due to the poor housing options within its bounds. 
The study noted that over a third of surveyed residents within the chosen area would choose to 
move out of their current dwellings if at all possible, suggesting a serious lack of economic 
opportunity and areas for advancement.97 
The discussion of Lewiston’s Model Cities program, and its contrast with the initiative in 
Portland suggests a strong distinction between how the two cities were able to capitalize on their 
respective inclusion in the federal revitalization program. First, the Lewiston project was never 
given the same financial resources as the program in Portland; as the latter was given much more 
in outside federal funds independent of the money explicitly stipulated for Model Cities. With 
this lack of capital, the Model Cities committee in Lewiston was unable to affect the same level 
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of change as in its southern neighbor. Second, my research suggests a difference in the 
institutional structure of the program’s organization and in the levels of support for the two 
programs within the respective City Halls. Even though both programs were directed by City 
Hall, Portland’s program had a larger amount of support from city leaders, while members of 
Lewiston’s Model City committee mentioned that they were confronted with a certain 
intransigence from persons within city government.  
 This difference and the discrepancy of funding suggest that these two cities’ experiences 
with the Model Cities Program is a critical juncture that explains a divergence in their economic 
fortunes. While both began the 1970s as regions that had lost their indigenous industry, by the 
end of the program in 1974, Portland was a changed city, while Lewiston had yet to find its 
footing. 
 
4. Data Related to Levels of Economic Anxiety 
 The secondary literature suggests that if an area is experiencing an economic downturn or 
if certain economic fear motivators are present, then there is an increased chance for politicians 
within that locale to adopt anti-immigrant policy and rhetoric. Daniel Tichenor, in Dividing 
Lines, contends that restrictive or inclusive immigration policies are not dictated by the 
economy’s boom or bust periods. His unit of analysis, however, is the United States as a whole. 
This thesis examines the smaller unit of two cities in Maine and, while it does not aim to 
disprove Tichenor’s explanation, it does suggest another layer in the economic causation model. 
The content of this chapter and the following chapter examining municipal politicians’ rhetoric 
suggests that, on the smaller, local level, economic downturns and associated anxiety can have a 
large influence on the saliency of certain more restrictive or inclusive viewpoints.  
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 While the majority of this chapter traces the historical choices and processes that explain 
the critical juncture between Lewiston and Portland, this section examines the economic data 
suggesting the numerical differences in economic fortunes between the two cities. The Model 
Cities programs in the two cities should not be considered as the sole catalyst for the cities 
differing economic outlooks. Rather, it is an important factor – even a critical one – that, over the 
course of time, made Portland a more viable candidate for increased economic revitalization. The 
analysis of data suggesting differing levels of economic anxiety does not attempt to create 
concrete links between the numbers and the exact events during the Model Cities timeframe; 
rather, it suggests, in conjunction with the discussion in Chapter Four, that these events had 
important repercussions in the years after their implementation. 
As detailed in the preceding sections, the injections of outside capital through Model 
Cities funding situated Portland in more comfortable position in terms of its own economic 
potential. Consequently, it was better positioned economically to absorb any increased flow of 
immigrants in the twenty-first century. These flows of money allowed for the city to develop its 
infrastructure, aesthetic design, and economy in ways that Lewiston was unable to. Based on 
these critical differences in levels of funding and allocation of resources, we should expect the 
data to reflect different levels of economic well-being in the two cities.  
As suggested by the aforementioned discussions of the closure of Lewiston’s mills and its 
municipal government’s inability to attract back major employment on the same scale, the city 
has been drastically affected by its slow economic decline. Currently in the city, a quarter of the 
children residing in Lewiston “grow up poor” and the majority of the city’s former mills stand 
shuttered – ever-present symbols of a bygone era.98 
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Table 3.1 Median Household Income99 
 
Table 3.1 details the median household incomes between the two cities. While both are 
similar in the early 2000s, 2007 represents a turning point. Since then the disparity between the 
two cities has increased. In 2017, the most recently available year of data, the median household 
income in Portland was more than $20,000 dollars more than that of Lewiston. This graph 
suggests that Lewiston’s financial status explains why residents are more willing to vote for 
politicians that espouse anti-immigrant viewpoints in recent elections. This refers directly to the 
theory of scapegoating put forth by Citrin et al. that contends that economic adversity in an area 
can act “as a trigger for the displacement of anxiety and anger onto minority groups.”100 The 
influx of Somalis in 2001 into an area such as Lewiston still having not experienced an economic 
revival in the same manner as Portland suggests that anti-immigrant standpoints are more salient 
within the Lewiston context. The literature suggests that an area still experiencing adverse effects 
of losing its major industry in conjunction with the arrival of a new population will be more 
likely to support politicians that espouse anti-immigrant rhetoric and policy. 
                                               
99 United States Census Bureau, “American Fact Finder,” U.S. Department of Commerce, last modified 2018, 
https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/nav/jsf/pages/searchresults.xhtml?refresh=t#none. 
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Table 3.2 Median Housing Values101 
 
As a measure of economic vitality, Table 3.2 details the great disparity between median 
housing values between the two cities. While both cities have seen their home values increase, 
the graph suggests that Portland’s housing market is much more robust than that of Lewiston. 
This real estate boom supports the claim that Portland is an area experiencing lower levels of 
economic anxiety than that of its northern neighbor. Portland has also been able to effectively 
recover its housing much faster than Lewiston’s after the financial crisis in 2008. And, Portland’s 
recent uptick in housing prices suggests a robust economy recently, while Lewiston’s downturn 
potentially suggests a dip in the city’s economy.102 
 
Conclusion 
While Tables 1 and 2 firmly support the notion that residents of Lewiston have 
experienced greater levels of economic anxiety than those in Portland, it is important to also note 
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that the secondary scholarship points to the power of media in the framing of people’s likelihood 
to support politicians that espouse anti-immigrant or pro-immigrant rhetoric and policy. While 
economic anxiety, based purely on numerical data, can create a feeling of trepidation among a 
population toward an immigrant other, the literature suggests that media’s framing of such issues 
and the reported-on rhetoric from elected officials can serve to greatly exacerbate this feeling of 
economic anxiety. Such rhetorical framing then must be explored. Therefore, while, Chapters 
and Three and Four illustrate the economic development and cultural differences between the 
cities, Chapter Five examines politicians’ actual rhetoric to see how such framing of issues plays 
out in the political arena.  
Using the framework set forth by Capoccia and Pierson, this chapter has contended that 
certain critical junctures can help to explain the economic and subsequent political rhetoric 
divergence between Lewiston and Portland. Those critical junctures take the form of important, 
and different, injections of outside resources into the two metropolitan areas. Importantly, 
institutional difference in how those funds could be used, i.e., the organizational structures of 
city governance, coupled with differing levels of support from city leaders, affected how these 
resources could be put to use, thereby setting each city on a distinct path toward any plausible 
economic revitalization.  
In other words, these separate sources of foreign capital and different commitments to the 
ideals put forth Model Cities allowed Portland to develop differently from Lewiston and to 
develop lower levels of economic anxiety, as suggested by the higher median incomes and 
median housing prices. With a more “comfortable” economic standing, the data suggest that 
citizens and politicians in Portland would be less likely to view immigrants as a threat to their 
economic well-being. And, this difference in economic position plausibly has consequences for 
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the instances of and receptivity to anti-immigrant rhetoric by city officials. Later chapters serve 
the role to delve into economic anxiety and politicians’ use of rhetoric surrounding this concept. 
Chapter Three has ultimately suggested that politicians in Lewiston are more likely to find 
success in painting immigrants as an economic threat to the well-being of their city.  
This chapter’s purpose has been to provide a detailed history of the Model Cities 
Programs in Lewiston and Portland and to discuss decisions and developments that have made 
municipal politicians in the two cities either more or less likely to adopt anti or pro-immigrant 
policy and rhetoric. Chapter Four moves into a discussion of further events in the economic 
development of the two cities and how further discrepancies in outside sources of capital have 




Chapter Four – Political Entrepreneurship, Further Injections of Capital, and 
the Creative Class 
 Chapter Four examines injections of capital into Lewiston and Portland during the 1990s. 
It looks at the two cities after the end of their Model Cities Programs and highlights additional 
differences in funding, economic development, and political entrepreneurship that may have 
reinforced the distinct paths which the critical juncture of Model Cities participation created. 
Furthermore, these distinct pathways may have been a crucial foundation for inspiration of and 
resonance with city officials’ rhetoric that either welcomes or shuns immigrant populations. 
Through the examination of these additional differences, this chapter contends that the distinct 
events in the economic development histories of Portland and Lewiston can help to explain their 
respective politicians’ differing rhetoric towards newcomers. Building on Chapter Three, this 
chapter posits that a second major injection of outside funding in Portland and the lack of such 
funding in Lewiston, reinforced the pathways of economic development in each city.  
To restate, the central aim of this thesis remains to examine the economic development of 
Lewiston and Portland and highlight the repercussions of such differing levels of expansion and 
growth on politician’s rhetoric and professed policy toward immigrants in each respective city. 
As shown in Chapter One, the secondary literature suggests that if a city is experiencing an 
economic downturn, citizens are more likely to support anti-immigrant rhetoric from politicians. 
The relevant literature also posits that a city with a greater population of creative class 
individuals, and institutions that promote increased access to cultural capital are also less likely 
to support anti-immigrant rhetoric. Building on these two major explanations, this chapter delves 
into the injection of outside funding in Portland, and a lack thereof in Lewiston, that reinforced 
the already distinct economic development trajectories of the two cities.  
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This chapter highlights the period of time from 1990 to near the present day and how 
further outside injections of resources have contributed to (1) different levels of economic 
anxiety, (2) the presence of different classes of people, and (3) different rhetoric and professed 
policy from municipal politicians in Maine’s major metropolitan areas. This chapter utilizes the 
theoretical framework derived from the scholarship of Richard Florida, Elaine Sharp, and Mark 
Joslyn to suggest that a city with a greater population of creative class individuals may be more 
likely to elect politicians who utilize pro-immigrant policy and rhetoric. 
 Similar to Chapter Three, Chapter Four relies on the theoretical framework on critical 
junctures and path dependency. This chapter contends that the “timing and sequence” of further 
outside sources of capital have created pathways that the two cities have distinctly followed.1 
Paul Pierson contends that even events that are “exogenous to the institution of interest” can 
have lasting effects on establishments in question. This suggests that occurrences, such as the 
economic development of cities and the different injections of capital, can have lasting 
repercussions on other institutions, like the ways in which political actors develop rhetoric and 
campaign positions.  
 This chapter also utilizes the theoretical framework of political entrepreneurs to describe 
how Portland was able to firmly reinforce its distinct economic development pathway. Adam 
Sheingate contends that political entrepreneurs are “individuals whose creative acts have 
transformative effects on politics, policies, or institutions.”2 This chapter contends that, in 
Portland, Intel micro-chip heiress Elizabeth Noyce, was such a political entrepreneur. Her vision, 
                                               
1 Jacob S. Hacker, “The Historical Logic of National Health Insurance: Structure and Sequence in the 
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actions, and investment in Portland had “lasting change…on politics, policies, and institutions” 
and reinforced the pathway of economic development that began with the Model Cities Program 
in the 1970s.3  
Additionally, the main theory derived from the scholarship of Richard Florida is integral 
to the contexts of Lewiston and Portland.4 His work suggests that the presence of creative class 
individuals in an urban environment is the primary driving force in a city’s economic 
development. Moving away from an earlier scholarship, which suggested that a city’s economic 
vitality could be traced simply to the existence of major corporations or firms within its bounds, 
Florida contends that individuals who earn their living “by means of creative thinking, designing, 
and producing” are the new drivers behind economic growth.5 Florida’s research “turns the 
standard model of regional economic development on its head,” by suggesting that “people don’t 
follow the jobs so much as the jobs follow the creative people.”6 
The literature suggests that some cities are better suited to attract creative class 
individuals than others. Cities that simply build office space and large industrial parks waiting 
for companies to move in, such as in the case of Pittsburgh, are not rewarded according to the 
                                               
3 Ibid., 188. 
4 Many scholars have identified problems with the creative class thesis and have adopted their own criticism of 
the work. Some have suggested that the presence of creative class individuals is the direct result of economic 
growth rather than the catalyst for creating it. While others still have suggested that Florida’s work is an 
attempt to “provide a highly-readable exercise in yuppie self-indulgence.” The critics suggest that Florida’s 
thesis is merely a method of giving cities an attractive, easy path toward economic revitalization. See Jeffrey 
Zimmerman’s article “From brew town to cool town: Neoliberalism and the creative city development strategy 
in Milwaukee” for more information on these critiques. While using the work of Florida, this thesis primarily 
focuses on the link between the creative class and associated mitigated effects of racial threat, as put forth by 
Elaine B. Sharp and Mark R. Joslyn in “Culture, Segregation, and Tolerance in Urban America.” Regardless of 
the creative class’ actual power in economic growth, the work of Sharp and Joslyn suggest that their presence 
in a city may produce lower levels of racial threat -- an integral link to the focus of this thesis. 
5 Elaine B. Sharp and Mark R. Joslyn, “Culture, Segregation, and Tolerance in Urban America,” Social Science 
Quarterly 89, no. 3 (2008): 575. 
6 Jeffrey Zimmerman, “From brew town to cool town: Neoliberalism and the creative city development 
strategy in Milwaukee,” Cities 25 (2008): 231 
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work of Florida; rather, cities with inclusive cultures, diverse populaces and job offerings, wide 
ranged entertainment and recreational opportunities, and distinctive “older, urban centers” are 
better suited to attract such individuals and thereby experience growth.7 Cities with the ability to 
attract creative class individuals are those that have “a multitude of casual ‘third place’” 
establishments, such as cafes, bookstores, and other restaurants where “informal social ties can 
be cultivated.”8 
Furthermore, the secondary scholarship importantly suggests that cities with larger 
populations of creative class individuals experience mitigated effects of racial tension.9 Elaine 
Sharp and Mark Joslyn contend that cities with larger creative class populations may be more 
accepting of a racialized other. They contend that this class’ presence “creates a cultural milieu 
that is pervasive enough to yield racial tolerance levels among the less educated that are much 
like those of the better educated.”10 Sharp and Joslyn also state that racial threats are “clearly 
mitigated [in cities] where the new creative class…holds sway.”11As most recent immigrants to 
Lewiston and Portland are racially different from the native population, this remains an integral 
explanation for the two cities’ divergence.12  
While critiques of Florida have repeatedly attempted to disprove his explanation that 
creative class individuals are a catalyst for economic growth, this thesis does not wade into this 
debate; rather, it focuses on the presence of the creative class and the institutions that attract 
them to a certain city as factors that play into the creation of a more welcoming city for 
                                               
7  Richard Florida, “The Rise of the Creative Class,” The Washington Monthly, May 2002, 20. 
8 Zimmerman, “From brew town to cool town,” 232. 
9 Sharp and Joslyn, “Culture, Segregation, and Tolerance in Urban America,” 575. 
10 Ibid., 588. 
11 Ibid., 575. 
12 See the narrative of immigration to Lewiston and Portland present in Chapter Two for more information on 
specific waves of immigration to the two cities over the past 30 years.  
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immigrants and an environment with greater receptivity to pro-immigrant rhetoric from elected 
officials. The hypotheses put forth by Florida, Sharp, and Joslyn remain important explanations 
for how and why municipal politicians, and cities as whole, may support or oppose anti-
immigrant policy and rhetoric. Their work suggests that if a city has a larger population of 
creative class individuals and therefore experiences mitigated effects of racial threat, its 
politicians will be more likely to espouse pro-immigrant rhetoric as the voting populace may be 
more in support of such policies.  
 This chapter is made up of two sections. The first part examines the second major 
injection of outside funding into Portland’s downtown and how this influx of capital has 
contributed to Portland becoming a hub for the creative class and institutions inducing increased 
cultural capital. It also examines the links between this development of cultural institutions and 
how a city may experience mitigated levels of perceived racial and economic threats. The second 
part highlights the economic development of Lewiston during the aforementioned timeframe and 
sheds light on the decisions and factors that may have contributed to the increased propensity for 
municipal politicians to adopt anti-immigrant positions. By highlighting different factors present 
in the two cities, Chapter Four deepens the explanation for the divergence in municipal political 
rhetoric. 
 
1. A Second Injection of Capital into Portland in the 1990s 
With the core of Portland’s historic downtown preserved because of the robust Model 
Cities Program and other efforts during the 1960s and 1970s, the Old Port area remained an 
historically influential and attractive site for commercial enterprises to open shop.13 In the 1970s 
                                               
13 Loretta Lees, “The Ambivalence of Diversity and the Politics of Urban Renaissance: The Case of Youth in 
Downtown Portland, Maine,” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 27, no. 3 (2003): 618. 
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a large number of privately owned “specialty shops” began to open up and many still remain and 
provide the retail power of this district today. However, the city did experience an economic 
downturn starting in the 1970s and 1980s even with the opening of new shops downtown. By 
1992, it was seeing a “debilitating mix of suburban flight, economic recession and a decline in 
the commercial real estate market.”14 Office space vacancy was at 23 percent, and the city was in 
desperate need of an economic revival.  
In the mid-1990s, investment began to flood into the city’s downtown from a variety of 
different sources. Similar to the Model Cities Program before it, the 1990s were marked by more 
large injections of outside resources into the Portland metropolitan area. However, instead of 
originating from federal funds, these sources of capital were mainly from private investors and 
community members. This was largely spearheaded by a woman named Elizabeth Noyce, a 
“Portland native and microchip heiress.”15 Having inherited large sums of money after a high 
profile divorce from Robert T. Noyce, a co-inventor of the Intel microchip, she made large 
investments into creating more attractive and enticing downtown real estate and also spent large 
quantities of her own money to invest in Portland’s cultural institutions.16  
Noyce’s major injection of capital into downtown Portland positioned her as a political 
entrepreneur who through “singular acts of individual creativity” effectively revitalized the city’s 
downtown and reinforced its pathway of economic development.17 The scholarship on political 
entrepreneurs suggests that these individuals are able to transform existing institutions and are 
                                               
14 Sara Rimer, “Real Estate; A philanthropist invests in downtown Portland, Me., hoping to stem the flight to 
suburbs,” New York Times, February 14, 1996, https://www.nytimes.com/1996/02/14/business/real-estate-
philanthropist-invests-downtown-portland-me-hoping-help-stem-flight.html. 
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sources of innovation and change.18 Her singular boost of capital into the city created an 
opportunity for businesses and individuals to move into the city, and Noyce’s commitment to 
funding both real estate and cultural institutions created a perfect storm for the city’s continued 
regeneration. No such major benefactor ever appeared to fund Lewiston’s renewal, and the city 
has felt the repercussions as such, as economic anxiety has continued to exist at a higher level 
than in Portland. 
 
1.A Elizabeth Noyce’s Business Investments 
Noyce’s efforts to revitalize Portland were concentrated and calculated. Beginning in 
1991, Noyce, confronted with the fact that “out-of-state financial institutions were picking off 
Maine's banks one by one” leaving Maine businesses at the whim of investors in far-off cities, 
decided to create the Maine Bank and Trust Company with an initial investment of $7.7 million. 
This bank quickly prospered and became an important financial force in the city. This acted as a 
catalyst for further investment in the city and also signaled the start to Noyce’s commitment to 
revitalizing the city. By capitalizing on the strong foundation left by the work done under the 
Model Cities Program, this section posits that Noyce’s investments turned Portland into a hub for 
the creative class and further mitigated potential racial threats posed by new immigration.  
She began by importantly making large investments to preserve and redevelop historic 
downtown real estate. Noyce invested heavily in buildings on Congress Street, a central artery of 
the city’s historic peninsula, and at one point owned close to “10 percent of the city’s office and 
retail space.”19 By continually working to preserve the city’s distinct urban flavor, Noyce’s 
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investments preserved Portland’s city character and gave the city an advantage in attracting the 
creative class, as the work of Florida contends that creative individuals may gravitate toward 
cities with a well-preserved “older urban center.”20 The preservation done by Noyce, and by the 
Model Cities Program before her, made Portland an attractive city to this class of individuals. 
In 1996, paying around $13 million, Noyce purchased “three office towers and an old 
five-and-dime store” on Congress Street.21 She had as her goal to entice businesses and 
enterprises back into the city’s downtown – businesses that might otherwise open in malls, or 
other areas outside of the city’s center.22 This remained similar to the original urban plan for 
Portland designed by Victor Gruen and his associates close to 30 years previously. With 
“Downtown as Mall” remaining the ethos of Noyce’s investment, the city remained well 
positioned for an urban revitalization.  
In the months and years following Noyce’s purchase and subsequent renovation of real 
estate on Congress Street, vacancy rates plummeted. One building at 465 Congress Street saw its 
vacancy rate go from 15% to 3%, while another at 477 Congress Street saw its rates decrease 
from 15% to 5%. With the investment made by Noyce and by others, the overall vacancy rate in 
Portland plummeted by 11.9% from 1992 to 1996 and pricing per square foot increased 
drastically as well.23 Noyce’s injections of capital into the downtown secured important 
attractive real estate for future businesses and gave Portland further options in providing space 
for new businesses to open, while retaining the historic nature of the city’s downtown.  
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A New York Times article published in 1996 covering Noyce’s investment into Portland 
quoted a prominent area businesswoman who made the conscious decision to move her computer 
consulting company from the suburbs to the downtown area. She stated that this decision was 
made due to the attractive, newly refurbished office space, the “Victorian lobby replete with 
marble, brass and mahogany details; the central location; the nearby parking garage; and the 
relatively crime-free neighborhood.”24 Once again, the making of such a decision suggests that 
Noyce’s investment created a climate in which businesses offering creative class positions were 
enticed by her efforts to create an attractive downtown. Her money spent revamping the core of 
Portland, created an environment where businesses were drawn to the city for its character and 
its well-appointed office space. 
Noyce also spearheaded the effort to entice L.L. Bean to open a now-closed retail 
establishment on Congress Street. For much of the population, this opening of a flagship store 
downtown represented that the area “had finally turned a corner” with respect to its 
revitalization.25 The opening of L.L Bean also coincided with Noyce’s investment in the, also 
now-closed, Public Market in downtown Portland. Working off the model used by Seattle in its 
Pike Place Market, Noyce poured money into creating a “block and a half wide” structure to 
house close to 23 vendors selling their wares to the public.26 The space was home to stalls selling 
seafood, meat, and vegetables, and was home to a public performance space for local bands. This 
project not only created a diverse shopping location for the downtown, but it also empowered 
local vendors who were provided with a location to sell their goods to the public.  
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The creation of the Public Market works again to support the case of Portland becoming a 
magnet city for the creative class. Key to attracting individuals in such a class is the diversity of 
the populace, but also the diversity of entertainment, eating, and recreational options, offering 
them avenues to “enjoy a mix of influences.”27 The creation of the Public Market serves as a 
powerful metaphor for the type of city Portland was becoming due to Noyce’s outside injections 
of capital, by not only revitalizing downtown office space, but by also providing for diverse and 
vibrant “third places,” or locations outside of work and home-life, Noyce’s efforts worked to turn 
the city into a magnet for the creative class. 
Noyce’s total donations toward Maine charities and other institutions were valued at 
nearly $75 million dollars by the end of her life.28 Her “individual entrepreneurial energy,” 
combined with that of other investors, has created a Portland wherein “grassroots” regeneration 
has reigned supreme instead of large-scale local government initiatives.29 While the success of 
the Model Cities Program in the late 1960s and early 1970s did provide a previous critical 
juncture in this history of the city, Noyce’s investments in business and real estate certainly 
represent a second major event creating a city with lower levels of economic anxiety than that of 
its more northerly neighbor. 
 
1.B Rise of Portland’s Cultural Institutions 
While the previous section suggests a robust economy and business sector in Portland, 
this section highlights the rise of Portland’s cultural institutions. Key to Florida’s concept of how 
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creative class individuals are drawn to a city is the concept that they are drawn to urban areas 
with a diverse selection of nightlife, arts and other forms of entertainment and recreation.  
The investments made by Noyce not only were targeted at the economy of downtown 
Portland, but also at kickstarting the city’s cultural renaissance. By strategically investing in the 
city’s cultural institutions, Noyce and others turned Portland into a cosmopolitan destination and 
one where the creative class of individuals would be likely to migrate to as the diverse cultural, 
recreational, and entertainment options in the city grew.  
This claim also builds on an important body of work suggesting that individuals with 
higher levels of education and with higher levels of cultural capital are more likely to be 
accepting of people from diverse backgrounds and be in support of immigrants.30 Research 
suggests that people with lower levels of education are more prone to seeing immigrants as both 
a cultural and economic threat. This work ties into the events in Portland as Noyce’s funding of a 
vibrant downtown with plentiful arts and culture made the attainment of cultural capital and 
increased learning more readily accessible. The presence of a robust cultural district suggests a 
greater accessibility to cultural capital, a mitigated perceived threat posed by immigrants, and 
overall increased support for pro-immigrant policies from municipal government officials. 
Noyce made sizable donations to both the Portland Museum of Art, the Maine College of 
Art and the Maine Historical Society (all of which are located on the central Congress Street 
corridor). She thereby offered the seed money that would eventually result in the creation of 
Portland’s Arts District.31  The establishment of such an area downtown was not the brainchild of 
Noyce alone but rather the explicit idea of the city government. This district was originally 
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decided upon by officials in City Hall who stressed the need to make the city a bastion for 
“cultural institutions and [an] artistic community,” the presence of which would make it an 
attractive location for creative class individuals according to Florida.32 This suggests that 
municipal actors in Portland were committed to creating a city engineered toward attracting the 
creative class. 
“Through direct grants as well as property tax rebates,” the city of Portland began to 
attract institutions into the newly defined Arts District. The Children’s Museum of Maine opened 
downtown, and the city sold a commercial building on State Street at a loss to the Portland 
Performing Arts Center to give the institution a new home.33 Building on a donation from Noyce, 
the Maine College of Art was also able to expand by moving into a former department store in 
the downtown. The arrival of these institutions along with a series of smaller galleries, cafes, and 
boutiques solidified the development of the city’s reputation for being both “quirky [and] 
cultured.”34 While the city was able to provide financial incentives to organizations to open up 
shop downtown, the large-scale investment in the district by Noyce acted as a further catalyst for 
Portland’s development into a well-heeled, cosmopolitan society with a diverse offering of 
cultural institutions fostering many different viewpoints. 
Portland’s institutions of higher education have functioned as ways to increase the 
education levels within the city. While Lewiston and its relationship with Bates College has been 
contentious in the past, with stereotyping rife on both sides of the divide, Portland’s main 
institution, the University of Southern Maine (USM), has committed itself to an “academic 
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quality that is affordable, flexible, and meaningful.”35 By focusing on offering an education that 
is affordable, and being a public institution, USM has been able to avoid the negative 
stereotyping present in Lewiston with regard to Bates students. More importantly, Lewiston has 
been unable to attract college graduates from its institutions of higher education to remain in the 
city; however, 75.6% of USM alumni remain in Maine after graduation and, of the school’s 
51,000 active alumni, 14,721 reside in Cumberland County, where Portland is located.36  
The work of Jens Hainmueller and Michael J. Hiscox suggests that people with higher 
levels of education are much more likely to have liberal, welcoming views toward immigrants.37 
They posit that persons with higher levels of education are “significantly less racist and place far 
greater value on cultural diversity in society, and they are also more likely to believe that 
immigration generates benefits for their national economy as a whole.”38 In 2017,  28.4% of 
Portland’s population over the age of 25 had a bachelor’s degree or higher, while in Lewiston 
only 12.6% had such an advanced degree.39 These data support the claim that Portland is an area 
with greater receptivity to politicians who espouse pro-immigrant policy and rhetoric because of 
the higher levels of education of its population.  
With Noyce’s large investments and with other injections of capital, the Old Port and the 
City of Portland as a whole has become an important symbol for successful economic 
development. The commercial redevelopment of downtown helped “spur residential 
reoccupation of the downtown” and created a process of gentrification felt throughout the city. 
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Portland is now known for its reputation of having an extremely well-preserved and 
architecturally significant downtown, anchored by the economic powerhouse that is the Old Port, 
and for having a vibrant selection of places where businesses, artists, and leisure classes can find 
locations to relax and to be exposed to a variety of different cultures and perspectives. 
Noyce’s large injections of outside capital were acts of political entrepreneurship that 
reinforced the city’s economic development pathway that began with the Model Cities Program 
in the 1970s. By heavily investing in the downtown, creating more economic opportunity, and 
firmly endowing strong cultural institutions, Noyce heavily contributed to Portland’s economic 
health on the eve of the city becoming a major site for the arrival of immigrants. This historical 
analysis suggests that economic anxiety was lower in Portland thanks, in large part, to these 
external injections of resources. 
 
2. Lewiston Today 
This section highlights the economic and cultural development of Lewiston during the 
time-frame of 1990 to the near present day. Similar to the discussion of Portland offered above, 
this part of Chapter Four explores any injections of outside capital into Lewiston and how it 
developed in the post-Model Cities era. By looking at the decisions and events occurring in 
Lewiston’s history, this section contends that the ultimate lack of outside capital and dearth of 
cultural institutions and other third place areas in the city created an environment in which the 
economic anxiety and racial threat posed by major immigrant arrivals was more potent.  
Beginning in the 1990s, Lewiston slowly began to change and develop following the final 
closure of the once-mighty mills. While Portland experienced a wave of large outside capital 
injections after the Model Cities Program spearheaded by the millionaire Elizabeth Noyce, 
Lewiston has not had such a large investment. The city has had its own smaller waves of 
  
129 
redevelopment, but it has not experienced the same success as Portland in large-scale economic 
revitalization.  
As shown by Chapter Three, Portland was situated in a significantly more advantageous 
place after the implementation of its Model Cities program, with multiple participants lauding its 
work in downtown revitalization and the implementation of service provisions to its populace. 
Chapter Three’s content also suggests that, while successful in some regards, the program in 
Lewiston was not quite as fruitful and, most importantly, the city was never able to revitalize its 
own downtown in the same way as Portland. As suggested by the work of Pierson, this thesis 
contends that these events represent a first critical juncture explaining the difference in policy 
and rhetoric espoused by municipal politicians in the two cities. This section highlights decisions 
made by the city of Lewiston, the lack of a political entrepreneur, and the lack of cultural 
institutions needed to mitigate the effects of the arrival of a racialized other in the form of the 
Somali immigration to the city.  
 
2.A Development in Lewiston 
 In 1992, Bates Mill No. 5, the largest building in the mill complex, was acquired by the 
city of Lewiston after the Bates Corporation fell behind on its real estate taxes.40 The city quickly 
formed the Lewiston Mill Redevelopment Corporation (LMRC), a society comprised of “city 
staff, elected officials, and private citizens.”41 In 1996 the LMRC hired Platz Associates, an 
Auburn, ME based firm to begin a design plan for the Mill No. 5 building. Platz began first by 
undergoing an extensive environmental cleanup plan within the building and began to market its 
                                               





spaces for development. In 2004, Platz bought the majority of the mill from the city of Lewiston 
and have acquired tenants such as Androscoggin Bank, TD Bank, Baxter Brewing Co., Grand 
Rounds, and Cross Insurance.42 This large reinvestment in the city’s historical infrastructure 
suggests a new period of economic vitality in the city, as over $70 million has been invested in 
the mill complex by the owners and its other occupants. The reinvestment has also created new 
Class A office space open to further occupants.  
However, as suggested by the work of Florida, cities that merely develop cookie-cutter 
approaches to attracting creative class individuals are unlikely to succeed. The path taken by 
Lewiston mirrors the attempts at revitalization by other former cities who have since lost their 
major industrial employers. His work highlights the case of Pittsburgh, PA, a city that built many 
amenities for businesses, but was unable to attract younger, creative class individuals as it lacked 
a thriving scene of nightlife, restaurants, and ethnic and cultural diversity needed to entice this 
younger generation.  
 Recent plans put forth by the city identify several areas that are still in need of 
improvement and investment. The 2012 Riverfront Island Masterplan identified key areas needed 
in the continued revitalization of Lewiston. It acknowledged that while the city had made 
headway, it was only just exiting a period of “severe economic headwinds” that have continually 
bogged the city down.43  
 City officials have identified a lack of proper housing and office infrastructure as two of 
the major factors preventing further growth.44 While Portland benefited from downtown 
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revitalization during the Model Cities period and then with the immense capital injections from 
Elizabeth Noyce, Lewiston has not been made the beneficiary of such generosity or periods of 
demolition of older, dilapidated housing areas for the creation of new forms of transport or 
building. 
 As shown in Chapter Two, Portland’s city officials created the Franklin Arterial, the main 
access route to the city’s downtown, by destroying many houses of low-income residents in the 
city’s Bayside neighborhood. A similar plan was proposed in 2004 in Lewiston to create a $4.5 
million boulevard from Lincoln to Knox Streets in the downtown area. Planners contended that 
this would open up the city to more revitalization and increase access to the downtown, but the 
plan was defeated by a group of community members.45 Though the downfall of this plan 
exhibited the agency of Lewiston’s low-income residents – something that Portland’s Bayside 
residents ultimately lacked during the heyday of Model Cities investment – it also may have 
detrimentally affected the city in certain ways by not allowing for easier access to downtown 
businesses and office areas. Though Portland’s city planners may have destroyed many people’s 
homes and livelihoods with the creation of the Franklin Arterial, it did allow for an easier access 
to the downtown area from Interstate 295, which may have been crucial in the development of 
the Old Port district and the peninsula more generally. 
Recent events and developments suggest that Lewiston is beginning to experience an 
economic renaissance. The development of former mill buildings and the continued openings of 
restaurants and shops in the downtown Lisbon Street area suggest a city that is beginning to 
regain its footing since the closure of the mills. However, as suggested by Chapter Three, levels 
of economic anxiety are still higher in Lewiston, as it has experienced decades of a lack of 
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revitalization. Lewiston has also importantly not seen the same development of a vibrant 
nightlife, arts, and culture scene in the same way as Portland. The conclusion of this thesis 
hypothesizes as to the direction that Lewiston is heading and suggest avenues that the city may 
pursue in order to continue this upward trend. 
 
2.B Difficulty in Attracting the Creative Class to Lewiston 
 The secondary scholarship suggests that a city with greater access to cultural capital, in 
the form of museums, art galleries, and other institutions, may experience a mitigated racial 
threat as posed by the arrival of a racially different population, and thus a lack of support of anti-
immigrant policies.46 The work of Florida and Joslyn and Sharp similarly suggest that a city with 
a greater number of creative class individuals, attracted to an area by the aforementioned 
institutions, may experience a mitigated perception of racial threat and therefore a lack of 
support of politicians that espouse nativist rhetoric. This section examines the presence of 
institutions promoting cultural capital, attracting the creative class to Lewiston, and the existence 
of businesses and development policies that affected the city’s inability to revitalize its 
downtown in the same manner as Portland.  
During the 1990s, while Portland’s Old Port district was slowing becoming an economic 
powerhouse, Lisbon Street, Lewiston’s main shopping avenue, was still in need of further 
investment. As has been stated, unlike Portland, Lewiston was unable to secure the outside 
funding of a donor needed to inject the capital to spear the revitalization efforts of the downtown. 
Chapter Three also suggests that Lewiston was also significantly set-back by the fact that its 
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Model Cities Program was unable to change the downtown and revamp the existing historical 
buildings in the same way as Portland’s.  
A 1995 report issued by the city acknowledged that Lewiston had made strides with 
regard to the diversification of its economy since the closing of the mills; however, it still 
highlighted the fact that its downtown was severely lacking in offering retail options, restaurants, 
and office space needed for revitalization.47 Importantly, this report made reference to the 
“negative stigma” surrounding the city’s core downtown area.48 The authors of the plan 
acknowledged the fact that the city was hurt economically by the aesthetic shortcomings of its 
downtown area.  
The plan also recognized the need to redevelopment many of the “key historic buildings” 
in the area.49 Once again, the city lacked major outside sources of capital needed for these 
projects and was unable to revitalize the downtown in the manner of Portland during the same 
timeframe. Florida’s thesis suggests that creative class individuals are drawn to urban areas 
maintaining their past-industrial charm and that also offer a diverse selection of outside-of-work 
entertainment. The content of the 1995 plan shows that Lewiston was not in a position to attract 
such a class of individuals. With the arrival of the first, albeit small, wave of immigrants from 
Togo in 1999, the lack of downtown revitalization and the continued heightened feelings of 
economic anxiety suggest that perceived racial threat and support of more anti-immigrant 
policies would be higher in the coming years. 
A 1997 Comprehensive Plan published by the city of Lewiston found that while 
extensive in its cultural heritage, the city importantly lacked an Arts District similar to the one 
                                               






found in Portland. The plan suggested that the city create a Cultural District in the heart of its 
downtown to promote the “value of arts and culture as both a content area and a process of 
learning.”50 During this timeframe, the city identified the need for the creation of incentives “for 
the development of retail, residential, including artists’ studios, and other culturally related 
enterprises.” While the city did see the establishment of the Public Theater in the downtown 
area, the opening of the Franco Center and other, smaller cultural establishments, Lewiston has 
been unable to match Portland’s commitment and funding available to such institutions 
promoting an increased cultural capital.51 The city does not have the same robust Arts District as 
present in its southern neighbor. 
The presence of Bates College in Lewiston has recently been a major player in the 
offering of cultural capital to the area; however, as noted in the Legacy Lewiston Report 
published by the city in 2017, the area is lacking in its ability to retain Bates and other college 
graduates after the end of their time on campus. 52 Students surveyed in the report noted that the 
city lacked a diverse selection of “college-student-friendly small businesses like pubs, clubs, 
cafes, thrift shops, a bowling alley, a yoga studio, retail clothing stores” and others.”53 The vast 
majority of students surveyed noted that they had “no interest in staying in Lewiston after 
graduation” given the aforementioned lack of “third places” and the dearth of attractive job 
options for their interests.54 Florida contends that without these institutions and opportunities, 
cities may be unable to attract high levels individuals employed in creative professions. 
                                               
50 Comprehensive Plan Committee, “Comprehensive Plan,” City of Lewiston, May 1997, 
http://www.lewistonmaine.gov/DocumentCenter/View/799/1997---Comprehensive-Plan---Part-1?bidId=.  
51 Ibid. 
52 Planning Board, “Legacy Lewiston - City Comprehensive Plan,” City of Lewiston, January 17, 2017, 
https://www.lewistonmaine.gov/DocumentCenter/View/7101/CompPlanForWebsite?bidId=.  




Community relations between the college and city itself have also only recently 
improved. While the college has recently stressed a symbiotic relationship with Lewiston, a 2003 
study published in the Princeton Review “rated the college 18th worst [in the country] for 
community relations.”55 As the town’s fortunes slowly declined and the college’s improved, a 
rift occurred – Bates students were regarded as being “wealthy and elitist” and out-of-touch with 
the post-industrial community burdened by economic downturn. A “murder of a Bates senior by 
a Lewiston man and the rape of a Bates freshman by a Sabattus man” in 2002 only furthered the 
distrust between the college and the community it surrounds.56  
Recent efforts to improve this relationship with the town have proved fruitful, with the 
taking down of the chain-link fence that once surrounded Bates’ campus and the establishment of 
the Harward Center for Community Engagement.57 As the majority of Bates students enter 
creative professions after graduation, if the Lewiston-area is able to attract more to stay after 
graduation, over time, levels of racial threat may decrease.58 Additionally, the sense of distrust 
and resentment present among certain factions of the native-Lewiston community may also harm 
the college’s ability to attract residents to the speeches, art exhibitions, pieces of theatre, and 
presentations offering diverse viewpoints and cultural capital. 
Given this lack of outside capital, the absence of a political entrepreneur, and an historic 
shortage of support at the municipal government level to fund programs to entice cultural 
institutions to the area, these events suggest that Lewiston’s lack of places and opportunities 
needed to attract creative class individuals to the area and its lack of cultural institutions play a 
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role in the city being more likely to support and elect politicians, particularly at the mayoral level 
who espouse an anti-immigrant doctrine. This is suggested by the work of Joslyn and Sharp, who 
contend that a city that lacks a population of creative class individuals is more likely to 
experience the effects of racial threat. 
 
Conclusion 
As laid out in the introduction, this chapter highlights how events and decisions 
concerning economic and cultural development in the 1990s contributed to the rise or fall of 
support for anti-immigrant rhetoric and policy from municipal politicians in Lewiston and 
Portland. Using the explanations put forth by Sheingate, Florida, Joslyn and Sharp, and 
Manevska and Achterberg, this chapter contends that the presence of an influential political 
entrepreneur, and the differing levels of creative class individuals and the associated institutions 
that attract them to an area, have contributed to different levels of support for anti-immigrant 
rhetoric in Portland and Lewiston. 
This chapter importantly highlights further differences in amounts of injections of outside 
capital between the two cities. While Portland benefited from both a more streamlined Model 
Cities Program and the millions put into the city by Elizabeth Noyce, Lewiston has not been as 
well served. This thesis by no means discredits the hard work put into city planning efforts in 
Lewiston; rather it merely points out the funding differentials between the two cities and the 
subsequent repercussions. Portland has been allowed to develop more freely with its greater 
sources of capital, presence of an important political entrepreneur in the city, and the smoother 
running of its Model Cities Program. As this chapter elucidates, this has led to the arrival of 
more creative class individuals in the city.  
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While much has been said to critique Florida’s creative class thesis, it is also important to 
stress this thesis does not rely heavily on his explanation that creative class individuals engender 
economic growth. Instead, this thesis focuses on the elevated levels of racial tolerance in cities 
with larger populations of creative class persons.59 By focusing on this testable explanation, this 
thesis avoids many of the critiques that scholars have put forth regarding Florida’s work. 
The different percentages of persons with higher levels of education in Portland as 
compared to Lewiston is also a key aspect of this chapter. The findings of Hainmueller and 
Hiscox are highly robust and importantly suggest that cities with larger populations of 
individuals with advanced degrees are much more likely to have pro-immigrant views 
themselves and support pro-immigrant politicians.  
Chapter Four describes events suggesting an economic and cultural divergence between 
Maine’s two largest cities, and the reinforcement of the two cities’ distinct pathways of 
economic development. Continuing the story of immigration in Portland and Lewiston, Chapter 
Five examines immigration-related policy and rhetoric at the state and the local level in Maine. 
By looking at the normalization of right-wing rhetoric in the state, and how politicians in the 
examined cities have framed immigration, Chapter Five utilizes the content of the previous 
chapters to offer an explanation for how and why anti-immigrant rhetoric has been more 
supported at the municipal level in Lewiston than in Portland.  
                                               




Chapter 5 – The Normalization of Right-Wing Discourse in Maine and Its 
Repercussions 
Donald Trump has changed the rules of the game in U.S. politics. He has continually 
broken down barriers of what is considered to be normal political discourse, and he has said 
things that would have been regarded as political suicide only a short time ago; however, his 
actions have shown that public opinion is no longer in line with elite beliefs espoused by news 
pundits, members of Congress, former presidents, and others.1  However, Paul LePage, the 
former Governor of Maine, has been acknowledged as “Donald Trump before Donald Trump 
became popular.”2 Even before Trump became prominent on a national stage, LePage was 
already making brash and explosive remarks toward minority groups, immigrants, and other 
marginalized parties. 
 Using the secondary literature on the normalization of right-wing rhetoric in U.S. politics 
and the consequent rise of nativism, this chapter examines LePage’s speeches and policy to show 
how such remarks became normal and accepted in Maine’s political arena. By examining his 
discourse, this chapter suggests that his comments have expanded the boundaries of what is 
permissible in Maine politics and thereby potentially contributed to the electability and continued 
                                               
1 Andrew Gelman and Julia Azari, “19 Things We Learned From the 2016 Election,” Statistic and Public 
Opinion 4, no. 1, (2017): 5-6; Daniel W. Drezner, “Donald Trump’s three types of norm violations,” 
Washington Post, December 19, 2016, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2016/12/19/donald-trumps-three-types-of-norm-
violations/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.559c2e010e4b; Tom McCarthy, “Donald Trump and the erosion of 
democratic norms in America,” The Guardian, June 2, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2018/jun/02/trump-department-of-justice-robert-mueller-crisis; Max Boot, “Here are the political norms 
that Trump violated in just the past week,” The Washington Post, May 21, 2018,  
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/global-opinions/wp/2018/05/21/here-are-the-political-norms-that-
trump-violated-in-just-the-past-week/?utm_term=.c1532aed4462.   




success of such Lewiston mayors as Robert Macdonald and Shane Bouchard. LePage’s 
comments and political discourse have allowed for “formerly taboo subjects and expressions” to 
enter into the state of Maine’s local political rhetoric and mayoral candidates in Lewiston have 
capitalized on this in order to be elected to the city’s highest office.3  
 Chapter Five also builds on discussion of economic development of Lewiston and 
Portland examined in Chapters Three and Four. As shown by these previous chapters, the distinct 
economic pathways of development in Lewiston and Portland have created two cities with 
different levels of receptivity to anti-immigrant rhetoric. These previous chapters have argued 
that Portland’s pathway alleviated economic anxiety while Lewiston’s did not. The scholarship 
of Jack Citrin, Donald Green, Christopher Muste, and Cara Wong contends that if individuals in 
an area perceive or experience economic adversity or believe that immigrants will have “harmful 
effects on employment opportunities and taxes,” they may be more willing to support candidates 
who vilify an immigrant other.4 Using this scholarship and the content of Chapters Three and 
Four, this chapter posits that due to Lewiston’s higher levels of economic anxiety, lack of 
creative class individuals, and its dearth of cultural institutions, this has become a city in which 
anti-immigrant candidates are more likely to gain electoral traction. Inversely, this chapter also 
contends that Portland’s robust economic development and growth of its creative class 
population and its cultural institutions combine to become barriers against the receptivity to such 
anti-immigrant rhetoric, and, these factors may induce support for politicians that espouse pro-
immigrant rhetoric and policy. 
                                               
3 Ruth Wodak, “‘Driving on the Right’ - The Austrian Case,” Center for the Analysis of the Radical Right, last 
modified 2018, http://www.radicalrightanalysis.com/2018/04/09/driving-on-the-right-the-austrian-case/. 
4 Jack Citrin, Donald P. Green, Christopher Muste, and Cara Wong, “Public Opinion Toward Immigration 
Reform: The Role of Economic Motivations,” The Journal of Politics 59, no. 3 (1997): 875. 
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 This chapter relies on the scholarship of Ruth Wodak and Matt Golder to explain how 
right-wing candidates have gained traction in Maine. An important aspect of populist discourse is 
the creation of an “us vs. them” dichotomy within a candidate’s chosen political sphere.5 This 
kind of discursive construction enables some assessment of testable explanations regarding 
outgroup dynamics presented in Chapter One. The creation of a distinct “other” remains a critical 
factor in the rise of right-wing candidates. These actors define the population they represent by 
marking stark divisions between native residents and the “other,” or the threat that poses a large 
problem to the continued success of a country, or, in this case, a state and city.6  
Secondary scholarship indicates that by highlighting and often exaggerating divisions 
among certain groups, populist politicians may drum up more support for their anti-immigrant 
rhetoric and policy. For example, Herbert Blumer posits that if political actors expand racial 
conflicts or differences into “big events,” potential adverse images or the perceived negative 
differences will be more potent.7 If right wing candidates are successful in creating such fears 
and stark divisions, the secondary scholarship suggest that their support may increase. The 
literature also suggests that if right wing candidates define the people they represent as “better” 
or “more” virtuous than the outgroup they have defined in their rhetoric, support for their 
platform may increase.8 
 This chapter is made up of three parts. The first section of this chapter looks at LePage’s 
speeches, interviews, and campaign platforms in order to show how he has used ingroup vs. 
outgroup dynamics and certain grievances to create a heightened sense of perceived threats 
                                               
5  Wodak, “‘Driving on the Right.’” 
6 Herbert Blumer, “Race Prejudice as a Sense of Group Position,” The Pacific Sociological Review 1, no. 1, 
(1958): 3. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Bart Cammaerts, “The Mainstreaming of Extreme Right-Wing Populism in the Low Countries: What is to be 
Done?,” Communication and Culture & Critique 11 (2018): 10. 
  
141 
within the state of Maine. This section relies on the aforementioned theoretical framework of 
Blumer’s outgroup anxiety theory in how politicians expand upon racial conflict. Then, this 
section looks to Matt Golder’s three primary motivators that have been shown to contribute to 
the rise of right-wing candidates: modernization, economic, and cultural grievances. By showing 
how LePage has used these tactics, this first section contends that his words and speeches have 
pushed formerly taboo subjects into mainstream discourse and elicited greater support for right-
wing policy and rhetoric in certain cities in Maine.  
The second part of this chapter highlights the policy and rhetoric of former Lewiston 
Mayor Robert Macdonald. It begins by examining the rhetoric of previous mayors and, in a 
fashion similar to the discussion of LePage, looks at the rise or fall of anti-immigrant positions 
within the city’s government. By examining how Macdonald was elected into office for multiple 
terms while confronted by liberal, Democratic, pro-immigrant challengers, this section posits that 
LePage’s earlier rhetoric and continued norm-breaking made Macdonald’s own anti-immigrant 
platforms politically viable in the economic and cultural context of Lewiston. While many facets 
of the community in Lewiston exhibited support for the newly-arrived immigrant population, this 
part of Chapter Five seeks to answer the question of how mayors who espouse anti-immigrant 
policy and rhetoric are able to maintain electability in such a locale.  
This section of Chapter Five importantly builds on the previous discussions in Chapters 
Three and Four that contend, respectively, that levels of economic anxiety and racial tolerance 
exist at different levels between Portland and Lewiston. This section posits that (1) the 
normalization of right-wing rhetoric accomplished by Paul LePage, (2) Lewiston’s higher levels 
of perceived economic anxiety and (3) lower levels of racial tolerance, which is often associated 
with a dearth of creative class individuals and institutions, make candidates, such as Macdonald, 
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politically viable. In examining how Macdonald and other mayoral candidates have framed the 
immigration debate within the city, this section posits that their policy and rhetoric has remained 
more salient in the Lewiston context than in Portland.  
The final section of this chapter moves the analysis to Portland and explores how 
municipal government officials have framed the debate surrounding immigration. By again 
employing data and research initially discussed in Chapters Three and Four, this section looks at 
how Portland’s city officials have responded to new influxes of immigrants and the immigration 
debate at large, as it becomes a polarizing issue across the country. This section works to show 
the stark differences between the two cities in terms of their elected politicians’ professed policy 
and rhetoric. 
 
1.The Rise of Paul LePage 
Paul LePage was elected to become Governor of Maine in November of 2010 after a long 
and contentious race during which LePage consistently butted heads with reporters and 
continually made brash statements. During the race for the states’ highest office, LePage was 
quoted saying that if elected he would immediately tell then-President Obama to “go to hell.”9 
Additionally, in the months prior to the election, LePage was caught on camera cursing when 
asked if his children had paid in-state tuition to attend college in Florida, the location of his 
second home.10 By engaging in such disputes and by running on a platform in which he pledged 
to insult the country’s first black president, the actions of LePage suggest a commitment to such 
                                               
9 Abby Goodnough, “Energized Base Tilts Rightward in Maine,” New York Times, October 27, 2010, 
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right-wing tactics as laid out in the literature on ingroup vs. outgroup dynamics and on the 
normalization of right-wing rhetoric. Particularly his comments directed toward President 
Obama even before his election suggest the creation of a stark boundary between himself and the 
office and occupant of the country’s chief executive.  
In making such statements early in his campaign, LePage began to normalize the use of 
tactics and verbal jousts that would, in a previous time, have made him unelectable. Given 
Maine’s historically independent voting base, with “more unenrolled voters than Democrats or 
Republicans,” the actions and comments made by LePage foreshadow events that would follow 
in the election of 2016.11 The state’s independent nature, but subsequent sway to the right, 
suggested a phenomenon that was about to take place on the national scale.  
 
1.A Modernization and Economic Grievances 
Golder’s work explores how economic grievances motivate support for right-wing 
candidates. LePage’s campaign platform, early rhetoric, and policy proposals heavily focused on 
the economic situation in Maine, and in his inaugural address in 2011 he stressed Maine’s need 
to “search for profit” and said that the state was “the hardest place in the country to start and own 
a business.” 12 His speech highlighted the economic shortcomings in the state and thrust the 
debate into the statewide political sphere. By focusing on how Maine’s economy had been 
failing before his time in office, LePage effectively highlighted the sense of longstanding 
economic grievances at the state and local levels.  
                                               
11 Goudnough, “Energized Base Tilts Rightward in Maine.” 
12 Paul LePage, “Inaugural Address,” (speech, Augusta, ME, January 5, 2011), State of Maine Office of 
Governor Paul LePage, https://www.maine.gov/governor/lepage/newsroom/speech.html?id=180886. 
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LePage centered much of his campaign platform on pledges to be a fiscal conservative, to 
balance the state’s budget, and to revitalize the state’s long suffering “manufacturing and natural 
resources industries.”13  In a state with cities and towns plagued by the loss of their major 
industry, as shown in Chapter Two and Three’s discussions of both Lewiston and Portland, 
LePage’s campaign promises and eventual platform as governor centered economic anxiety in 
the political discourse. In a 2013 State of the State address, LePage professed his commitment to 
“fishing, farming and forestry,” as the driving forces of “Maine’s economic engine.”14 Because 
of his disregard for the changed twenty-first century economy, LePage’s remarks and policy 
worked to exacerbate some of the grievances laid out in Golder’s scholarship – grievances that, if 
magnified in media and discourse, may give rise to the normalization of right-wing rhetoric. 
Golder writes that giving voices to economic grievances often associated with de-
industrialization are a potent way of drumming up support for right-wing platforms and for 
candidates that broach topics that were formerly considered taboo. People who are “unable to 
cope with rapid and fundamental societal change” are thus termed the “modernization losers.”15 
Research suggests that individuals experiencing this sentiment of resentment are more likely to 
support right-wing candidates and disregard other more problematic statements such candidates 
may make.  
LePage’s economic policy exacerbated these modernization grievances and further 
inflated feelings of resentment among populations feeling left behind. As highlighted by 
Chapters Three and Four, the issues at play in the city of Lewiston suggest an area with a greater 
                                               
13 Christopher Burns, “What stands out about LePage’s approach to the economy: A focus on industries of the 
past,” Bangor Daily News, June 18, 2016,https://bangordailynews.com/2016/06/18/the-point/what-stands-out-
about-lepages-approach-to-the-economy-a-focus-on-industries-of-the-past/. 
14 Ibid. 
15Matt Golder, “Far Right Parties in Europe,” Annual Review of Political Science 19 (2016): 483. 
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propensity to support candidates espousing a rhetoric focused around modernization grievances, 
as the city has yet to fully recover from the loss of its major industry and employers. While 
Lewiston’s economy has undoubtedly grown since the closure of its mills and the city and state 
have seen recent low rates of unemployment, the content of Chapters Three and Four suggest 
that the city still has higher levels of economic anxiety than those in Portland.16 
The city’s historical tie to the textile industry also makes it a location in which 
modernization grievances may be more easily activated. Lewiston’s skyline is still dominated by 
the formerly bustling mill structures, and, while some have been revitalized, many still stand 
empty and unused. These highly visible symbols of a bygone industrial period make Lewiston an 
area in which modernization grievances may be felt more strongly since these buildings stand as 
markers to the city’s loss of its major industry, and their presence as empty shells may 
exacerbate the feelings of being left behind by the rapidly changing global economy in recent 
years. While Portland has seen a drastic change to its downtown economy in the years since the 
loss of its major shipping industry, Lewiston has only recently seen development return to 
Lisbon Street and the old mills 
As suggested by Golder, if there is a feeling of being “left behind” by the “globalized and 
post industrial economy,” populations may throw support by candidates who espouse a doctrine 
that pledges to return an area to its former glory.17 LePage’s State of the State address in 2013, 
while not specifically referring to Lewiston’s textile industry, evoked a commitment to such 
bygone industries in the state as a whole. By highlighting how the state had fallen behind in 
terms of its industrial prowess, LePage’s words thrust modernization grievances into the 
                                               
16 Edward D. Murphy, “Unemployment in October remained at historic lows,” Portland Press Herald, 
November 16, 2018, https://www.pressherald.com/2018/11/16/unemployment-in-october-remains-at-historic-
lows/.  
17 Matt Golder, “Far Right Parties in Europe,” Annual Review of Political Science 19 (2016): 483. 
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statewide political discourse, effectively creating a base for continued support of right-wing 
candidates who followed in his footsteps. His commitment to revitalizing the state’s industrial 
base drew more people to support his platform and led more to disregard his more virulent 
discourse. His words highlighted how the state’s population, who formerly worked in such 
traditional industries, had been left behind by the growing world economy and that he 
represented a force that would help them regain their former glory.  
LePage’s rhetoric on the need to bring back Maine’s traditional industries and his early 
addresses focusing on the state’s supposedly dire economic situation heightened the perceived 
economic and modernization grievances in the state. As suggested by the work of Golder, right-
wing candidates who utilize such grievances in their discourse and professed policy may see 
increased support for their platforms. Further sections of this chapter examine how municipal 
politicians in Lewiston have benefited from the manner in which LePage thrust these discussions 
into the state’s political sphere. 
 
1.B Cultural Grievances and Ingroup vs. Outgroup Dynamics 
 During his gubernatorial campaign, LePage promised to a crowd of fishermen in 
Brooksville, Maine that if elected he would personally tell then-President Obama to “go to 
hell.”18 By using such profane language to talk about the United States’ first black president 
during his campaign, LePage effectively created a stark boundary between himself and Obama 
and the population he professed to represent. He went on to say in the same speech that the 
President was “taking us to a place where my children and my grandchildren will never come 
                                               




back.”19 As suggested by the work of Golder if right-wing candidates are able to highlight the 
supposed “incompatibility” of the group they profess to represent with another opposing group, 
support for their platform will increase.  
 The words and actions of LePage are also in line with Bart Cammaerts theory on the 
creation stark ingroup vs. outgroup demarcations. Cammaerts posits that if a candidate is able to 
create the myth that a native population is somehow “better” or “more virtuous” than a group of 
perceived outsiders, the subsequent feelings of threat may create an environment in which right-
wing candidates are able to derive more support.20 LePage’s early comments directed at Obama 
suggested such an incompatibility between the people of Maine and the President of the United 
States. By insulting Obama and painting the president’s identity and political positions in a 
negative light, LePage created the feeling that the population he professed to represent in Maine 
was being corrupted and drawn down a dangerous path. Cammaerts’ research suggests that if a 
right-wing politician creates such a boundary and utilizes discourse that paints their represented 
population as “better” than a dangerous group of outsiders, support for their platform may 
increase.  
 In 2016, LePage remarked that “out-of-state drug dealers” were coming to Maine and 
impregnating “young white girl[s] before leaving.” He went on to say that “guys with the name 
D-Money, Smoothie, [and] Shifty” were coming into the state and wreaking havoc.21 These 
comments, with the use of clear racial profiling, created a widespread backlash across the state. 
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In saying such words, LePage contributed to furthering the divide between native residents of the 
state and anybody seen as outsiders, newcomers or not belonging in the state. By creating the 
sense that virtuous, white Maine women were being impregnated and harmed by outsiders, 
LePage not only invoked much older racist tropes of white women being defiled by black men, 
but he also further normalized the public expression of such sentiments. As suggested by the 
work of Megan Ming Francis, by utilizing such behavior, LePage effectively condoned the 
furthering of racist beliefs and actions in Maine and suggested that such discourse was 
permissible in the state’s political arena.22 These comments served to only highlight the creation 
of ingroup versus outgroup boundaries in Maine, and by employing such racialized names, 
LePage’s discourse suggested that he represented and would defend white Mainers and not those 
of a different race. 
 In February of 2016, LePage made another remark saying that asylum seekers in the state 
were bringing disease and the “ziki-fly” into Maine.23 He claimed that because of these new 
arrivals “conditions like hepatitis C and H.I.V. were on the rise in Maine.”24 He continued this 
trend of insulting marginalized populations by saying in August of the same year, that the 
“enemy right now, the overwhelming majority of people coming in, are people of color, or 
people of Hispanic origin.”25 These comments again intensified the creation of a stark divide in 
Maine between the native, majority white, residents, and the recent arrivals of racially different 
asylum seekers, refugees, and other newcomers. By exacerbating the sense of threat posed by 
racialized others, LePage succeeded in furthering the normalization of such dialogue in the state 
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of Maine and making the fears of immigrants potentially more potent in certain areas. As 
suggested by the work of Peter Burns and James Gimpel, if the arrival of a racialized other 
coincides with an economic downtown in an area, support for right wing candidates who espouse 
anti-immigrant policy and rhetoric may increase significantly.26  
 LePage’s repeated focus on the dangers of the arrival of racially different populations 
into Maine served only to increase the perceived sense of risk. In the case of Lewiston, a city 
with (1) higher levels of economic anxiety, (2) increased arrivals of a racially different 
immigrant population since the early 2000s and (3) a lack of cultural institutions, the governor’s 
rhetoric set the stage for receptivity to anti-immigrant platforms and support for mayors who 
employed such positions. 
In the 2010 election LePage garnered 43% of the votes cast in Lewiston in the three-way 
race – over a thousand more than his nearest challenger. In the 2014 gubernatorial race, LePage 
had even more success in Lewiston, receiving 50% of the vote in another three-way race. These 
data suggest that LePage was highly favored in Lewiston and supports the claim that candidates 
emulating his tactics and rhetoric would receive greater electoral support given their backing of 
his candidacy.27  
LePage’s comments in 2016 were important in the way that they stoked the fire for anti-
immigrant rhetoric leading into the 2017 mayoral election in Lewiston. Due to LePage’s 
comments in the Maine context, and the rise of Trump on the national stage, further sections 
contend that former-Mayor Shane Bouchard was able to be elected due to the factors at play.  
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 By using such “brazen provocations” the words of LePage and other right-wing 
politicians have been picked up by media outlets and given prominence in the news cycle. By 
doing so, Thomas Greven contends that news sources give credibility to this discourse and 
continue to aid in the normalization of similar dialogue.28 Regardless of the ideological leanings 
of the outlets themselves, the work of Greven and others contends that the reporting on a larger 
scale serves to only further the efficacy of right-wing actors ability to gain support.  
Through his statements, LePage created a heightened sense of fear of the “other” within 
the state of Maine. His provocations and racist comments highlighted the perceived threat of 
outsiders and created a sense of fear. This thesis contends that in doing so, LePage’s words 
created a space in which economic anxiety and racial threats were increased in the state as a 
whole. His words contributed to the normalization of right-wing rhetoric in Maine and also made 
the adoption of such platforms potentially more politically viable in certain cities. 
As suggested by Chapters Three and Four, due to the differences in their Model Cities 
Program and the cultural and economic development in the 1990s, Lewiston has developed into 
an area that may be more inclined to support candidates who espouse anti-immigrant rhetoric. Its 
distinct economic pathway has led to higher levels of economic anxiety and a dearth of 
institutions attracting creative class individuals to the area in the same numbers as Portland. The 
following section of this chapter seeks to create connections between how municipal actors in 
Lewiston built upon the normalizing of formerly taboo subjects by LePage, the heightened 
perceived racial threat, and higher levels of economic anxiety to be elected to the city’s highest 
office.  
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2. Mayoral Rhetoric and Policy in Lewiston 
 This section examines the rhetoric of mayors in Lewiston and seeks to elucidate links 
between their words and the speeches and discourse of Paul LePage. As has already been 
suggested in the content of Chapters Three and Four, the economic development history of 
Lewiston has created an environment in which the perceived risk of a racialized other and the 
levels of economic anxiety may be higher. This section examines how the mayors of Lewiston 
have used such events, in conjunction with the ascent of Paul LePage and the normalization of 
right-wing rhetoric, to achieve electoral success in the city’s context.  
While much of the rise of anti-immigrant rhetoric in Maine can be attributed to ascent of 
LePage to the state’s governorship, it is important to note that Lewiston itself had a contentious 
relationship with the immigration debate even before LePage’s election. Shortly after the initial 
arrivals of Somalis into the city in 2001, then-Mayor Larry Raymond penned an infamous letter 
directed toward the newcomers. In his writing, Raymond noted that the Somalis already in the 
community should advise their compatriots against coming to Lewiston as the city was “maxed 
out financially physically, and emotionally.”29  
After the publication of this letter, there was an outpouring of support for the Somali 
community in Maine. Then-Governor Angus King professed his support for the newly arrived 
immigrants and Mayor Raymond eventually met with Somali community leaders. However, no 
explicit apology ever came from the mayoral office.30 While the letter elicited major backlash, it 
also suggested the higher levels of economic anxiety present in Lewiston. In a city with a limited 
tax base, high tax rates in general, and lacking the economic revitalization present in Portland, 
                                               





Raymond’s words touched upon a general feeling that existed within the community – a feeling 
that the city was still experiencing tough times and that there was simply not enough wealth to 
share with a new population. 
In conjunction with the letter, rumors began to spread around the city that the new Somali 
residents were receiving “free cars, courtesy of the government, $10,000 grants, even free air-
conditioners and groceries.”31 While completely false, these whispers contributed to a rising 
feeling of resentment toward the newly arrived population. Maine offers a welfare program 
called General Assistance funded by taxpayer dollars to its neediest residents. It gives out this 
money through a “combination of state and city funds…[and] vouchers for rent, utilities, and 
food.”32 In 2002, Lewiston gave out $343,000 of General Assistance funds and the money was 
split “almost evenly between native-born Mainers and refugees.”33 However, the existence of the 
program itself threw the debate of immigrants and their access to public resources to the 
forefront of the discussion in Lewiston.  
Jeffrey Passel and Michael Fix contend that the issue of the use of public resources has 
become the “most hotly contested question in U.S. immigration.”34 And, Jens Hainmueller and 
Michael J. Hiscox posit that the belief that immigrant groups are posing a burden to the financial 
health of a locale or are simply freely benefiting from programs in place are serious motivators 
for the arousal of support for anti-immigrant policy and rhetoric.35 The existence of these 
underlying rumors in place in Lewiston, even before the campaign and election of Paul LePage, 
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suggest that the city was more likely to support candidates espousing anti-immigrant policy and 
rhetoric as it already had the underlying currents of a city that was feeling maxed out financially 
by the arrival of the Somalis. 
 
2.A Election of Larry Gilbert 
 Even as tensions began to flare between the native population of Lewiston and its new 
residents, Larry Gilbert, a vocal supporter of the newly arrived immigrants, was elected to the 
become mayor of the city in 2007. Gilbert notably “advocated for Somalis’ inclusion in local 
government and supported funding for Somali organizations” across Lewiston.36 However, it is 
important to note that Gilbert was elected into office before the ascent of Paul LePage to the 
Maine governorship. While the election and actions of Gilbert do represent an important period 
in the history of municipal politicians’ support for immigrants in Lewiston, the end of his time in 
office is arguably a larger event in the examination of why and how anti-immigrant politicians 
have found electoral success in the city.  
 During his time in office, Gilbert was an active supporter of Lewiston’s newest residents. 
His inauguration was officiated by a Rabbi, a Catholic priest, and a Somali elder in order to 
represent the many religious beliefs and communities present in Lewiston. Throughout his term 
he increased city funding to local immigrant organizations and penned Lewiston’s Welcoming 
Proclamation, which asserted that the city is a “community where all are welcomed, accepted 
and appreciated.”37  
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 In July of 2011, Gilbert travelled to Washington to testify in a Senate hearing on 
immigration reform and spoke at length about the “new life and energy” injected into the 
community by their arrival.38 Gilbert spoke about the “positive impact” the city’s immigrant 
population was having on the “social fabric of [the] community and [the] local economy.”39  
Even though Gilbert’s time in office represented strong and vocal governmental support 
for the immigrant population in Lewiston, the election of 2011 was a turning point in the 
changing nature of the city’s municipal politicians’ immigration rhetoric and policy. This 
election represented another important moment in the history of Lewiston: the first election since 
the start of Paul LePage’s campaign and ultimate governorship. As suggested by the previous 
sections of this chapter, LePage’s campaign and early time in office created a political 
environment in which economic anxiety, racial differences, and the normalization of right-wing 
rhetoric became more pronounced.  
 
2.B Election of Robert Macdonald 
While Gilbert did not run in the 2011 election against Macdonald, his legacy and his 
strong commitment to Lewiston’s immigrant population was given a resounding defeat with the 
election of Macdonald in 2012. As said by Abigail Fisher Williamson in her writing on 
immigration and municipal government response in Lewiston, there “could hardly be a greater 
contrast than that between Mayor Larry Gilbert...and Mayor Robert Macdonald.40 Macdonald’s 
election represented a turning point in the mayor’s office immigration rhetoric in Lewiston.  
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This section posits that Macdonald was able to maintain his electability due to the rise of 
Paul LePage in the state of Maine and the increased normalization of right-wing rhetorical 
devices. As previous sections have shown, LePage created an environment within the state where 
perceived racial threat and economic anxiety were exacerbated. Throughout his campaign and 
his early years in office, LePage highlighted the threats posed by the new immigrant 
communities and continually stressed the need to bring back Maine’s traditional industries – a 
message that echoed strongly between the shuttered Lewiston mills. 
Chapters Three and Four have suggested that Lewiston is more susceptible to politicians’ 
use of economic, modernization, and cultural grievances due to its development history. This 
section contends that Macdonald, and his successor Shane Bouchard, were able to ride the wave 
created by LePage toward electoral success in Lewiston. By capitalizing on the heightened 
economic anxiety within the city, Macdonald was able to successfully defeat Democratic, 
markedly pro-immigrant challengers three times.  
The 2011-2012 mayoral race in Lewiston was incredibly close with the race going to a 
runoff in December. However, Macdonald eventually won his first term primarily due to the fact 
that his Democratic challenger, Mark Paradis, died from cancer only days before the election. He 
ran on a platform that focused on the detrimental effects of the recent immigration to the city. In 
an interview with the Twin City Times, Macdonald noted that the recent “influx [was] not only 
diminishing a quality education for Lewiston’s property taxpayers’ children, but [caused] our 
schools to be labelled as failing.”41 He also noted that it was potentially time to “replace 
                                               




congeniality with aggressiveness” in the mayoral office and to fight for the people of Lewiston 
“with a job or a sponsor,” not those who entered the city “with [their] hand[s] out.”42 
By highlighting how the new arrivals to the community were drawing on city resources 
and professing to be a bellicose representative of a city being taken advantage of by the newly 
arrived immigrant population, Macdonald was able to gain support for his campaign. These 
comments were particularly salient in the era of Maine politics post the election of LePage to the 
governorship. 
As suggested by the work of Passel and Fix and Hainmueller and Hiscox if a candidate 
focuses on how an immigrant community is perceived or framed to be unduly drawing upon 
public resources – resources that some think should only be directed toward native residents – 
support for anti-immigrant platforms may follow. Macdonald, by making the threat to the 
financial health of the city posed by immigrants a central part of his campaign, may have been 
able to gain more support from a native population already facing a less than ideal economic 
situation themselves.  
Macdonald’s pronunciation importantly came after LePage’s 2011 inaugural address in 
which he highlighted the state’s economic shortcomings and thrust the debate on how to solve 
the crisis into the forefront of Maine’s political sphere. By focusing on economic grievances and 
attacking a majority racially different immigrant population, Macdonald may also have driven 
more supporters to his campaign. The efficacy of such a tactic is supported by the scholarship of 
Burns and Gimpel who contend that if the arrival of a racialized other coincides with an 
economic downtown in an area, support for right wing candidates who espouse anti-immigrant 




policy and rhetoric may increase significantly. Macdonald utilized this situation to his own 
electoral advantage.43 
Macdonald did not halt his anti-immigrant comments after his original pronunciations 
during his campaign; rather, in 2012, he was quoted in a BBC interview saying: “You 
(immigrants) that come here, you come and you accept our culture and you leave your culture at 
the door.”44 Macdonald was berated for his comments by many in the local media and never 
issued a full apology for his words.45 The mayor went on to accuse the Somali community in 
Lewiston of “shirking [their] duties” by not returning to their home country to fight in the brutal 
civil war. These comments furthered the creation of a stark divide between the Somali 
population and the native residents and suggested that the Somalis were somehow cowards and 
less virtuous than the native population in Lewiston by fleeing a brutal and bloody conflict. By 
calling on the newly arrived residents of Lewiston to assimilate, Macdonald eluded to the notion 
that their own culture was something potentially dangerous, a threat that needed to be addressed.  
Rather than being rebuked by the voting public for attacking a community that had begun 
to bring important economic development into the city, Macdonald was elected for his second 
two-year term in office in 2013. Even though many had protested against his 2012 comments, 
Macdonald was able to maintain power in the city. In the 2013 election, Macdonald ran against 
former-mayor Gilbert. In this race he “decisively beat” Gilbert in an election many viewed as a 
“public referendum on Gilbert’s approach to welcoming immigrants.”46 This election suggested 
that Macdonald’s views on immigration were still salient, potent, and shared by much of the 
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populace in Lewiston. The election results support the claim of previous chapters: that 
Lewiston’s higher levels of economic anxiety and perceived racial threat may make politicians 
who espouse anti-immigrant policy and rhetoric more successful. 
Leading up to the election in 2015, Macdonald stated that he would support a bill in 
Maine’s State House that asked that “a Web site be created containing names, addresses, length 
of time on assistance and the benefits being collected by every individual on the dole.”47 
Macdonald himself was, due to his position as mayor of Lewiston and not as a state legislator, 
not able to support the bill in the next legislative session, preferring instead to wait for a sponsor. 
Macdonald justified his suggestion by saying that “the public has a right to know how its money 
is being spent.”48 Once again, Macdonald highlighted the strains present on the city’s welfare 
system. While not specifically naming the immigrant population as the target of the potential bill, 
he brought to light the city’s less than perfect economic vitality and directed the public’s 
attention to people he believed were scapegoating the city.  
As suggested by the work of Passel and Fix and Hainmueller and Hiscox, if a populace 
believes that an “overcrowding of public services” may occur, support for anti-immigrant 
positions may increase.49 Macdonald’s continual focus on the city’s welfare system moved the 
issue to the forefront of the political debate in Lewiston and his actions may have contributed to 
the continued support for his anti-immigrant rhetoric in city elections. 
Macdonald’s outburst was rewarded with a third and final election to the mayor’s office 
in 2015. In this election, Macdonald narrowly beat progressive activist and Bates College 
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graduate, Ben Chin. Macdonald ran on what some would call a “stealth campaign” platform with 
“no events...no campaign headquarters and no website.”50 Instead of losing to Chin, and his 
massive fundraising efforts of $87,800, Macdonald won the election to his third straight term in 
office. His platform mainly consisted of him harkening back to his previous actions, comments, 
and proposals by saying that “people know what I’ve done.”51 By saying this, Macdonald 
focused the voting population on his previous attacks on Somali culture and Lewiston’s welfare 
system. Macdonald rode to victory with 53% of the vote compared to Chin’s 47%, and this 
election again established that anti-immigrant rhetoric was more salient in Lewiston than a pro-
immigrant progressive agenda among the voting public.52 
While some claim Macdonald was “not as consistently hostile to the Somali immigrant 
population as his periodic outbursts suggest,” his time in office was marked with attacks on their 
culture and their use of the state and city’s welfare system.53 He has supported the immigrant 
community in certain ways, notably praising the recent state championship winning soccer team 
and signing onto Lewiston’s Welcoming Proclamation put forth by Gilbert.54 However, even 
though Gilbert’s term was a marked shift from the rhetoric surrounding Raymond’s letter to the 
Somali community, Macdonald’s repeated electoral success suggest the greater support for a 
candidate espousing anti-immigrant rhetoric and policy in Lewiston in the era during and post-
LePage’s time in office. 
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2.C Election and Resignation of Shane Bouchard 
 In 2017, Lewiston was again confronted with the choice between the progressive 
Democrat Ben Chin and Shane Bouchard, a Republican candidate endorsed by then-Governor 
Paul LePage and the outgoing Mayor Robert Macdonald.55 While Chin won the first election in 
November, he was unable to gain the necessary 50% plus one needed to win outright. The 
election went to a December runoff, where Bouchard won by 145 votes. However, the race was 
marred by a leak of campaign emails that “may have played a small role in swinging some 
votes.”56 These emails noted that Chin had said that he had “encountered racism on the 
campaign.”57 This news spread like rapid-fire among conservative news sources and may have 
contributed to Chin's ultimate defeat with some suggesting that Chin was only willing to “talk to 
people who [agreed] with him” and not the wider populace.58 As suggested by the work of 
Greven, the very reporting of such an issue on a larger scale by reputable news sources serves to 
only further the efficacy of right-wing actors’ ability to gain support and, in this case, paint a 
negative image of the Democratic candidate.59 
 Bouchard campaigned on a platform advocating against the increase of city property 
taxes and “saying no to hosting new refugees at this time.”60 In his candidate profile in the 
Lewiston Sun Journal, Bouchard said that he would target the “economically draining social 
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services dependent groups” and that he would attempt to decrease the offering of translation 
services by the city government.61 By using such a platform, Bouchard showed himself to be of a 
similar mold to Macdonald. Instead of using the welcome dialogue of former-Mayor Gilbert or 
of the candidate Chin, Bouchard preferred to continue the status-quo set in place by Macdonald 
at the local-level and LePage at the state-level.  
Importantly, the election of Bouchard came after some of LePage’s most explicitly 
racially charged comments. His words regarding out of state drug dealers and the dangerous 
diseases supposedly being brought in by the new waves of refugees and asylum seekers worked 
to exacerbate the sense of a racial threat within Maine and to create a stark divide between white 
Mainers and the recently arrived populations. By campaigning on a platform of working to limit 
the number of refugees entering the city, Bouchard’s subsequent election again suggested the 
greater potency of such anti-immigrant standpoints in Lewiston.  
 Bouchard’s next year in office was not marred by any of the same anti-immigrant 
comments as was common for his predecessor. However, in March of 2019, Bouchard was 
rocked by a scandal. A woman, formerly a volunteer on Chin’s 2017 campaign, admitted to 
leaking internal emails from the Democratic campaign to Bouchard during the race. Furthermore, 
she “released more than 150 texts between her and Bouchard, including one in which he told a 
racist joke and one in which he seemed to compare a meeting with his fellow Republicans to a 
Ku Klux Klan gathering.”62 Following their release, Bouchard resigned from his office on March 
8, 2019. 
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 These texts revealed the private discussions between Bouchard and the woman in 
question. They suggested a man who is deeply sexist, privately racist, and capable of making 
comments just as incendiary as either LePage or Macdonald. While these comments and texts 
were not part of the information available to the electorate during the 2017 mayoral election, 
their existence and Bouchard’s campaign platform supports the case that Lewiston is still a 
community where anti-immigrant rhetoric is more supported. They also suggest a city that still 
has a long way to go in terms of stamping out racism in local government. One text sent by 
Bouchard compared a local meeting of Androscoggin Country Republicans to a “clan meeting,” 
(a reference to the white supremacist Ku Klux Klan) again suggesting a deeply racist platform 
endemic at the highest levels of local government.63 
Bouchard’s resignation has plunged Lewiston into an atmosphere of uncertainty, and only 
an upcoming mayoral election can tell what this event’s repercussions may be. Will the city 
continue to be a place where the electorate votes anti-immigrant candidates into office, or will a 
candidate in the mold of Chin or Gilbert gain access to the city’s highest office? 
 
3. Rhetoric and Policy in Portland  
 As suggested in Chapters Three and Four, Portland has developed into a city with (1) 
lower levels of economic anxiety, (2) a greater population of creative class individuals, and (3) 
more diverse offerings of institutions promoting cultural capital and varied viewpoints. The 
secondary literature contends that a city with these factors may be more likely to vote into office 
and support politicians that espouse welcoming, pro-immigrant rhetoric and policy. This section 
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highlights such a divergence between the aforementioned rhetoric in Lewiston and that in 
Portland.  
Portland has not always seen full support for pro-immigrant platforms in its municipal 
government. In 2001, in the wake of 9/11, John Griffin won an at-large seat on Portland’s City 
Council.64 During the race, Griffin was condemned for comments that other council candidates 
found “insulting” and “inappropriate.”65 He told a reporter that the “People in Portland [were] 
fed up with the do-gooders and the immigrants, especially the Hispanics and blacks.”66 While 
Griffin’s comments may have represented the views of some in the city, the reactions to his 
comments suggest that others occupying elected office in Portland did not share his views. James 
F. Cloutier, a member of the City Council at the time, argued that Griffin’s words were “not even 
remotely true” and that they were “insulting” and “inappropriate.”67  
The election of Griffin to City Council and his campaign discourse is an anomaly in the 
history of rhetoric from elected officials in Portland. In 2003, the City Council’s public safety 
committee voted to recommend an ordinance that would prohibit “police and other city workers 
from randomly asking people about their immigration status.”68 The proposal was a powerful 
message supporting the rights of the city’s immigrant community, particularly in the post-9/11 
Patriot Act era, in a city with a major port and an airport where “two of the Sept. 11 terrorists 
started their fateful journey.”69 Previously to this vote, the City Council had gone even further to 
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condemn the Patriot Act, and, in a nonbinding resolution, voted to criticize the act for “infringing 
on civil liberties” and it officially denounced the “recent immigration sweeps” being carried out 
across the country.70  
In 2004, Portland’s Mayor Nathan Smith vocally condemned arrests carried out by 
federal immigration officials in the city. Speaking after the arrest of “at least 10 people in the 
Portland area on the grounds of being in the country illegally,” Smith said that the city “was 
more committed in ever to making its ethnic communities feel safe in Maine” despite recent 
actions by the federal governments.71 All these actions in the early 2000s solidified the City 
Council and Mayor’s position on immigration and showed how the city’s elected municipal 
officials were committed to making sure the city remained steadfast in its support of civil rights 
for all residents.  
 
3.A Portland Post-LePage 
 While Lewiston elected Macdonald to his second two year term even after his vehement 
anti-immigrant tirades in 2013, in December of the same year, Portland’s city officials vocally 
condemned Governor LePage’s proposal to “prevent asylum seekers and some other immigrants 
from receiving General Assistance” support.72 Instead of taking Macdonald’s position and 
attacking the state’s welfare system, members of Portland’s City Council called the proposal 
“discriminatory” and the mayor at the time, Michael Brennan, affirmed the city would still 
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provide aid to those in need regardless of the governor’s actions.73 The comments from Brennan 
and members of the City Council again showed the pro-immigrant stance taken by Portland’s 
elected officials.  
Soon after Lewiston elected Robert Macdonald to his third and final term in office, the 
Portland electorate in 2016 voted in Pious Ali, an African-born Muslim, as one of the city’s two 
councilors at-large.74 Ali’s ascension to Portland’s governing body was a resounding message of 
defeat to the anti-immigrant rhetoric occurring at the state and national level. While Lewiston 
had just voted into office a mayor known for attacking the city’s large, racially diverse, 
immigrant population, the decision by the voters in Portland supports the findings in previous 
chapters that the city is more supportive of pro-immigrant rhetoric and policy. 
 Even though Ali’s race was one between two progressive Democrats, his election 
represented an important symbolic message to the country: that Portland would put its full 
confidence behind a man not born in the United States and of a different race than the majority of 
the population to lead their city. While Lewiston has elected a Somali woman to the city’s school 
board, the city has not voted a recent immigrant into the mayor’s office or a city council seat. 
The decision by Portland to vote Ali into office suggests a greater commitment and willingness 
to allow a recent immigrant into municipal government.75 
 Portland has also repeatedly fought back against the policies and comments of Paul 
LePage. Instead of using the new political atmosphere created by LePage to gain electoral 
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success, municipal politicians have repeatedly attacked his comments and worked against his 
policies. In 2017, Portland Mayor Ethan Strimling accused LePage of “not backing up his claim 
that the city [was] misusing state funds by providing welfare to illegal immigrants.”76 Strimling 
claimed that the governor did not give a “shred of evidence” to support his claims.  
This clash had started early in 2014, when the LePage administration “attempted to 
prevent asylum seekers from receiving state benefits until the federal government allows them to 
work.”77 While a judge ruled in this debate that LePage was able to withhold funds, the reactions 
from members of Portland’s City Council were not in support; rather, they were vehemently 
opposed and argued that it would not “help Portland....or the state of Maine.”78 
 Both of these rebuttals of LePage’s policies suggest a reaction from municipal politicians 
in Portland that has been far different from that in Lewiston. Instead of taking a stance akin to 
Macdonald in Lewiston and similarly attacking the welfare system, actors in Portland stood up 
and professed their commitment to pro-immigrant platforms and support of programs to help the 
city’s newcomers. Furthermore, in August of 2018, Strimling and Ali proposed a measure that 
would allow “noncitizens, such as refugees and asylum seekers, the right to vote in municipal 
elections.”79 This act of giving non-citizens political agency in Portland again suggests municipal 
politicians’ commitment to a pro-immigrant, welcoming platform. While not yet enshrined in 
city or state law, this proposal supports the claim that Portland’s municipal politicians are more 
likely to put forth pro-immigrant rhetoric. 
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 However, Portland is currently experiencing its own minor crisis with regard to its 
immigrant population. As growing numbers of specifically refugees and asylum seekers are 
arriving in Portland, the city has begun to reach a breaking point as to its ability to effectively 
provide for these newcomers. These recent arrivals have “overwhelmed local services, including 
the city’s emergency shelter for homeless families.”80 Its history of being a “compassionate and 
welcoming community for immigrants,” as suggested by the local politicians’ rhetoric and 
policy, has made the city into a major destination. Still Strimling and others in City Hall have 
remained committed to supporting this population and have said that the “issue isn’t that too 
many people are coming [to Portland] – it’s that [the city doesn’t] have enough housing to put 
them.”81 This comment made by Strimling further reinforces the unwavering pro-immigrant 
rhetoric and policy coming from the city’s municipal offices and suggests that Portland will 
continue to do its best to welcome newcomers. 
 The rhetoric and policy of Portland’s municipal election officials was not swayed by the 
normalization of right-wing rhetoric caused by Paul LePage. The previous section has shown that 
LePage’s comments, and the messages put forth by both Macdonald and Bouchard found 
increased receptivity in Lewiston, a city with higher levels of economic anxiety and perceived  
racial threat. This section on Portland has highlighted how the city’s politicians have remained 
committed to pro-immigrant rhetoric and policy even with the normalization of right-wing 
rhetoric at the state and national-level. These findings support the claim that, due to its economic 
development path, Portland has become a city in which its elected politicians are more likely to 
espouse pro-immigrant rhetoric and policy. 
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 This chapter has shown how Portland and Lewiston have developed into cities with very 
different levels of support for politicians espousing pro-immigrant level in their respective 
municipal governments. Lewiston’s higher level of anxiety, smaller population of creative class 
individuals, and lack of culturally-focused institutions have led to the city being more likely to 
vote into office, especially at the mayoral level, candidates who espouse markedly anti-
immigrant platforms.  
 While the city charter of both cities does give the city councils more power in day-to-day 
decision making, this chapter heavily focuses on mayoral rhetoric and policy, particularly in the 
Lewiston context, due to the high public visibility of said office. The secondary scholarship 
contends that due to the nature of the office, mayors are “actively involved in building political 
support for their views and participate more extensively in local partisan activity.”82 They are 
also normally involved in many ceremonial duties which further increases their “public 
visibility.”83 Regardless of their actual power, this chapter has focused primarily on mayoral 
rhetoric as it may be the most accurate method of gauging the political leanings of a locale. 
 This chapter has also shown how the rhetoric of Paul LePage has created a political 
environment within the Maine where right-wing rhetoric, that would have formerly been 
considered taboo and uncouth, has become an accepted part of political discourse. While 
Portland has renounced and turned its back on LePage’s efforts to create divisions in the state, 
Lewiston has, in the time since LePage’s election to the governorship in 2010, only elected 
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mayors who have made multiple anti-immigrant or racist comments. In detailing these events, 
this chapter has shown that Lewiston is a city with a greater receptivity to such platforms.  
 However, this chapter also highlights important events that may change the immigrant-
related dialogue in both cities. Lewiston’s mayoral resignation crisis in 2019 and the following 
election may present itself as an opportunity for the city to make a different decision with regard 
to the occupant of its highest office. Portland, as well, has been confronted with an overcrowding 
of its shelters and a strain on its resources. It remains to be seen if its politicians will continue to 







 This thesis has examined how and why the cities of Portland and Lewiston, Maine have 
moved in distinct directions with regard to their municipal politicians’ stance on immigration. By 
examining the economic development pathways of both cities, this thesis has utilized testable 
explanations from the secondary literature to contend that voters in Lewiston are more receptive 
to anti-immigrant rhetoric due to (1) the normalization of right-wing rhetoric accomplished by 
Paul LePage, (2) Lewiston’s higher levels of perceived economic anxiety, and (3) lower levels of 
racial tolerance, which research suggests is associated with a dearth of creative class individuals 
and institutions. By using a historical institutionalist framework emphasizing critical junctures, 
path dependency, and political entrepreneurship to account for the distinct economic 
development undertaken in Lewiston and Portland since the mid-twentieth century, this thesis 
has shown how the two cities have diverged into areas with different levels of receptivity to anti-
immigrant rhetoric. In this concluding chapter, I summarize the main findings of my research, 
highlight areas needing further research, and offer policy suggestions. 
 
Main Findings 
Key to this thesis is the theoretical framework of critical junctures and path dependency. I 
argue in Chapter Three that the distinct implementation of the Model Cities Programs in 
Lewiston and Portland represented a critical juncture that set the cities to embark on markedly 
different economic development pathways. Paul Pierson makes the case that certain events can 
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lead to “divergent outcomes” even when cases in questions have “initially similar conditions.1 
This explanation functions well within this context as Lewiston and Portland both had similar 
histories of immigration, early anti-immigrant sentiment, and loss of their major industries. I 
argue that the Model Cities period from 1969-1974 set the cities on very different tracks for their 
long-term economic development.  
Chapter Three highlighted this critical juncture and suggested that the difference in the 
organizational structures of city governance, along with different levels of support from city 
leaders at the time, created an environment in Portland where economic revitalization moved in 
smoother a manner. I maintain that this program’s differing implementation created the two 
distinct pathways followed by the cities in question and made changes to these paths, difficult or 
impossible to take. 
Of utmost importance to this thesis is the claim that this critical juncture had (1) large and 
lasting effects on the political development of the two cities examined, (2) that these distinct 
pathways have contributed to higher levels of economic anxiety and instability in Lewiston, and 
(3) that such economic circumstances may be an inspiration of elected actors’ anti-immigrant 
positions. In this way, testable explanations derived from the secondary scholarship have been 
applied to the cases in questions and have been shown to be accurate explanations for how and 
why anti-immigrant rhetoric may gain traction in a specific area.  
By highlighting the economic divergence between the two cities, I argue that, in line with the 
explanation suggested by Jack Citrin, Donald Green, Christopher Muste, and Cara Wong, when 
times are bad or when there is “less to go around” people are more likely to blame new 
immigrant groups for their problems and may be more likely to support anti-immigrant rhetoric 
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and policy from local politicians.2 Citrin et al. contend that “beliefs about the economic 
consequences of immigration have political ramifications when they serve as legitimating 
arguments for restrictionist policies” which supports Chapter Five’s discussion of political 
rhetoric in Maine.3 
Furthermore, the research of Jens Hainmueller and Michael J. Hiscox posits that the 
notion that immigrants are perceived to be posing a strain on the public services offered by a city 
will increase receptivity to anti-immigrant rhetoric. As previously shown by Chapter Three, the 
data and research suggest that indicators of economic anxiety are higher in Lewiston than in 
Portland, thus explaining the city’s election of mayors espousing anti-immigrant rhetoric.  
Overall, my research has suggested that in the local context, differing levels of economic 
anxiety prove to be a potent motivator causing increased receptivity to anti-immigrant rhetoric 
from a city’s elected officials. This is in line with the existing literature; however, scholars of 
immigration do contend that perceived cultural or racial threats do remain a more potent 
motivator for support of anti-immigrant rhetoric.4 This thesis tackles that question as well within 
the context of the cities in question and suggests that Portland has lower levels of perceived 
racial threat due to its greater creative class population and its diverse range of cultural 
institutions. 
While Lewiston has experienced higher levels of economic anxiety, it has also seen the 
arrival of a racially different immigrant group mainly from the African continent. Additionally, 
the literature contends that an arrival of a racialized other coupled with an economic downtown 
                                               
2 Jack Citrin, Donald P. Green, Christopher Muste, and Cara Wong, “Public Opinion Toward Immigration 
Reform: The Role of Economic Motivations,” The Journal of Politics 59, no. 3 (1997): 876-877. 
3 Ibid., 877. 
4 Katerina Manevska and Peter Achterberg, “Immigration and Perceived Ethnic Threat: Cultural Capital and 
Economic Explanations,” European Sociological Review 29, no. 3 (2013): 445. 
  
173 
may create greater support for anti-immigrant positions.5 Portland’s ability to mitigate perceived 
racial threats posed by such new arrivals represents another important finding from this thesis, 
and Chapter Four has supported this claim. 
 Using Richard Florida’s scholarship on the creative class of individuals and the claim of 
Elaine Sharp and Mark Joslyn that a city with a greater population of such persons may 
experience mitigated levels of racial threat, I contend that the economic development pathway 
followed by the city, beginning during the Model Cities period and reinforced by the political 
entrepreneurship of Elizabeth Noyce, allowed Portland to become an area with lower levels of 
perceived racial threat. I argue that this is the case because of Portland’s ability to attract more 
creative class individuals to the city and the city’s diverse selection of so-called “third places” 
offering easily accessible cultural capital. As shown in Chapter Four, Portland’s development, 
and the integral efforts of Noyce during the 1990s, positioned the city to becoming a more pro-
immigrant area as immigration increased near the turn-of-the-century.  
The revitalization started during the Model Cities-era and furthered by the establishment 
of a diverse selection of institutions offering creative capital to Portland essentially fostered an 
environment more welcoming of diversity. Noyce’s donations to the Portland Museum of Art, 
the Maine College of Art, and the Maine Historical Society created the foundation for Portland’s 
Arts District and firmly established the city’s accessible attainment of cultural capital.  
I have shown that Noyce positioned herself as a political entrepreneur affecting major 
change in Portland. As suggested by the scholarship of Adam Sheingate, Noyce is an individual 
whose actions had “transformative effects on politics, policies, and institutions.”6 Her singular 
                                               
5 Peter Burns and James G. Gimpel, “Economic Insecurity, Prejudicial Stereotypes, and Public Opinion on 
Immigration Policy,” Political Science Quarterly 115, no. 3 (2000): 223. 
6 Adam D. Sheingate, “Political Entrepreneurship, Institutional Change, and American Political Development,” 
Studies in American Political Development 17, no. 2 (2003): 185. 
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injection of funding into Portland reinforced the city’s economic development pathway and 
created an urban environment more attractive to the creative class and with greater access to 
cultural capital. As suggested by the secondary scholarship, these results, in turn, had large 
effects on the increased receptivity to pro-immigrant political rhetoric in Portland. 
Importantly, Chapter Four has shown that little to no such cultural support or investment 
occurred in Lewiston during a similar timeframe. Furthermore, the city’s at times contentious 
relationship with Bates College, an influential cultural institution, suggests that the building of 
intercultural bridges and the accessibility of diverse opinions may be more difficult to attain in 
Lewiston.  
Finally, this thesis has discussed the power of the normalization of right-wing rhetoric at 
the state level and its repercussions on the levels of support for municipal politicians espousing 
anti-immigrant platforms. Building on Matt Golder’s scholarship and examining how right-wing 
actors use modernization, cultural, and economic grievances to garner support, Chapter Five has 
highlighted how LePage used these grievances for his own purposes and how his words have 
thrust racial and economic threats into the state-wide dialogue. I contend that this norm-breaking 
behavior remains a dangerous tool in politics throughout the state and the country as a whole. By 
capitalizing on people’s grievances and through breaking norms, my research has shown how, in 
cities with elevated economic anxiety and lower levels of cultural capital, elected officials with 
explicitly anti-immigrant rhetoric can maintain their political viability.  
While Lewiston did elect mayors with both pro-immigrant and anti-immigrant positions 
before the election of Paul LePage, Chapter Five has shown that after his campaign and time in 
office, the city’s receptivity to anti-immigrant rhetoric greatly increased. The election of Robert 
Macdonald in 2011, his re-elections in 2013 and 2015, and the eventual election of Shane 
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Bouchard in 2017, support the claim that Lewiston is a city more likely to support anti-
immigrant elected officials. By examining their platforms and the racial and economic threats 
made more visible through LePage’s time in office, Chapter Five has highlighted how anti-
immigrant rhetoric has remained more salient in Lewiston than in Portland since 2010.    
Importantly, Lewiston’s elected officials have accomplished this task by emphasizing the 
supposed strains posed by newcomers on the city’s public services and how these new 
populations are somehow culturally incompatible with the city’s values. By using testable 
explanations highlighted in Chapter One, Chapter Five has shown how receptivity to anti-
immigrant rhetoric remains higher in Lewiston.  
 
Potential Further Research 
While this thesis paints a picture of the economic development pathways of Lewiston and 
Portland and their repercussions on receptivity to anti-immigrant rhetoric from municipal elected 
officials, its arguments and evidence remain limited by the scope and timeframe imposed on this 
project. More work needs to be done to examine Lewiston’s political receptivity to anti-
immigrant rhetoric and to assess whether that pattern can shift. Consequently, in this section, I 
offer areas that require further research. 
Throughout the process of researching, information on Lewiston’s attempts at economic 
revitalization and the carrying out of its Model Cities Program remained difficult to unearth. I 
was repeatedly unable to find plans and meeting details needed to create a clearer picture of the 
influences present at the city at the time. To further understand the dynamics at hand in the city 
during the program’s implementation from 1969-1974 and during the years following, I would 
suggest a closer examination of the City of Lewiston’s archives. However, as I learned during 
my discussion with Lincoln Jeffers, head of the city’s Economic Development Office, much of 
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this potential information remains buried in City Hall archives which remain relatively 
disorganized. Jeffers also suggested that due to recent turnover in certain office positions, 
locating specific papers may prove to be a large challenge. Regardless, in continuing this 
project’s research, I would suggest a closer examination of these documents. This would include 
a closer look at the Model Cities Program proposals submitted by both cities and a detailed 
historical analysis of the politicians in power during this timeframe.   
This research process has also highlighted further questions requiring more investigation. 
Specifically, how will Maine’s designation as a state where the death rate has overtaken the birth 
rate influence how its citizens, and importantly business owners, view these immigrant 
communities?7As noted by Maine’s state economist, “these demographics are putting the state in 
a precarious position going forward.”8 With Maine being confronted with problems of having 
barely enough working-age people to fill such necessary positions as firefighters, Postal Service 
workers, and police officers, it remains to be seen whether municipal officials in cities, such as 
Lewiston, will open their arms and promote the economic benefits of immigration. Further 
research is needed in defining and highlighting when an economic imperative may override 
factors causing support for anti-immigrant rhetoric. A recent report from the Maine Department 
of Labor notes that the “work force is shrinking just as demand for certain jobs, particularly in 
health care, is increasing and leading to shortages that will ripple across the state.”9 This suggests 
that the entire state may be confronted with difficult decisions in the near future: will elected 
                                               
7 Sabrina Tavernise, “Fewer Births, More Deaths, Result in Lowest U.S. Growth Rate in Generations,” New 
York Times, December 19, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/19/us/census-population-growth.html.  
8 Jess Bidgood and Katherine Q. Seelye, “Governor’s Views Don’t Help as Maine’s Population Dwindles,” 





officials forego potential platforms for the good of their city’s economic vitality, or will they 
detrimentally affect Maine’s economy by utilizing anti-immigrant rhetoric and policy? 
 
Policy Suggestions 
As shown in Chapter Five, both Lewiston and Portland have the potential to redefine the 
political discourse on immigration in both cities. Lewiston, after the resignation of Shane 
Bouchard, will be faced with an upcoming election and, potentially, the chance to redefine the 
city’s receptivity to anti-immigrant rhetoric. Portland, after having become known nation-wide 
as a welcoming home for immigrants, is faced with the problem of overcrowding. Will elected 
officials continue to remain open and welcoming in their rhetoric and policy, or will the 
crowding of public serves create an increased chance for anti-immigrant platforms to arise? 
In order to continue to create cross-cultural bridges and highlight the benefits brought by 
immigration, I suggest that politicians, in Lewiston specifically, should “support immigrant 
organizations rather than relying on individual intermediaries.”10 Abigail Fisher Williams 
contends that by directly supporting “meaningful interethnic contact,” municipal politicians can 
more effectively promote “societal acceptance.”11  
To accomplish this task in Lewiston, future mayors who recognize the benefits of 
immigration should, by employing their high visibility, plan events and opportunities for 
intermingling of native populations and newcomers. In doing so, they may be able to speed up 
the process of immigrant integration. Lewiston is not lacking in potential organizations with 
whom future mayors could partner. With the presence of the Immigrant Legal Advocacy Project, 
                                               
10  Abigail Fisher Williamson, Welcoming New Americans? Local Governments and Immigrant Incorporation, 




Maine Immigrant and Refugee Services, and the Immigrant Resource Center of Maine all located 
within the city, through partnerships and vocal support, future mayors could use their high 
visibility to make strong statements of support.  
With regard to Lewiston’s economic development and its potential to attract creative 
class individuals, I suggest a mass re-design of the still-empty mill structures. By offering low 
rent artists space, housing, or by creating a space highlighting the city’s rich, beneficial 
immigrant history, Lewiston may be able to increase cultural capital, further economic 
development, and make an environment that is more attractive to young graduates of Bates and 
other area colleges. Indeed, as the costs of housing increase in Portland, Lewiston may be able to 
capitalize on a situation where Portland is becoming increasingly inaccessible to the core 
populations that make up Florida’s creative class. 
I do recognize the financial constraints and wishful thinking apparent in these proposals. I 
do not want Lewiston to lose touch with its heritage, history, and unique culture; rather, I believe 
that through effective political support and municipal planning, the city can be become a model 
for the integration of a newly arrived immigrant group and a beacon for how immigration has 
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